

**DECENTRALISATION AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION FOR
DEVELOPMENT IN MUCHINGA AND NORTHERN PROVINCES OF ZAMBIA**

**By
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**Thesis submitted to the University of Zambia in fulfilment of the requirement for award
of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Public Administration**

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DECLARATION

I, do hereby declare that this thesis represents my own original work and has not been previously submitted for a degree, or any other qualification at this or any other university.

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This thesis has been approved as fulfilment of the requirement for award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Public Administration by the University of Zambia.

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DEDICATION

Appreciation to my parents Mr Winfred Silomba and Mrs Doras Nang'andu Silomba who have encouraged me through this gruelling journey.

I would like to honour and dedicate this thesis to my Wife and Children for their patience, sacrifice and support throughout the strenuous period. I am glad, I can now say that if I live, it's now over. I have no intention of taking you through this ordeal again although you have developed the resilience to handle such an eventuality if by chance it occurred in future.

In namwanga and especially pacilambya, I say, Nasalifya sana, u Leza abe nimwe.

ABSTRACT

I had to change the direction of my study from focusing exclusively on decentralisation and forms of decentralisation to decentralised community participation in Muchinga and Northern provinces of Zambia. The change of study focus was because several scholars have written on decentralisation and forms of decentralisation without curiously undertaking a study on decentralised community participation in specific regions.

This study relied on the ladder of citizen participation theory in the analysis of findings employing mostly qualitative methodology by engaging participants to review their real-life experiences and feelings. In that way, it enabled community members and key informants to tell their own stories about community participation for development thereby facilitating the understanding and appreciating the study objectives on the nature and extent of community participation within the context of decentralisation in Zambia since independence.

It has been discovered that in 1964 just after Zambia's independence, government's provision of public services to citizens was very impressive because the economy at that time was very good. However, after 1970s, considerable decline in service delivery by the central government became prominent giving rise to declines in the living standards of most of the people and as such, citizens exerted pressure on the state with demands for increased provision of social services.

To address the challenges being faced by communities in both urban and rural areas regarding shortfalls in infrastructure, economic and social service provision, government devised institutionalised community participatory structural mechanisms at local service delivery levels.

The study results however, have shown that, despite the creation of institutionalised participatory structures in communities since independence, community members have not actively participated in decentralised community development activities because the linkages and mechanisms to participate are fragmented and not very clear to the users and public at large. The unclear structural provision and guidelines on local participatory framework has resulted into citizens and authorities failing to gain the legitimacy which should be enjoyed at community level. The local governance structures lack integrated mechanisms coupled with a strong overarching legacy of centralisation affecting institutions and a conservative mind-sets at all levels which are not useful platforms for community members to champion local development agenda. Citizens have a poor image of poor service delivery by local authorities rendering decentralisation reform and outcomes not immediately visible to most actors.

Although community members have traditionally provided some support to community programmes, there is little control and influence over local planning for enhanced community participation. And as such, the decentralised community participatory process does not characterise effective community engagement because of poor collaboration and coordination among stakeholders. Among others, the evolution of a participatory process is blemished by lack of appropriate legal continuity and poorly coordinated community structural participatory mechanisms.

The study results however, have shown that, when political will exist, it is possible to extend local participation beyond its traditional levels. Under present circumstances, where local participation is promoted by central government or local authorities, it is difficult to establish whether this type of participation has effectively met decentralisation objectives and the mechanisms which in principle should be that of promoting community participation.

Community participation results have indicated massive political manipulation hampering effective community participation thereby creating a poorly coordinated community participatory process because the centre occupies the driving force. In this situation, much of decentralised community participatory failure has been due to lack of associating citizens to

decentralisation reforms as well as the failure by central government to quickly devolve both human and fiscal resources to the lower level structures.

There is need to devise a comprehensive approach to compel communities to participate in local development activities and reduce the dependence of community members to government for service provision. It is also imperative to thwart the forces working against meaningful community participation in development efforts. In this context, the political landscape on the matter is necessary as resource providers because the mechanisms of decentralisation have to be implemented by a way of recognising citizens as custodian of local development. Local participation and democracy can be better served if a link exists between community members and central government.

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ACRONYMS

ADCs	Area Development Committees
CBOs	Community Based Organisations
CHB	Central Health Board
DDCC	District Development Coordinating Committee
DHRD	Department of Human Resource Development
DLGA	Department of Local Government Administration
DPIC	Decentralisation Policy Implementation Committee
DIP	Decentralisation Implementation Plan
DS	Decentralisation Secretariat
FGDs	Focus Group Discussions
HOC	House of Chiefs
HRC	Human Rights Commission
LAS	Local Authorities
LOGOSP	Local Government Support Programme
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MLGH	Ministry of Local Government and Housing
NDCC	National Development Coordinating Committee
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
PDCC	Provincial Development Coordinating Committee
PSRP	Public Sector Reform Programme
VPCs	Village Productivity Committee
WDCs	Ward Development Committee
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the study

Governments across the world have in recent years made frantic development efforts by formulating policies and programmes aimed at shifting from the realm of centralised planning tendencies to local level planning initiatives (Helmsing A. H and Egziabher T.G, 2005). This shift started in Europe and North America where planning for, and promotion of Local Economic Development (LED) emerged in the 1970s (Helmsing A. H and Egziabher T.G, 2005). The emergence of LED was in response to among others, the failure of centralised development strategies and spatial inequalities of access to opportunities between the urban centers and the rural areas.

In Zambia, during the period immediately after independence in 1964, government's provision of public services to citizens was very impressive due to the buoyancy of the economy at that time. As time progressed, especially after the 1970s, considerable decline in service delivery by the central government became prominent. This led to declines in living standards of most of the people and as such, citizens exerted pressure on the state with demands for increased provision of social services.

To effectively provide services and accelerate development, the central government recognised the need to address the challenges being faced by communities in both urban and rural areas regarding infrastructure, economic and social service provision using community participatory mode. In that respect, since then, governments have developed a new relationship with citizens in a bid to make community members participate more actively in the decision-making for development process. In that context, Governments have also strived to enable councils and municipalities to become fully committed in promoting community participation in the realisation that, a fully committed and involved citizenry is essential in the implementation of community development programmes. And as such, communities have since then worked toward complementing government effort by getting involved in community development activities.

The improvement in public service delivery through decentralisation has continued to be one of the key agenda objectives of all successive governments. 'Still faced with constraints and

failure of centralised service delivery especially at the local level, decentralisation has been a priority of government policy advocating for a bottom-up planning to address the challenges of local needs and concerns (Manor; 1998).

It is the aim of government to promote citizens' participation in issues that are pertinent to their welfare. Inadequate participation by citizens is a hinderance to the progress of the nation at all fronts such as political, social and economic development. Zambia has been strategically planned to be inclusive in its development trajectory by harnessing people's voices in augmenting the nation's development agenda (7th National Development Plan 2017-2021).

Arising from the above therefore, governments in Zambia have from time to time taken various measures to address the shortcomings of the centralised system of governance. The measures instituted includes the attempt to reduce the central governance command system, the introduction of Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP) as well as the amendments of related legislation to strengthen and empower the local people. However, despite the foregoing measures, little expected positive change has been registered particularly with respect to improvements in social service provisions. In general terms, despite the decentralisation reform being in force to address the problems of under-development by allowing citizens to participate in local development activities, the devolution of significant authority and control over resources to communities have not been fully realised despite the present designed local governance structural mechanisms targeting community participation for development.

Currently, the overall governance system tends to be overly centralised with local governance that is heavily reliant on the centre for policy direction and resources. Consequently, the current local government system undermines meaningful community participation, democratic development and socio-economic development. To crown it all, the nation's commitment for decentralisation has been tempered by political consideration especially that the decentralisation reform has been influenced by a centralising tendency from the colonial administration with a strong desire by the centre to maintain effective control over local-level administration despite passing various pieces of legislation to enhance local participation at community level.

While the earlier focus on decentralisation was on transfer of resources and functions to improve administrative and service delivery outcomes, the recent paradigm shift has been for government to free its arm while maintaining the relationship with its citizens. This shift is occasioned by what Hayden (2007) terms ‘an assumption that development is the product of what people decide to do themselves to improve their livelihoods.’ And with people as the focus, decentralisation efforts emphasise citizen participation in decision making as fundamental in most development programmes that involve people at the grassroots level.

And as a matter of fact, for more than fifty years since independence, the government of the Republic of Zambia has been focusing its attention on the decentralised participatory system of governance and its impact on socio-economic development of the nation. Of interest is that community participation through decentralisation in Zambia can be traced from 1964 when the United Nation Independence Party (UNIP), passed a Legislation known as the Legislation and Development of Villages Act which promoted citizen participation through the establishment of local governance structures. Generally, the objectives for establishing these structural committees were mainly because of government recognition that increased community engagement will create direct development initiatives thereby improving local public service delivery and poverty reduction.

However, despite governments’ recognition of the need to increase community participation, the lack of effective participation at the local level seems to have remained high in contrast with the legal provisions and the objectives of decentralisation reform programme implementation. This is also in contrast with the Decentralisation Implementation Plan (DIP) of 2009 and the National Decentralisation Policy (NDP) of 2013 Objectives and Strategies stressing the need to address the ineffectiveness of participatory activities at the local level. There are several areas where decentralised local participation for community development have not been fully attained nor extended systematically to a wider practice.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Zambia’s population is estimated at 15.9 million of which 57.9 percent is rural based. While the largest percentage of the population lives in rural areas, the country has had huge development deficits. The key sectors that can help facilitate growth and development have lagged in-service provisions. The inadequacies in the provision of social services such as

education, health and eradication of high poverty levels have remained the greatest challenge to national development since independence.

Despite some favourable economic growth recorded in the last decade, rural areas have persistently exhibited high levels of poverty currently at 76.6 percent while that of urban areas at 23.4 percent with the projected national population at 15.9 million (CSO:2016). This means that 8.5 million people are living in poverty with 3.5 million of those living in extreme poverty placing Zambia in the category of the most unequal countries (7th National Development Plan 2017-2021).

According to the Demographic and Health Surveys, the mortality rates in Zambia are still high coupled with poor health and sanitation, poor nutrition and inadequate provision of education and health services. Therefore, government desire to increase community participation is an effort to alleviate various challenges which communities face in the country such as poverty, illiteracy, poor transport system, various disease burdens and social welfare services.

It is widely recognised that centralised governance system disadvantage some parts in the country because decisions and the implementation of programmes are concentrated in cities and towns or at sector headquarters. Arising from the above, Government has in the past come up with reforms and programmes aimed at reducing developmental gaps between the urban and rural areas to increase opportunities for local participation for development. And to attain the participatory objective, legal provisions have been enshrined in the current Zambian Constitution demanding for effective partnership where citizens in collaboration with government institutions provide strong participatory leadership.

The Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 2 of 2016, Article 147 states that; “The management and administration of political, social, legal and economic affairs of the state shall be devolved from the national government to the local government level.” Article XI of the Constitution of Zambia declares the establishment of devolved local government as a means of promoting community participation for the provision of wide range of social and economic services at the local level.

In the same context, Article 148 (1) of the Constitution of Zambia states that; “Local governance shall be undertaken through sub-structures,” such as the Ward Development Committees (WDCs).

Part XI of the Constitution of Zambia provides for the system of local government and stipulates that, there is established a local government system where:

- (a) functions, responsibilities and resources from the National Government and Provincial administration are transferred to the Local Authorities in a co-ordinated manner;
- (b) the people’s participation in democratic governance is promoted;
- (c) co-operative governance with the national Government, Provincial administration and Local authorities is promoted to support and enhance the developmental role of local government;
- (d) the capacity of Local authorities to initiate, plan, manage and execute policies in respect of matters that affect the people within their respective districts is enhanced;
- (e) social, spatial, financial and economic planning, at the district level, is developed, prioritised and promoted;
- (f) a sound financial base is established for each local authority with reliable and predictable sources of revenue;
- (g) the performance of persons employed by the national Government and Provincial administration to provide services in the Sub-structures is overseen by local authorities;
- (h) the provision of Government services is monitored, and projects are implemented in sub-structures;
- (i) accountability of local authorities is ensured; and
- (j) the right of Local authorities to manage their affairs and to form partnerships, networks and associations to assist in the management of their respective districts and further their development.

These provisions have been supported by the revised National Decentralisation Policy of 2013 and the Cabinet Circular No. 10 of 2014 which provide for the implementation of the revised National Decentralisation Policy which provide guidelines in the implementation process.

However, despite the various provisions, some even being enshrined in the basic law of the land on decentralisation for community participation in achieving the much needed social and economic development in the country, a full decentralisation adoption at operational level has not significantly developed and remains weak. There is a gap in understanding why citizen participation has not been fully realised in the implementation of decentralisation programmes for local development.

This situation has left governments in a puzzle because not much has been realised through decentralisation to contribute to community participation and improved social service delivery as expected by both the citizenry and government.

1.3 General Objective

To investigate the nature and extent of community participation on decentralised activities in Muchinga and Northern Provinces of Zambia.

1.3.1 Specific Objectives

- (i) to examine the extent of community participation in selected state sector institutions;
- (ii) to investigate the nature and extent of community participatory mechanisms in the established local governance structures;
- (iii) to investigate the nature and extent of community participation in the design and implementation of community projects; and
- (iv) to investigate the impediments to full community participation.

1.4 Research Questions

Taking into consideration the statement of the problem and the rationale of the study, the overarching research questions that guided the study are in the context of indicators showing local community members participation in local development in relation to decentralisation

reform that characterise community participation, or a lack of, in Muchinga and Northern provinces of Zambia. The proposed study answered two specific questions in relation to the study objectives as outlined below:

- (i) what mechanisms has the state established to persuade community members to effectively participate in local development programmes and projects?
- (ii) what are some of the major challenges encountered by communities in participatory community development activities?

1.5 Significance of the study.

This thesis is the result of my curiosity as a passionate civil servant interested in local governance and development. While this explains why decentralisation was chosen for the study, Muchinga and Northern provinces of Zambia represent a relevant case for other reasons as well. The two provinces remain poorly developed since 1964 despite the good intentions of raising local participation and development which decentralisation reform is envisaged for.

There is very limited descriptive understanding in most studies on difficulties and the realities of complexity of decentralised community participatory programmes and what is required to make those programmes successful. This study highlights that the nuances that exist in the different contexts need to be carefully understood so that researchers, policy makers and policy implementers can engage with the complexities presented. And since Zambia is striving to implement decentralisation reforms, examining community participatory structural implications remains the most important thing to understand factors that either constrain or enables communities to provide developmental services through community participatory mode. As it is the case with other developing countries in Africa, the transition towards a more participatory democratic society entails coming up with plans premised on the theory of change meant for articulating a systematic way of enhancing local development.

Therefore, by placing itself amidst the field of community development, this study provides an additional perspective to the analysis of the links between democratic participatory governance and decentralisation reform aimed at improving community involvement for local development and service delivery. Of great importance, is that the impact of decentralisation

in rural areas through a cross sectoral perspective has not been assessed despite the widespread process of community participation through decentralisation. Therefore, problems associated with community participation permitted a closer exploration. This is particularly so in the face of limited empirical evidence to support the argument attributed for citizen abilities and failure to participate in local activities. Apart from being a requirement for an award of doctoral degree, the study also adds to the existing knowledge base on decentralised community participation. Lessons from Northern and Muchinga provinces can inform policies having limited understanding on decentralised community participation practices in development.

1.6 Theoretical Framework

1.6.1 Concepts and Definitions.

It is important to note that when describing complexities of community participation from a decentralised perspective, it is important to understand the process of participation and interpret the process within theoretical and conceptual justifications.

To begin with, community development and community participation are somehow complicated concepts which have been described as elusive. The concepts are used ambiguously with contradicting interests to justify different politics, policies and practices. The problematic nature of these terms arises because they are historically explained within theoretically contested ideas which change in changing political environment and with time, ideology and economics. Crow and Allan, (1994) have indicated that the forces behind the creation of community life are both complex and beyond easy manipulation.

As Mayo (1994) postulates, the term ‘community’ has been in use since 14th century to refer to the common people who are held together by their simplicity and sometimes due to poverty and culture. The concept includes the quality of having something in common and the sense of common identity with shared characteristics.

Community in that context is referred to the people who live in a common geographical area such as ethnicity, religion, politics and occupation who share common but diverse interests (Mayo, 1994: 51). In this context, community includes three aspects such as the place or locality, interest and function (Tett, 2010). ‘Community of locality’, as described by Tett

simply refers to people who have things in common and live in a geographical community such as village or neighborhood.

However, sociologists such as Ohmae (1991), Castells (2010) have provided an explanation that 'locality' or 'spatiality' is not really a feature of contemporary communities because there can be communities based on networks and shared interests, feelings and identity without a spatial element, such as in a virtual community where contact is through the internet and related networks.

Community, therefore, is about localities, networks and identities. This means that whatever kind of networks or social relationships exist among people with certain identities for effective collective community development, the defined locality is imperative. In that regard, the concept of 'community' has been perceived as a social system with a set of relationships taking place in a specific locality. Thus, people and ties that bind them in a certain geographical location are crucial to community's survival.

However, sometimes even in tightly defined geographic areas, some people or groups may not be considered as residence in a location as part of the community. As Bray (2003) postulates, communities are rarely homogenous because of sub-groups which do not always operate in harmony.

The heterogenic nature of community represents features of most modern or urban communities. The rise of living standards, the economic change in the labour market, freedom and advancement of information communication and technology, growth of manufacturing activities and high population resulting from immigration threaten the bonds that exist in societies which is now even protruding into rural or tradition communities (Crow and Allan, 1994).

Theoretically, contemporary communities can be well understood as communication communities which are based on new kinds of belonging and peculiar to the circumstances of modern life expressed in unstable, fluid, open and highly individualised groups.

Individuals in today's communities are more actively seeking to achieve belonging than the preservation of boundaries. These communities, according to Mayo (1994:53), are open to external social networks which in some circumstances free the concept of community from its local roots. In other words, communities of today are characterised by a dense network of

relationships, the dynamics of which can obstruct or facilitate development (Das Gupta et al; 2003) because they are subject to political manipulation in search of power, resources and public participation for the social, political and economic development of nations.

In the same context, there are several preconditions that determine successful relationship between central and local government as indicated by the World Bank (1989:88). Such preconditions include: (a) the need and urge for a strong system of local government in a democratic political environment; (b) that local government be allowed to play a vital role as a full partner in regional and national development; (c) a fair division of financial resources between central, regional and local bodies; (d) a fair division of human resources between central and local government; (e) formal and effective checks and balances between central and local government; (f) full and adequate consultation and regular flow of accurate information at and between all level; (g) full participation of each citizen ,irrespective of race and gender at all levels of administration and government thus ,the extension of democracy to all spheres of government; (h) political and social harmony. Local government is therefore seen as the cornerstone in the local governance structure and community participation.

Governance in real terms denotes processes by which public policy decisions are made and implemented by government and other stakeholders. Governance is the result of interactions, relationships and networks between the different sectors such as government, the public sector, private sector and civil societies. It involves decisions, negotiation, and different power relations between stakeholders to determine who gets what, when and how. The relationships between government and different sectors of society determine how things are done, and how services are provided. Governance therefore is concerned much more on good government and it shapes the way a service or set of services are planned, managed and regulated within a set of political social and economic systems.

Democratic local governance is an integral part of local development approaches which is closely related to basic rationale for decentralisation reforms and local government's capacity building. Good governance at local levels signifies quality, effectiveness and efficiency of local administration and public service delivery; the quality of decision-making procedures, inclusiveness, transparency, and accountability as well as the way power and authority are exercised at community levels.

While local government is an essential institutional building block for local governance, the wider governance sphere comprises a set of state and non-state institutions, mechanisms and processes, through which public goods and services are delivered to citizens and through which citizens can articulate their interests and needs, mediate their differences and exercise their rights and obligations.

The concepts of local governance and decentralisation at times used interchangeably are related but different concepts. “Decentralisation is primarily a national political, legislative, institutional and fiscal process. Local governance can be affected by decentralisation processes (UNDP, 2010). Decentralised governance for development is a key area of democratic governance, decentralised governance for development should be responsive and representational. People and institutions must be empowered at every level of provincial, district, society, national, city and village level.

Therefore, the aspect of decentralisation is concerned with broader issues as provided for in the basic law of the land such as issues on social development and the creation of opportunities for the involvement of general populace and or citizens in economic, political and social life. Crook and Manor (1998) describes participation by specifically pin pointing to election and politics and defines participation by citizen as the process of active engagement with public institutions. This means that, the predominantly economic view on decentralisation has become increasingly inspired by political motives. This shift is expressed in the growing importance of “governance”, calling for a more comprehensive approach to decision-making at the different government levels. In contrast to government, ‘governance’ explicitly refers to the relationships between the state and civil society in the management of economy and society. Governance goes beyond the public sector, and as such includes the wider population. In this regard therefore, decentralisation should be considered as an effective policy measure in overcoming the problems caused by excessive centralism and predominantly central economic planning.

Governance has been conceptualised as a four-dimensional issue. It is ‘good’ when four conditions are met, these are accountability, transparency, participation and equity with equal access to and use of resources as policy priority.

This entails that the increasing attention to both decentralisation and governance has resulted into a focus on the role of local government, because government level is viewed as the most

responsive to population's demands. In the same context, local development is understood as increasing the development opportunities in terms of general well-being, employment and income for the population, and ensuring that these opportunities are evenly distributed among the different groups. Therefore, it shows that the objective of decentralisation in Zambia stems from the need for the citizenry to exercise control over its local affairs and foster meaningful development which requires that some degree of authority is decentralised to provincial, district and sub-district levels. And to remove the absolute control by the center, it is necessary to transfer the authority, functions and responsibilities with matching resources to lower levels. (GRZ, Cabinet office; 2012).

1.6.2 The meaning of Community Participation and Development

The understanding of the meanings of the words 'community' and 'participation' individually can best explain the term 'community participation'. Nick Wates (2005) defines the word community as a group of people sharing common interests and living within a geographically defined area. The term 'community' has both social and spatial dimensions, generally the people within a community come together to achieve a common objective, even if they have certain differences (Hamdi, Action 1967). The concept of a community works on the age-old principles of 'unity is strength' and 'united we stand. A community generally has two certain elements, that is, physical boundaries and social interests common among the people. The term 'participation,' simply means having a share 'in or to take part in,' thereby emphasising the rights of individuals and the choices that they make to participate. Different scholars have defined 'participation' as an act of educating citizens to increase their competence. Participation is a vehicle for influencing decisions that affect the lives of citizens and as an avenue for transferring political power. Therefore, participation is an act of collective effort to increase and exercise control over resources and institutions on the part of groups and those who previously were excluded from control.

Development is a concept which is highly contested, and it is inherently complex and ambiguous. In simpler terms, development' is a process of change. Therefore, development is the process of enlarging people's choices (UNDP, 1990). Development consists of the removal of various types of circumstances that leave people with little opportunity of exercising their reasoned agency. Development is seen as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy, the expansion of the 'capabilities' of persons to lead the kind of

lives they value and have reason to value. (Sen, 1999). Sen has argued that there is a broad set of conditions including being fed, being healthy, being clothed and being educated.

However, critics of development approaches argue that the strategies and policies designed during the last decades have not satisfactorily worked because aid and development have been driven by planners who have failed to motivate the people in developing countries (Sachs 2005).

Several contexts specific or 'specialist' development indicators have been created in response to the realisation that universal development indicators may contradict subjective perceptions of wellbeing and development. This approach is particularly associated with Chambers (1997) who argues that the perceptions of poor people rather than of rich people of the development community should be the point of departure because top-down development indicators may not correspond with how poor people themselves conceptualise changes in their wellbeing. Security, dignity, voice, and vulnerability may be more important than consumption in some circumstances.

1.6.3 Definitions and Forms of Decentralisation

At a most basic level, decentralisation refers to bringing government closer to the people. Govinda (1997) observes that decentralisation is neither possible nor desirable to identify one definition of its meaning. For these reasons, it is better to describe the forms that decentralisation takes. Rondinelli et al, (1983) have provided a first categorisation and differentiated the various forms in describing deconcentration, delegation, devolution and privatisation.

These categories represent various definitions based on political, administrative, deconcentration, delegation, devolution, deregulation, decentralisation by default and privatisation as categories of decentralisation. Political decentralisation as a category gives citizens and their elected representatives more power in public decision making. It is often associated with pluralistic politics and support to democratisation. Administrative decentralisation refers to the transfers of responsibility for planning, financing and managing certain public functions from the central government and its agencies to field units or government agencies such as provincial or district line agencies (Litvack et al, 1998).

On the other hand, deconcentration is the redistribution of financial and management tasks and responsibilities among different levels of the central government. It is often considered the weakest form of decentralisation. Delegation and devolution entail that the central government transfers decision making responsibilities to semi-autonomous organisations not wholly controlled by the central government, but ultimately accountable to it. Deregulation refers to the competition among private suppliers for services that in the past had been provided by government and that remain under public control.

Decentralisation by default is when the public sector, due to severe administrative and financial constraints cannot ensure the delivery of basic services. These services in turn are often taken up by community based organisations through self-help initiatives or NGO projects. In both cases, the central government has no control or cannot influence the activities at the local level. Therefore, without a link between central and local level it is not possible to talk of decentralisation.

Privatisation refers to the delivery of public services taken over or given to the private sector. In this case, the government loses the control over the activities at the local level. One risk associated with privatisation is that state monopolies can turn into private monopolies (Turner and Hulme (1997)). However, government may not completely lose control because, for privatisation to take place, there is need to define rules and regulations that will provide a framework for private initiatives. On the other hand, fiscal decentralisation refers to the process through which the central government gives financial responsibility to lower level of administration. In this case, local level bureaucrats remain responsible to higher levels of the administration.

Deconcentration represents a relatively easy step since the government retains political control, difficulties arise with delegation to local authorities of decision-making authority and financial autonomy implicit in democratic decentralisation. For this reason, most decentralisation reforms have been limited to deconcentration (Manor 1999).

Different forms of decentralisation provides for transfer of authority and responsibility to lower levels in two-fold; 'territorial' and 'functional'. It is territorial when services are geographically closer to the clients or citizens, while it is functional when authority is transferred to an agency that is functionally specialised.

The argument is that communities should be aware to participate in local development through their local governments that can as well promote the participation of civil society in the decision-making process (Devas 1997 and Robinson 2007). As the level of governance which is closest to the people, local authorities play a vital and major role in educating, mobilising and responding to the public in promoting sustainable development.

In the same context, decentralisation is associated with the process of democratisation, not only because people can elect their own governments, but because local governments are anticipated to be better informed about local issues, and therefore might be more efficient in the distribution of scarce financial resources and services (Regulska 1997).

Considering the above concepts, the analysis and understanding of the theoretical framework on participation offers a comprehensive framework for thinking about involvement, empowerment and partnership. It also provides key issues and practical techniques for effective community participation. The theoretical framework as we shall see later in this chapter deals with situations where someone, or some organisation, seeks to involve people at some level. This means that participation doesn't just happen, it is initiated either by community members with a range of interests, many of whom will have different priorities.

Some community members may wish to be closely involved in an initiative, others not. The theories suggest that it is more useful to think of stakeholders in community programmes. In this context, anyone who has a stake in what is happening. It does not mean that everyone who is affected has an equal say. The most useful theory in this study is the "Ladder of Citizen Participation theory", this theoretical framework prompt thinking about who does not participate and who has most influence during community participation activities. This is the situation where partnership working becomes an imperative strategy for social services provision particularly on community development for the poor majority in both urban and rural areas.

It is interesting to note that, in registering progress in community participation through decentralisation, most of the sub-Saharan African governments collaborate with communities in establishing, administering, maintaining and financing community activities. For this study, this collaboration is termed as government community partnership in social service provision.

The purpose is to position the study within the related literature based on the historical and political complexities of the three main concepts “community development, community participation, and decentralisation to explore complexities of social service provision. The analysis of participation in the context of theoretical decentralised community development has explored patterns of local participation and motives for participation. It has as well provided principles for effective partnership in development.

1.7 Decentralisation and Participation Theories

There are various theories explaining the intricacies regarding community participation by citizens. This study has attempted to link the chosen theoretical illustrations which support the research findings. In this context, the theoretical framework guiding the study has been evaluated mainly by exploring theories related to community participation and decentralised community engagement. The purpose is to explain community participation in relation to theoretical illustrations and how the theories have been utilised to investigate the findings on the extent to which community participation in Muchinga and Northern provinces of Zambia has been conducted.

As shall be seen later, an explanation has been provided for the choice of the Ladder of Citizen Participation Theory as a lense through which to interpret difficulties of community participation and decentralised community engagement. In that regard, both strong and weak links and ties have been examined in detail for community development activities within which bonding and linking are scrutinised as important aspects in the theoretical analysis of community participation.

1.7.1 Public Value Theory (PVT)

The fundamental assumption of public value theory is to provide services according to the public interest (Bozeman 2002). Public interest is defined as what people would choose if they saw clearly, thought rationally, and acted disinterestedly and benevolently (Bozeman 2002; Lippman 1955). Thus, this theory entails desired outcomes of public programmes and participation of expected beneficiaries to see the outcome clearly for the services when

delivered by the government bodies. Bozeman argues that 'Public value theory tends to operate at the highest levels focusing on specific desired programme outcomes (Bozeman, 2002; 146). This theory induces public institutions to recognise public value of resources, goods and services and arrangement under what the public can best be served (Ibid; 2002).

However, critics of this theory have argued that public interest is sometimes viewed as too vague, too value loaded, too ambitious and too conflicting with the policies. Scholars like Stoker have also contested that most of the public programmes and policies are a reflective of the public interest (Stoker; 2006). Accordingly, others have justified that the trend of embracing people and their interests forces the government to introduce good governance which is transparent and foreseeable by the people.

In real terms, Public Value Theory states that the public sector can stay alive by creating public value through the successful practice of public management to increase the public value produced by public sector organisations. The public value paradigm turns the old bureaucratic practice of public service delivery towards a new way of thinking by incorporating people's interest and choice for the provided services.

Therefore, the public value theory articulates that public officials and representatives should include people in making decisions for service delivery. The theory pursues the implementation of good governance with people as its central element. In this context therefore, one can postulate that Public value theory seeks to understand and predict the behaviour of the government sector of the economy as the outcome of the individual choices made by voters, politicians and bureaucrats interacting in a political playing field and or marketplace. In other words, public choice is an application of neo-classical economic tools to mean self interest and utility maximisation to explain political behavior.

Stoker (1988) notes that Public Value Theory is entrenched within the neo-liberal theory which argues for private sector market-led development as opposed to state-led development. Advocates of Public Value Theory indicate that the optimum mechanism for allocating public goods and making public decisions is the market. The proposition, therefore, is that economic activities are determined by forces of demand and supply. There is no government interference in the allocation of goods and services and determining costs and there is also private ownership of property.

Stoker points out further that public value theorists advocate that the public sector particularly the local government, has become very huge and complicated for ordinary people to understand and control. The theory thus argues for reforms and other administrative management styles such as contracting out, privatisation, decentralisation and bringing outsiders into the public organisation as a system of performance-related pay among others as alternative arrangements to improve efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery.

Public choice theory analyses the benefits and costs of decentralising the provision of delivery services. The theory assumes that the voter is a customer and the politician is a businessman. It holds the view that the people are aware of their needs and therefore, people's involvement in planning and implementation of programmes is a more effective and efficient way of meeting people's demands (Russel and Nicholson 1981; Mueller, 1979). Hence, the theory proposes people themselves to make choices about services, taxes and other policies. However, in analysing this theory on the individual perspective, the problem is that the public choice theorist is not much concerned with improving the capacity of government institutions for facilitating effective services which may not be achieved by market mechanism. The public choice approach is useful in understanding the nature of goods and services. It analyses the cost and benefits of decentralisation. However, the main limitation of public choice approach is that it is too much rationalistic and suggests narrow prescriptions.

1.7.2 Democratic Decentralisation Theory

Assertions in favour of decentralisation are often founded upon a wider critique of central state planning which holds that large and centrally administered bureaucracies represent an inefficient and potentially destructive means of allocating resources within various communities and society (World Bank, 2000). Three assertions are used to substantiate this contest. One argument is that central state bureaucracies lack the time and place knowledge (Hayek, cited in Ostrom et al, 1993: 51) to implement policies and programmes that reflect people's real needs and preferences. The second argument holds that states based on principles of command and control are qualitatively different from markets and voluntary organisations (Robinson et al, 2000).

Considering the above, states lack the flexibility and reach to provide certain types of goods and services particularly ones with large information requirements. And the third argument is

premised on the assumption that unchecked authority and inadequate incentives which can be reflected in salaries, rules of promotion and so on encourage 'rent seeking behavior' among government officials (Ostrom et al, 1993). Underlying the case for democratic decentralisation is an assertion that a more decentralised state apparatus will be more exposed and therefore more responsive to local needs and aspirations (Crook and Sverrisson, 2001). This will produce systems of governance that are more effective and accountable to local people (Blair, 2000; Crook and Manor, 1998; Manor, 1999; Rondinelli et al, 1989).

In other words, the democratic decentralisation theory is the development of give-and-take relationships, a mutual benefit between central and local governments and between local governments and citizens. The theory addresses the power to develop and implement policy and as well as the extension of democratic processes to lower levels of government and measures to ensure that participatory democracy is sustainable.

The democratic decentralisation theory gives the explanation of democratic decentralisation by embracing four interlinked dimensions namely: authority, autonomy, accountability and capacity. By authority it implies the extent of power which is transferred to community members in giving major decisions on revenues, administrative, economic and political issues. Transfer can be in the form of delegation, devolution, deconcentration, or privatisation based on the stage of the process and dimension. And by autonomy it means the rights and discretion to independently decide on major political, social and economic issues under their jurisdiction. Accountability means the dual responsibility of citizens and or elected officials to their constituencies and their higher bodies of government.

1.7.3 Local Government Democratic Theory

The Local Government democratic theory states that to acquire an effective and efficient delivery of public services, there is a need for a bottom up approach in the process of making decisions. This theory is classified into two categories being the centralised and decentralised theories. The local government democratic theory is also surrounded by explanations on the notion of local self government and the localist theoretical justifications which are oriented toward maximum decentralisation of functions and powers.

The local government democratic theory postulates that the local tier is closest to citizens who are more responsive and accountable to communities. It is for this reason that popular participation becomes the best effective method for the delivery of public services for community development.

1.7.4 The Democratic Theory

The democratic theory gives an elaborate justification for participation and the question of inclusion. One key distinct feature in democratic theory is on its ability to explicitly explain issues and principles between collective and considered decision-making. Ideally, the local government democratic theory and the actual democratic theory represent alternative strategies for safeguarding the principle of equality. The essence of collective decision-making as a principle is that people are treated as equals if their interests are given equal weight hence the notion of ‘one man, one vote,’ this therefore explains the fact that decision-making proceed based on free public reasoning among equals and interests unsupported by considerations that convince others carry no weight (Cohen and Sabel; 1997:320).

This explanation also corresponds to the voluntaristic and the epistemic principles of democratic legitimacy as given by Schmalz-Bruns (2002:44-45). The voluntaristic principle states that everybody should have the equal chance to decisively bring to bear his or her preferences, while the epistemic principle is based on the idea that people as autonomous persons are best represented in their faculty of demanding and giving reasons to each other (Bruns 2002:45).

The democratic theory, recognises the pluralist conception which illustrate that people’s interests and opinions are often diverging and conflicting. Accordingly, liberal institutions are in different ways designed to allow collective action even in the face of diverging interests such as voting. This means that if fundamental rights and freedoms are guaranteed in the constitution, people will have morally sound reasons to accept decisions even when they go against their own interests.

The liberal principle of legitimacy as alluded to by Rawls (1993) states that the deliberative or the epistemic principle on the other hand takes departure in the assumption that consensus can be reached through free and unrestrained discourse. The liberal principle gives the

contention that democratic institutions need to secure the preconditions for free and unrestrained discourse because all relevant points of view should be represented. This model can in general be said to put higher demands on the level of participation in society than say, the liberal representative model because it recognises that participation is necessary to protect citizen's objectives and interests, while the developmental model puts stress on the intrinsic value of participation for the enhancement of decision-making and the development of the citizenry.

1.7.5 Social Capital Theory

The term 'social capital' was first used to refer to the public infrastructure of a nation in the 1950s during the industrial component of capital. Social capital is a socially constructed term built upon social exchange that has been developed from social ties existing in social structures. In other words, unlike other forms of capital such as economic capital in people's bank accounts or human capital, which is inside people's heads, social capital is inherent in the structure of people's relationships (Portes, 1998:7).

Robert Putnam makes an important contribution to the social capital debate at community level and highlights productive aspects of social capital by arguing that social capital helps to improve the efficiency of society by facilitating the coordination of social actions (Putnam, 1993). He has defined social capital as social or community cohesion resulting from the existence of local horizontal community networks in the voluntary sector, personal spheres and the density of networking between these spheres (Putnam, 1993:163). Putnam has supplemented social capital theory with three aspects namely, a high level of participation in local networks; a positive local identity and a sense of solidarity and equality as well as norms of trust; reciprocal help; support and cooperation. Such aspects according to Putnam act as social assets which are also relevant in community development process. In other words, networks create social capital for community development.

Field (2005), in explaining about Social capital, reinforces the notion that social capital theory centres on the proposition that people's social networks are an asset. This reflects Putnam's perspective of this form of capital. Both see social capital as a network of ties emerging as the result of long-term decisions on resources which are linked to possession of a

lasting network of institutionalised relationships of mutual recognition. As explained earlier, social capital consists of resources embedded in social relations and social structures. It is a kind of an investment for actors to mobilise, access and use resources in social activities (Daly, 2010).

According to James Coleman, in the development of social capital theory, his perspective on social capital is that social capital is linked to the structure of ties and that the productive aspects are context specific. He claims that social capital represents resources with the expectation of reciprocity which goes beyond individuals to involve wider networks whose relationships are governed by a high degree of trust and shared values (Coleman, 1990). The generated resources resulting from social capital as Coleman suggests benefit all actors who are part of the social structure and for this reason, they constitute an essential part of the 'public good'. Thus, social capital in this sense is incompatible with high levels of inequality and instead it complements egalitarian perspectives (Putnam, 2000). Network ties in social capital are presented in three forms namely; bonding, bridging and linking (Putnam, 2000).

Firstly, bonding social capital is exclusionary and tied to strong social network ties. In this context, people relate to shared demographic characteristics which maintain the homogeneity. Bonding social capital is good for reinforcing reciprocity and mobilising solidarity. However, as the connections among individuals are confined to their shared demographic characteristics, bonding social capital reinforces collective action and helps the poor to gain the influence to get by, although it blocks them in getting ahead (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000).

In understanding bridging, Putnam (2000) has indicated that bridging social capital refers to the building of connections between heterogeneous groups. In this sense, as Field (2003) put it, bridging social capital brings together people across diverse social divisions. Accordingly, this form of social capital is facilitated by the existence of weak ties or non-redundant ties. Also, the ties are vital in connecting the disconnected social clusters. Again, Putnam points out that the connections in bridging social capital are good for linkage to external assets and for information diffusion that can generate broader identities and reciprocity.

However, due to hegemonic power of the dominant class in society, improving the extent to which the poor are provided opportunity to increase their stock of bridging social capital is a

challenging task. Bridging social capital is important for external network relations especially in modern communities where the expansion of social structures is not limited (Castells, 2010). Jiang and Carroll (2009) have maintained that bridging social capital increases the externality of resources outside the target community. This is where networks become a vital means of bridging barriers for sustainable community development (Dale and Newman, 2010).

Thirdly, linking social capital on the other hand pertains to connections with people in power whether in politically or financially influential positions. Linking social capital or vertical ties as Dale (2010) postulates links citizens to power and decision-making authority such as government. This kind of social capital is relevant in examining the nature of power relations in community participation as it brings together different social groups from different layers of society. Therefore, how the powerful individuals and groups utilise their positions for the common good has an impact on decentralisation. This is because networks and social capital can be used negatively to corrupt local actors and benefit the powerful especially when bonding social capital among them is high. Woolcock and Narayan (2000) have indicated that central governments that uphold the rule of law, honour contracts and resist corruption tend to reduce this negative effect on community development projects. Therefore, social assets can only be capitalised upon in an environment that shares similar expectations based on trust and reciprocity.

1.7.6 Ladder of Citizen Participation Theory

In order to appreciate our study findings, the Ladder of citizen participation theory was chosen as the main guiding theory of this study because by nature of its construct, it integrates the central thesis by explaining difficulties and compelling reasons associated with participatory practices by communities in development process. The Ladder of Citizen Participation theory best explains different levels of community participation in various stages. It provides 'lenses' through which to look at community participation in stages of complicated problems as well as a social issue which needs attention on different aspects.

The theory has eight rungs or steps arranged in a ladder pattern corresponding to the extent of citizens' power in community participation as well as in determining the end products in development. At the bottom of the ladder is Nonparticipation by citizens. The


Nonparticipation has two elements: Manipulation and Therapy. These two rungs describe levels of non-participation that have been contrived by some to substitute for genuine participation. The real objective at this stage is not to enable community members to participate in planning or conducting programmes, but to enable technocrats and powerholders to educate or cure the participants.

At the middle of the ladder is tokenism which has three elements namely; Informing, Consultation, and Placation. These three elements or features corresponds to levels of participation that allow the have nots to hear and to have a voice. At this stage, citizens may hear and be heard, however, citizens lack the power to ensure that their views are heeded by the technocrats or the most powerful. When participation is restricted to these categories of people, there is no follow through, no muscle, hence no assurance of full citizen participation because although the ground rules allow the community members to advise, the powerholders continue to have the right to decide.

At the topmost of the ladder, is Citizen Power which also has three elements; Partnership, Delegated Power and Citizen Control. These three features are equivalent to citizen power where true and meaningful participation takes place.

By looking at this Theory in details, it indicates that, it is necessary to disclose the manipulation of people in community participation programmes and projects by professionals and policy holders. As briefly described above, there are features which elaborate stages of participation. Accordingly, Arnstein proposed eight rungs or steps each matching to a different level of participation from the bottom to the top. The steps or rungs according to the theory are; (1) Manipulation; (2); Therapy; (3); Informing (4); Consultation (5); Placation (6); Partnership; (7); Delegated power; and (8) Citizen control. The theory justifies the level of citizen participation at different stages from the bottom lung or step up to the top with corresponding characteristics and participation features. Table 1 gives an illustration of the various steps regarding the levels of citizen participation in each category of the lung.

Table 1. Ladder of Citizen Participation Theory



Source: Sherry R. Arnstein, (1969:217).

Arnstein indicates that the rungs at the bottom of the ladder are the ones with least citizen participation or that is where nonparticipation takes place. Arnstein called the bottom as ‘Manipulation and Therapy.’ According to the theory, manipulation is found at the bottom rung. In real life situation, the reality is that people participate in community development through committees, neighbourhoods and or boards.

However, the contention is that of building participatory action whereby the experts or development specialists for the most part end up educating, persuading and advising the citizens what to do. In manipulation, authorities often use the local people to get involved just to inject the government viewpoint of policy and programme activities. In doing so, citizens have the perception of thinking that they are participating with authorities despite having no power or legitimate functions in those programmes. The authorities usually use terms such as ‘informing’ ‘gathering’ ‘public relations’ ‘open house’ as strategies to persuade citizens in thinking participation is present.

Therapy is the participation by a small group masked as citizen participation. Free discussion is used to employ ideas unrelated to the real issues with the intent to employ ideas that overlay the original problems while in the actual sense, the problems are never addressed.

The middle part of the ladder is occupied with 'Informing, Consultation and Placation' this is the middle rungs of the ladder and it borders between Manipulation at the bottom of the ladder and Citizen Control at the top. This part of the ladder is called 'Tokenism.' According to Arnstein, this is where citizens can participate just by simply giving their views but have no real say because they do not make decisions on issues and whatever they say does not matter. When one analyses the 'informing' rung of the ladder, it is discovered that citizens are provided with information but often at late stage in the planning process. Meetings under this form are conducted as one way of communication by the authorities but usually providing sketchy information lacking in depth analysis and discouraging questions or providing inappropriate answers.

On the other hand, 'consultation' rung on the ladder of citizen participation theory is perceived as a window-dressing ritual because authorities convey information to citizens but restrict the input of their ideas. In addition, no assurance is guaranteed to citizens of the use of ideas and attention to their concerns. While 'placation' rung in the ladder of citizen participation theory gives citizens some degree of influence although some form of tokenism is apparent. This method of participation is however clever in its techniques of placing a few selected 'worth poor' on committees in which they have no accountable actions or where they are out-numbered by the power elite. Under this tactic, the minority can be easily outvoted, ignored or persuaded. Also, this form of citizen participation often places people in situations where major planning decisions are made by authorities and approved in a formalistic way by the appointed officials or committees.

The upper three steps on the ladder are called 'Partnership, Delegated power and Citizen Control.' The Delegated power and Citizen Control are equivalent to Citizen Power where true and meaningful participation takes place.

In 'partnership, delegated power and citizen control' the theory states that citizens participating on this level share a true state of partnering with authorities. As Arnstein puts it, citizen participation is better when it gives citizen power to influence decisions about their

own governance. True participation is therefore found at the top of the ladder where we find citizen power.

In addition, Arnstein's work is compared to the work of Edmund Burke (1968). He noted (as cited in Renn et al (1995) that citizen participation through boards or committees serves important legitimating and efficiency functions for public institutions by educating the public. Government institutions also benefit from the public's knowledge. Renn et al (1995) has supported Arnstein's work indicating that participatory activities of citizen advisory committees which are at the middle rungs of the ladder are mainly in form of 'tokenism' in the decision-making process.

Arnstein model, therefore, displays the lower levels of participation as top-down communication and one-way flow of information. While the middle levels compose procedures designed to consult, involve and inform citizens of decisions, the highest levels are a two-way flow of information with greater authority given to citizens. Therefore, assessing the activities involving citizens at each planning stage against the character of participation provide an opportunity to measure the effectiveness of citizen participation. Effectiveness of citizen participation is defined as citizen power. When citizens have power, when they can influence the outcomes of policy decisions, then citizen participation is effective.

In that regard, the theory is thus a tool to measure greater participation practices both from the official based to the community. The measures are beneficial to both the community and authorities. The more a community is involved in the decision-making process the more it develops a personal commitment to the project and programmes leading to the best resolution of problems.

In the ladder of citizen participation theory, the categorisation of the various types of people involvement is extremely crucial in clarifying the confusion between non-participation and true citizen power and to identify the real motives behind participatory programmes.

Arnstein's Ladder of Citizen Participation Theory is the explicit recognition that there are different levels of participation from manipulation or therapy of citizens through to consultation. Shelly's theory of participation has been advanced and new terminologies added

to it. There has been a shift towards the understanding of participation in terms of the empowerment of individuals and communities. Arnstein also brought about the understanding and growing prominence of the idea of the citizens as consumer where choice among alternatives is seen as a means of access to power. Under this theory, people are expected to be responsible for their welfare and should therefore be active in public service decision making. The theory essentially treats community participation as a marketing exercise in which the desired result is sold to the community.

In the process, and because of the development of the ladder concept of participation, Wilcox (1999) identified five interconnected levels of community participation based on information, consultation, deciding together, acting together and supporting individual community initiatives.

The Ladder of Citizen Participation theorises on citizen involvement at various stages based on the levels and in accordance with how and when their participation has an impact on local development. The structural top stage in terms of participation is in most cases superficial without local appropriation. By the same token, incremental bottom level participation is not effective and almost impossible without planned intervention from the top financially giant levels. Given that public policy implementation is also a cognitive process for local actors who interact variably with the policy, participants at the bottom of the ladder are deemed to possess very little policy-relevant knowledge that can influence or shape decisions for real participation like those found at the top. More knowledgeable actors at the top have authentic and supportive responses while those considered to be less knowledgeable are found at the bottom of the ladder who are strategically passively aligned and remain indifferent.

Therefore, it is important to see the intensity of participation and power dynamics which is described by Arnstein's (1969). Although her original article is quite old, still it possesses great appeal to a wide range of audiences interested in issues of community participation because of its simplistic ladder metaphor. As stated earlier, a graded movement upwards through eight steps (rungs) summarises the different ways through which communities can be involved in the decision-making process.

Accordingly, the eight rungs are also subdivided into three main groupings. The first two rungs at the bottom are categorised as non-participatory, these are 'manipulation and therapy'

in this category, beneficiaries do not have any real participation in planning and implementation. People are generally placed in rubberstamp advisory committees or advisory boards to seek their support. The next three rungs known as tokenism' is composed of 'informing, consultation and placation'. Here beneficiaries have the scope to be informed and have their voice heard in the decision-making process. However, the ultimate decision-making power remains in the hands of the powerful. And finally, the top three rungs categorised as citizen power is composed of 'partnership, delegated power and citizen control.

In partnership, people have the scope to share power with power holders through negotiations. In the case of delegated power and citizen control, beneficiaries hold the power to decide and influence the direction of changes (Arnstein 1969). In this category therefore, community participation is closely related to the process of community empowerment. When participation is considered an 'end', it is meant to be empowering. In view of that, it is expected that beneficiaries will acquire or exercise power for negotiations, influencing decisions or making decisions.

1.7.7. Critique and illustrations of the Ladder of Citizen Participation Theory

Initially, Arnstein developed a model that examines correlation between citizen participation activities and the resulting effectiveness. The model is a tool which can be utilised to measure community influence over the decision-making process. Arnstein's theory, therefore, defines a framework for analysing the various approaches to citizen participation. It expounds full citizen participation to mean 'citizen power' in terms of the amount of actual control citizens have over policy decisions. There is recognition in the interpretation of the theory by explaining that while participation is a cornerstone of democracy, it is as well a time decency and privilege that should be commended by everyone in communities.

The theory also defines participation as the redistribution of power between the have and the have-nots. The have-nots are defined as the local poor people and or community members in societies. The focus is mainly on advocacy and equity regarding community participation.

Arnstein's theory notes that the have-nots in communities are offended and disillusioned by their incapacibilities in dealing with inequalities and injustices that they encounter in their daily lives. It states that, citizen participation should be equated to 'citizen power' where no one

has absolute control. The theory redefines citizen participation as a categorical term for citizen power where it has been mandated to include the have-nots in the planning and policy making. In that regard, how information is shared, how goals and policies are set, how resources are located and how programmes are considered and operationalised are issues analysed in the study through the lense of citizen participation theory.

One important aspect is the fact to note that the ladder of citizen participation theory suggests that the classification of citizen participation programmes is important because different programmes represent varying degrees of citizen influence and that an attempt to assess the impact of citizen participation must account for these variations. It emphasises conflicting levels of participation and its effect on the decision-making process by stating that several professionals in the field, while claiming to represent citizen views are un aware of community needs from direct communication with affected citizens. The theoretical model shows various outcomes because of different types of participation. Accordingly, these vary from empty refusal illustrations of manipulation, therapy, informing, consultation, placation, partnership, delegated power and citizen control. Each of these have a degree of citizen involvement and corresponding outcomes.

The ladder however compares powerless citizens with the powerful to highlight the fundamental divisions between them. In fact, neither the have-nots nor the power holders are similar unions. Each group encompasses a host of divergent points of view, competing vested interests and splintered subgroups. The justification for using such simplistic abstractions is that in most cases, the have-nots really do perceive the powerful as a monolithic system and power holders do view the have-nots as a sea of 'those people,' with little comprehension of the class among them.

It should be noted that the typology does not include an analysis of the most significant roadblocks to achieving genuine levels of participation. These roadblocks are based on both sides of the simplistic boundary. On the power-holders side, they include racism, paternalism, and resistance to power redistribution. On the have-not's side, they include inadequacies of the poor community's political socio-economic infrastructure and knowledgebase as well as the difficulties of organising a representative and accountable citizen group in the face of futility, alienation and distrust.

Another aspect to note about the eight separate rungs on the ladder of citizen participation theory is that obviously in the real world of people and programmes, there might be more than the eight rungs with less sharp and pure distinctions among them. For example, some of the characteristics used to illustrate each of the eight types might be applicable to other rungs. Take employment as an example of the have-nots in a programme, it can occur at any of the eight rungs and could represent either a legitimate or illegitimate characteristic of citizen participation. And depending on their intentions, powerholders can hire poor people to co-opt them, to placate them, or to utilise the have-not's special skills and insights.

If one makes analysis of some steps in the theory, we note that in citizen control for example, people have the degree of power which guarantees that participants or residents can govern a programme. On delegated power as a rung, citizen participation is performed through negotiations between citizens and authorities. This results in a positive role which people play in partial decision making with the authority over a plan or project. In Partnership, power is redistributed through negotiation between citizens and power-holders. While under the level of tokenism placation, citizens begin to have some degree of influence though tokenism is still apparent. On consultation, people are invited to give their suggestions, this rung of the ladder is still a mock because no assurance is offered in a sense that the concerns and ideas of citizens are not taken into consideration.

However, more emphasis is put on a one-way flow of information. Level of non-participation therapy in respect to group therapy masked as citizen participation which is at the lowest rung of the ladder. While in manipulation, citizens are placed on rubberstamp advisory committees or advisory boards for the express purpose of educating them or engineering their support. Therefore, instead of genuine citizen participation, the bottom rung of the ladder signifies the distortion of participation into a public relations vehicle by powerholders. This illusory form of participation initially can be vague when the socially elite or government official invite some community members to serve in development Committees.

Another target of manipulation is sub committee on minority groups and or the poor, which in theory are to protect their rights. In practice, these sub-committees, function mostly as letterheads, they just trot forward at appropriate times to promote certain planned activities because government officials and the elites are the ones who educate, persuade, and advise the citizens what to do.

The elites legitimise the manipulative agenda by emphasising the terms of the programmes. This style of non-participation is in most cases applied to various programmes encompassing the poor with various local structures created. These bodies frequently have no legitimate function or power. The elites use them to prove that citizens are involved in the programmes. But the programmes may not have been discussed with the people or it may have been described at a meeting in the most general terms.

Informing citizens and or community members of their rights, responsibilities and options is the most important first step toward legitimate citizen participation. However, frequently, the emphasis is placed on a one-way flow of information from officials to citizens with no channel provided for feedback and no power for negotiation. Under these conditions, particularly when information is provided late in planning, people have little opportunity to influence the programme for their benefit.

Meetings can also be turned into vehicles for one-way communication by the simple device of providing superficial information, discouraging questions or giving irrelevant answers. In the same context, inviting citizens' opinions like informing them can be a legitimate step toward their full participation. But if consulting citizens is not combined with other modes of participation, consultation can be a pretense because it offers no assurance that citizen concerns and ideas will be considered.

When powerholders restrict the input of citizens' ideas, participation remains just a window-dressing ritual. People are primarily perceived as statistical abstractions and participation is measured by looking at the presence of community representatives at the meetings. What citizens achieve in all these activities is that they have participated in participation. And what powerholders achieve is the evidence that they have gone through the required motions of involving those people. At Placation level citizens begin to have some degree of influence though tokenism will be apparent. An example of placation strategy is to place a few hand-picked worthy poor on Committees or on public bodies like the education Boards, police commission, or planning committees. If they are not accountable to a constituency in the community and if the traditional power elite hold most seats, the have-nots can be easily out voted.

It is important to note that the degree to which citizens are placated depends largely on two factors; firstly, the quality of technical assistance they have in articulating their priorities and secondly the extent to which the community has been organised to press for priorities.

1.7.8 Ladder of Citizen Participation Theory as the guide theory for the thesis

Theories of community participation and decentralisation have considerably been given greater attention through out in our study findings. However, on a more practical level, determining which issue and at what level the community can be involved in has been central in understanding of decentralisation and community participation through examining in details the Ladder of Citizen Participation Theory. This theory provides a useful means of appraising community participation because it takes into consideration complexities associated with community participation in various stages. It considers different dimensions of power, process and capacity during citizen participation process.

The eight levels of participation help in the analysis of community participation difficulties because the rungs are arranged in a ladder pattern with each rung corresponding to the extent of citizens' power in determining the end products. And as shall be seen later in the study findings, the nonparticipation elements are manipulation and therapy. These two rungs describe levels of "non-participation" that have been contrived by some to substitute for genuine participation. Taking into real consideration, the real objective at this stage is not to enable community members to participate in planning or programmes implementation, but to enable technocrats and powerholders to educate or cure the participants.

At the middle of the ladder of citizen participation is tokenism with three elements namely; informing, consultation and placation. These three elements culminate to levels of tokenism that allow the have nots to hear and to have a voice. The theory puts forward a categorisation by justifying that tokenism is where citizens hear and can also be heard, however, under these circumstances, citizens lack the power to ensure that their views are fully heeded to by the technocrats or the most powerful. Thus, when participation is restricted to these category of people, there is no follow through, no muscle, hence no assurance of full citizen participation because although the ground rules allow the community members to advise, the powerholders continue to have the right to decide.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

In this literature review, we will briefly discuss literature on the developmental aspects of community participation and then cover the reforms on decentralisation and political participation. We will also examine the literature on the nature of decentralisation in Zambia and how it has facilitated community participation for local development. In the process, we will establish the kind of gaps that need to be done on decentralisation and community participation. We shall, thereafter, examine the literature on other countries experiences in a bid to theorise the study findings with empirical data.

To begin with, community participation for development has been in practice since the formation of societies where people lived a communal life. Community participation is also embedded in the history of British imperialism and colonialism as a method which was used to meet social and economic development for the new political and social expectations of the working class after the Second World War (Tett; 2010). In that context, community development was presumed in a way that the involvement of local people would encourage self-reliance and self-regulation. Thus, as many scholars such as Tett suggests, community participation for development promotes widespread education and commonality.

In developing countries, especially those found in Africa in particular, community participation for development can be traced back to the Post Second World War reconstruction with the efforts to improve the social and economic wellbeing of people (Phillips and Pittman, 2009). Arising from the above, community participation for development is still understood today as a tool to reduce poverty, diseases, ignorance as well as to quell anti colonial struggles. In Zambia and Kenya for example, the colonial administration used community development to control and channel the forces of anti-colonialism which dominated the political scene. By the late of 1950s, Africans were recruited as community development officers with the majority working as Community Assistants.

In Zambia, community participation is still portrayed for rural development with emphasis on the creation of social infrastructure including welfare and community health activities to include health centres constructions, roads and bridges. Therefore, community development is concerned with the creation of improved socio-economic conditions through emphasis on voluntary cooperation and self-help efforts. In the late of 19th century in Malawi, self help schemes were used to supplement the insufficient resources available for education in rural areas. In the same context, almost all primary schools built and equipped after independence in most African countries had initially been the result of self-help effort known as Harambee and Chama-chamapinduzi in Kenya, Ujaama in Tanzania and Humanism in Zambia.

Central and East Africa countries are not the only countries pronouncing the concept of community development, we note also that various countries in africa are embedded in the political and ideological context as part of the movement towards building socialist self-reliant states. Chama-Chamapinduzi, Ujaama, Harambee and Humanism concepts were before used as phrases representing the spirit of self help as part of the drive for community development through the practice upon which social services provision were based.

Therefore, working and living together in the established collectively run communities and villages was encouraged to simplify the provision of and access to social services. Collins (1972) demonstrates that the principles of rural development laid down in the Arusha Declaration includes values of self help and self reliance which are expected to promote the aim of community development. In this case, community development followed central government driven self help manner rather than the grassroot mode of bottom-up approach.

As already alluded to, Self help schemes in the African context became the reference point in the construction of primary and secondary schools after independence as part of community development. However, self-help activities take the shape of community development when they are included in the government's community development framework. In that regard, community development is about interacting with people to assist communities to make changes in their own lives. It is a process of participatory interventions that mostly promote self help and service delivery when the state is unable to satisfy community aspirations.

Phillips and Pittman have described community development as both a 'process' and an 'outcome'. As a process, it focuses on developing and enhancing people's ability to act

collectively; it is an outcome when it takes collective action, the result of which is community improvement in physical, economic, cultural, social, environment, and political spheres.

It is important to note however that, the realisation of community development depends on how the existing knowledge is used or provided for the people to collectively initiate and execute developmental activities for their communities. In addition, Phillips and Pittman (2009) indicate that the presence of high degrees of social capital and social capacity in the community makes it possible for people to work together effectively and sustain strong relationships, connections and networks. Accordingly, community development work is a process of developing relationships with people and encouraging people to build relationships with each other to get things done. It is about educating people on how best to live together and how communities can best relate themselves to resources and power.

This implies the necessity of involving community members or the local people in the planning, management and decision-making processes of activities that affect their lives.

Shaeffer (1994) has pointed out that local people are more capable and responsive to social change but less able to change their lives autonomously. Shaeffer suggests two contrasting thoughts for local people's participation in community development activities: the paternalistic and the populist. The paternalistic assumes that local people are passive and fatalistic, uninterested and incapable of initiative for improvements, and thus everything must be done for them in a bureaucratic manner. In a situation like this, individual actors in rural communities become passive recipients of social services.

The populist thought on the other hand, perceives rural people as interested in change and completely capable of transforming their communities if only the politicians and bureaucrats would give them such opportunity. Therefore, in this sense, community development entails listening, valuing, understanding people's experiences and analysing them while linking them to the forces of power embedded in the structure of the society.

2.2 Reforms on Decentralisation and Political Participation in Zambia

The scope of reviewing the literature that describes comprehensive community participation and more importantly, the role of decentralisation in spearheading community participation for local development and service delivery can not be over emphasised. In this study,

attention in literature review is now drawn to various decentralisation programmes undertaken by Zambia.

Zambia has undertaken several administrative reforms aimed at making local administrative machinery more responsive to the demands of citizen in the context of decentralisation. The historical aspects of decentralisation in Zambia can be traced as far back in 1964, when Zambia inherited a dual system of administration. This system comprised of the field and local government administration designed for colonial convenience. The administrative structure comprised of a Resident Commissioner charged with overall coordination of Provinces and Districts. The Minister of Local Government then was charged with the responsibility of overseeing local government administration. (National Decentralisation Policy; 2013).

At the Provincial level, the Provincial Commissioner was head of Provincial and District Administration and answerable to the Resident Commissioner. In the same structure, all the civil servants were answerable to the Provincial Commissioner. This structure did not provide for Local Self Government. Further, the district commissioner headed the field administration and he/she was the Central Government representative who was responsible for the supervision of all field staff in the district.

The District Commissioner was answerable to the Provincial Commissioner. Elected representatives controlled Local Government structures such as Municipalities and township councils established within the District. Also, at this level, were the tribe based Native Authorities, which were part of Local Government for rural areas.

In the Local Government reform of 1965, as envisaged in the Local Government Act of 1965, the Government established various administrative structures, at National Level for example, the Government established the Ministry responsible for Local Government, while the Provincial administration was headed by a Cabinet Minister who was assisted by a Resident Secretary, a civil servant appointed by the Public Service Commission. The Cabinet Minister was answerable to the President, while the Resident Secretary was answerable to the Secretary to the Cabinet.

The Local Government Act of 1965 provided for the Municipal Rural and Township Councils. The Councils were headed by the Mayors/Chairmen who were elected political heads of the council. The Town Clerks/Councils Secretaries were administrative heads of local authorities and were appointed by their respective councils, and later, the native authorities were abolished.

In 1967, the District Secretary replaced the District Commissioner as head of district administration. And later in 1968, the President appointed the District Governor as political head of the district. However, the District Secretary Continued as head of field administration and was appointed by the Public Service Commission. In 1979, the Government enacted the Village Development and Registration Act. In this enactment, government created the Ward Development Committees (WDCs) and Village Development Committees (VDCs). The village became the primary focus for local development with emphasis on self reliance and cooperation enhanced through cooperatives.

The Local Administration Act of 1980 saw the merging of Party and Government structures at district level. Under this reform, government established the following:

- (i) at National level, the Ministry of Decentralisation was created in the Office of the Prime Minister assisted by a Minister of State;
- (ii) at Provincial level, the Member of Central Committee assisted by the Provincial Political Secretary and Permanent Secretary was head of administration;
- (iii) at District level, a District Council was established in every District of Zambia. The Council administration and the office of the District Governor were merged as one administration headed by the District Governor. The District Governor was Chairperson of the District Council assisted by the District Executive Secretary who headed the district secretariat; and
- (iv) at sub-district level the District Council was supported by Party structures of Ward, Branch and Section Committees. Local Government elections were abolished and replaced by party elections.

However, in 1991 when the Multi-party democracy was introduced, the then Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) government made the following changes.

- (i) party structures were separated from Government structures;

- (ii) at National level, the Ministry of Decentralisation was transformed to the Ministry of Local Government and Housing. This Ministry was responsible for local government while Cabinet Office was responsible for Provincial and District Administration;
- (iii) at Provincial level, the Deputy Minister was appointed as head of Provincial administration and assisted by the Permanent Secretary;
- (iv) at district level, positions of District Governor and District Secretary were not retained. As a result, there was no head of district administration to coordinate all sectors of government. The Town Clerk or District Council Secretary coordinated sector Ministry activities on administrative arrangement introduced in 1995. The Councils remained body corporate and operated independent of the district field administration.
- (v) At both National and Provincial levels, the structures have remained the same. However, the functions and reporting relationship have changed slightly. The President appointed District Administrators in 2000. While the District Administrators reported directly to the appointing authority, the Town Clerks/Council Secretaries reported to the Councils; and
- (vi) The Councils remained corporate bodies, operating independent of the field administration at district level. The District Heads of Sector Ministries report directly to their Ministerial Headquarters through their provincial heads.

The analysis of the current decentralised structure shows that the Province is streamlined because it is a critical and an important link between the district and the centre. The argument given forthwith is that the district is envisaged to be the focus for development and service delivery, thus empowering local communities to play an effective role in national affairs. Contemporary argument so far, indicate that at the district level, there is a system of Local Government which is based on the principle of democratically elected councils based on universal adult suffrage. And like was provided in the the 1965 Local Government Act, the policy provides at the sub-district level, the Ward Development Committees (WDCs) with full linkage to and participation of village and traditional councils.

The following are the expected benefits from the devolved system of governance as envisaged in the current National Decentralisation Policy. One fundamental benefit is the political stability which is secured by active participation of the local people in development

efforts and in politics through voting and other practices such as civic education. The main view by decentralisation proponents is that citizen participation strengthens democratic accountability thereby enhancing sustainable development.

Other benefits to be accrued is that local representatives become more accessible to community members thus held accountable for their policies and outcomes than detached national political leaders or public servants. Further, it is envisaged that responsiveness of government is improved because local representatives are best placed to know the exact nature of local needs and how they can be met in a cost-effective way and that locally specified plans are tailor-made for local area using detailed and up to date information.

Community participation aims at promoting local resident participation in governance at the local level to enhance local governance and development. Furthermore, through the policy on decentralisation, the government has promoted co-operative governance with provincial administration, provincial assembly, and local authority to support and enhance the developmental role of local government. The policy has also recognised and promoted the participation of chiefs and other traditional leaders in the governance and in the preservation of culture and heritage whilst respecting cultural diversity and to enhance delivery of services.

To address the challenges relating to development planning, government has through the policy on decentralisation programme provided a framework on the development planning process and implementation of the development plans by linking the operations of Ward Development Committees (WDCs) to the planning unit of the council. The policy provides for the facilitation and the establishment of District Planning Units managed by qualified personnel and devised mechanisms for strengthening the linkage between planning and national budgeting process and promoted local economic development at district level.

This is to extend the influence on the periphery through participatory good governance in local government to maximise outcomes from development plan implementations. However, there is little scope for the people to be effectively engaged in the affairs of their localities despite the much anticipated decentralisation reforms. One of the major reasons for this ineffectiveness is the barrier caused by government bureaucrats and politicians not to

specifically provide services in accordance to demand due to lack of resources to meet the demand of people in accordance with demographic statistics of the population.

Tordoff (1980) gives a more comprehensive description of the various institutions entrusted to spearhead development at the district and provincial level with a view of popular participation in Zambia which existed from 1965 until the late 1970s. Tordoff observed that decentralisation was understood as the political devolution of power by central government to subordinate authorities. This study however departs from Tordoff's political point of view and argues that decentralisation through community participation can bring the much-needed development and local democratic governance.

Local authorities typify the grassroots representation of the people in a given country. Peter Kaumba Lolojih (2008) has correctly observed that if government of the people by the people and for the people was to be achieved, it is at the local government level where every citizen is afforded an opportunity to participate in public affairs. Without participation at the local level, there can be no democracy at the national level. Lolojih narrates that people's power and participation are fundamentally related to local government. Lolojih's work is however focused on central government providing services through local authorities by understanding that government is for people and should not be separated during service provision. This study departs from that perception by focusing on local participation by citizens independent of central government.

In his PhD study, Chikulo (1983), examined the administration of government in Southern province. He observed among others that despite the many efforts by government in a bid to create appropriate political and administrative structures and a policy commitment to decentralise provincial and district levels, a wide gap had emerged between the rhetoric and reality in the countryside. Chikulo noted that not much devolution had taken place resulting in provincial ministries failing to undertake their developmental functions as required.

Chikulo's works have indeed provided an eye opener to this study as far as field administration is concerned especially that, during that time when Chikulo was undertaking his study, the country was governed by one party state with vertical rather than horizontal administrative system. Vertical administrative system does not in any way support creativity, initiative and popular participation in which this study is based on.

Critical review has also largely been drawn from the study of Peter Kaumba Lolojij's (2008) study. He argued that a government predisposed to centralising tendencies cannot create an enabling environment in which the performance of individual local authorities may largely be judged by the actions of council officials. Mr Lolojij captured several thematic areas on how local authorities performed during his period of study.

This study, however, is mainly concerned with citizen participation at the local level. To some extent however, this study can not divorce itself from exploring local authority performance on decentralisation specifically by exploring on participation by citizens for development. In that regard, Lolojij's work is of reverence due to several factors that contribute to poor performance of the local authorities. It is a matter of fact that government tendency to centralise decision making on critical matters of local authority operations at the expense of local initiatives has adverse effects for citizen participation on local development. Although Lolojij's work was mainly confined to examining the effectiveness of service delivery by local authorities without giving much attention to grass root level participation, it is of great help when one makes analysis by triangulating his findings on decentralised local participation at community level in collaboration with councils.

This study, therefore, recognises the fact that decentralisation and local governance are different names of the same coin. Both are concerned with diverse objectives of vibrant living and working in environmentally preserved self-governing communities. Good local governance is not just about providing a range of local services but also about preserving the life and liberty of residents, creating space for democratic participation and civic dialogue, supporting market-led and environmentally sustainable local development and facilitating outcomes that enrich the quality of life of residents.

Several developing nations have been criticised that in the process of decentralisation, developing countries do not allow the private sector, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as well as ordinary people to have respective roles to play. Decentralisation is accordingly a version of seeking such balance between top-down and bottom up communications to reach at good governance. And by shifting responsibilities and function from central governments to sub-national governments, an adequate division of function and responsibilities will thus be considered established and participation enhanced.

Generally, criticisms against and for decentralisation especially in the developing countries, Zambia to be specific are not uncommon. Decentralisation is likely to foster more local loyalty to regional identities than the national identity. This may encourage more autonomy from the central government and even a territorial secession in multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies as observed in western province's Barotse agreement of 1964 which was signed in the context of decentralisation.

However, Litvack Ahmand (1998), has explained that "newly created autonomy may be manipulated by local elites for seeking their narrow personal benefits at the cost of general population who are in dire need of improved livelihood. Accordingly, decentralisation may increase corruption at local level and thus this would not improve accountability. This again may mean that increased efficiency and effectiveness of public resources may not be realised especially that resources such as capital, human and even social at local level in low income countries like Zambia are very limited. Another argument given on decentralisation is that it jeopardises equity among different localities. Resourceful areas like Lusaka and Copperbelt may take advantage of opportunities created by decentralisation while relatively poor areas like Mbala, Nchelenge, Milenge, Isoka, Muyombe to mention but only a few can not.

What has been noted in the literature on decentralisation is that there is a wide gap, both among supporters and critics of decentralisation, between assumed outcomes and empirical evidence of supporting or discrediting the assumption. There has been little systematic analysis of devising an appropriate framework to assess the effects of decentralisation in the Zambian scenario. This difficult partly derives from the numerous ambition which decentralisation is hoped to achieve. At the same time, advocates often argue that improvements in one area in turn trigger better results in other areas. They also tend to base their arguments on explicit and implicit normative values in supporting decentralisation, thus, the positive outcomes are taken for granted.

Litvack Ahmand (1998), noted that decentralisation is neither good nor bad for efficiency equity or macroeconomic stability, but rather its effects depend on institution specific design. In this context, the process of decentralisation involves many kinds of stakeholders in many different fronts. The Zambian case indicates that it is indeed a policy forced to carry an unrealistic burden of expectation regarding its ability to transform whole societies dominated by authoritarian or patronage politics just like what Crook and manor (1998) indicates.

Outcomes of this bold decentralisation are often negotiated and bargained over how political power and material benefits are shared and contested. Impacts of decentralisation therefore need to be well scrutinised for its benefits to communities.

It is not much useful to argue whether decentralisation in a given country has been successful or not. Such evaluation according to Crook and Manor (1998) would more likely to depend on who evaluated and in what standard. There is usually a mixture of some elements of success and failures, while some tendencies are for positive sum others create zero sum or even negative sum. In the context of developing countries, there has been a swing from centralisation to decentralisation in the 1960s and 1970s when the transition from colonial to African administration was sought. Then with independence, new developing countries relied on centralised administrative structures. Zambia had only one-party political system, UNIP. Centralisation did not produce political liberalism, economic growth or human development.

The literature and policy documents reviewed have shown that while decentralisation entails potential improvements in the efficiency of public service delivery and the creation of democratic spaces of participation, there are also various shortcomings linked to the power of local elites and the exclusion of marginalised groups in local decision-making processes. However, exclusion of marginalised groups is not a point to argue for participation in Zambia, it may come in if one considers social status and participation in development. Like indicated by Bray (2003), community participation increases the relevance and impact of services, but at the same time exacerbate dissonances within societies. When this happens, it is usually because policy makers “have failed to examine in sufficient detail the types of community being considered and the circumstances of operation” (Ibid: 41).

In the analysis of the decentralisation of any service, it is important to remember the political nature of a service in question and the need that governments must find the right balance in terms of which responsibilities remain at the central level and which ones are decentralised. While the development of any community and the planning of projects and assessment systems should remain a responsibility of the central government, Govinda (1997) argues that community-based organisations and the community members can be involved in day-to-day management such as maintenance of infrastructure. As shown by some of the country experiences, community members play a role in supporting project initiation activities as

well. Moreover, the development of a “participatory culture” is based on local norms and gives enough time to develop a partnership with local governments, line agencies and service providers.

As the case of northern and muchinga provinces and Zambia particularly, to achieve positive results in terms of community participation in development, some pre-conditions seem to be of particular importance, communities need to be informed about the objectives of the programmes and need to have opportunities to express their preferences in a way that is binding for politicians and officials, the definition of community participation should take into account traditional forms of social capital such as community and self-help initiatives (bonding and bridging) and define spaces where these can actively link with local institutions and make a concrete contribution to governance and management of public services (linking social capital), have local elections, cooperation (versus competition) between various levels of the administration, and harmonisation with other relevant decentralisation initiatives (Fiske 1996, Govinda 1997, Manor 1999). These are necessary long-term processes that require commitment from the government and external support from international donors such as JICA in terms of financial resources and technical assistance in decentralisation.

Accordingly, Zambia has shown that often large bureaucracy at the centre is not reduced and limited public resources are not efficiently utilised. By encouraging people’s participation in entire development processes, more effective and sustainable development outcomes can be ensured because people can have more ownership of activities in which they are participating. Decentralisation in most developing countries have not been considered to contribute to good governance in real terms. The reform tends to be differently defined depending on contexts. Broadly, it is capacities in societies in which various stakeholders attempt to seek solutions that can bring positive outcomes for those who are concerned. Good governance therefore has not been well established to allow stakeholders reach a reasonably clear common vision, to guide their actions for mutual benefits which Govinda and Mannor alludes to. A key administrative and political strategy for improving governance and service delivery is one of the central arguments in this study.

The acknowledgement and the problematic revelations arising from ‘inadequate’ decentralisation in developing countries, Zambia inclusive, illustrates the importance of devolving authority, functions and resources to lower level institutions for effective service

delivery and community participation to be guaranteed. Although the study has provided a general assessment of the situation in Zambia, unlike for Muchinga and Northern provinces, nevertheless the findings forms a very complementary and inspiring scenario.

Arising from above, historically, when the United Nation Independenc Party (UNIP) planned for decentralisation, the aim was for administrative reorganization thus is to improve administrative performance. However, in several reasons, the administrative rationale was to advanced UNIP political recognition beyond decentralisation objectives. The political reasons were more paramount than the concerns for improving administrative performance and development at the local level.

The Zambian experience, however, shows that with poor community development, decentralisation became the only perceived solution and a push of government initiatives towards development as well as for political re-organisation and recognition. It should be stated here that underdevelopment in many areas of the country also propelled government to come up with various developmental plans to enable citizens to appreciate the party and its government.

Arising from the above, since independence in 1964, Zambia has initiated several decentralisation reform programmes that have had a mix of deconcentration, delegation and devolution. Deconcentration in Zambia has occurred through the strengthening and extension of the inherited system of field administration, whereby various central government ministries are represented in the provinces and districts by central government staff based at the local level. Such human resources are as well accountable to their respective district and provincial heads, which are also accountable to the central government departmental or ministerial headquarters in Lusaka. Deconcentration has also happened through the development of provincial and district government. Ideally, provincial and district government in Zambia has been maintained for coordinating government work at district and provincial levels.

Delegation of specific functions has mainly occurred through the creation of statutory bodies such as the National Housing Authority (NHA) for the provision of housing. While devolution in Zambia has occured through attempts to strengthen the role of multipurpose local authorities governed by local councils, the process has been weak and not impressive.

Membership on local councils has been through election, selection and appointment of one form or another.

Considering the above, the decentralised local system during and after-independence can be described by looking at the administrative arrangements that existed during the colonial era.

It is interesting to note that Zambia, by then known as Northern Rhodesia was divided into eight provinces, and each of these like it is currently, was also subdivided into districts. As of 1962, Northern Rhodesia then had only forty-four districts. But unlike we see now, each province was headed by a provincial commissioner other than the Provincial Permanent Secretary. There was an establishment of the Minister in Charge of the Province who was the overall controller of the Province. The Provincial Commissioner was responsible to the minister in charge of African Affairs for the administration of the province, and for the preservation of law and order in the Province.

The Minister in Charge ensured that the laws were enforced, and the overall policy of the government was adhered to and executed. The Minister in Charge had the responsibilities among others of planning within the framework of general policy, about the political and economic as well as social development the province. The provincial planning was performed in close connection with the officials from the districts, and in consultation with the chiefs and native authorities and such formally constituted local authorities as may have existed in the province (Mitchell, 1963).

The provincial commissioner had authority and presided over several provincial level agencies whose duty was to put into effect plans for development at the province. Furthermore, within various ordinances, the Provincial Commissioner was empowered either to appoint directly or to advise the central authorities on the appointment of members of various boards and authorities. The Commissioner under the Native Authorities Ordinance could appoint any African to oversee the native authority for an area for a period of up to six months (Mitchell, 1963). The Provincial Commissioner had also certain judicial powers and duties equivalent to those of a Resident Magistrate.

This clearly shows that at independence, the newly formed government of Kenneth Kaunda inherited a fragmented administrative structure. It was a kind of a diffuse collection of government departments enjoying a large measure of autonomy and only loosely controlled

by any central, coordinating body, whether bureaucratic or political (Dresang, 1975: 92). Thus, the situation in which the country found itself at independence was that government field officers operated under the double supervision of the all-purpose district secretary.

Arising from that fragmentation of administrative system, UNIP, Zambia's new Party and its government found the inherited administrative structures unsuitable for meeting its political and economic objectives, thus concluded that administrative reforms were necessary for the country. As Tordoff (1980:185) observes, one of the Zambian Government's most urgent tasks in 1964 was to transform the inherited structure of provincial administration - the focal point of the colonial system of government - into an instrument of economic development. Thus, in July 1964 the old system of provincial and district government was abolished and, the following month, was replaced by a new, more limited structure of provincial and district government (Tordoff, 1980). The Ministry of Local Government was tasked with the responsibilities of supervising local authorities especially those in rural areas through its own cadre of local government officers (Tordoff, 1980:185).

Further, many important functions of the native authorities were not inherited by the new rural councils but by central government instead. These included responsibilities for agriculture, conservation and primary education. One important aspect to note here was that the new provincial and district government system become a strategic part of the machinery of central government and it was organised under a separate ministry with its own permanent secretary and minister. It differed from all the other field agencies of the central government in two major ways:

Firstly, the officers had a wide and varying range of responsibilities. Their remit covered everything for which no special agency existed and secondly, the provincial and district government system had the responsibility to coordinate the functioning of all agencies of government at both provincial and district levels to ensure that they performed well.

However, by the middle of 1966 it was already clear to the government that the performance of provincial and district government was unsatisfactory. In June 1966, the government tried to strengthen provincial and district government with the release of a presidential circular which attempted to raise the status of the districts and Resident Secretaries. In his circular, President Kenneth Kaunda directed that all Residential Secretaries would be chief

government coordinating officers in their provinces or districts with reference to the work of economic development to maintain the morale and well-being of the civil service. Thus, the Resident Secretaries ensured that government policies and procedures were understood by the people and that the presence of the government was felt throughout the provinces and districts. Above all, the President directed the resident Secretaries to supervise general functioning of other government departments within their provinces or districts.

However, the above presidential directive had little impact because it was not accompanied by any piece of legislation or any suitable measures and before long, provincial and district government was once again under official scrutiny.

Unlike this study focusing on decentralised community participation, Royson M. Mukwena observes in his study by focusing on the functions of one-party participatory democracy in which the structure of the central government was very eminent at the local level. Accordingly, he explains that in January 1968, a Working Party of Civil Servants was set up to examine how provincial and district government could be strengthened. One of the major areas of concern was that of insufficient coordination among the various agencies operating at the district level. And as already observed above, provincial and district government had been stripped of most of its former functions, which had been distributed to central government ministries and departments.

The district secretary, who was supposed to play a coordinating role at district level, had thus lost several responsibilities including the powers over local authorities. To crown it all, the district Secretary stopped to be an effective coordinator of government departments because he/she could not coordinate the councils to act in collaboration with the civil service departments. Because of the loss of authority by the district secretary, civil servants in the district became more reluctant to listen to the district Secretary's directives. The existence of a new political authority by UNIP party functionary further weakened the district Secretary's authority (Zambia, 1979:23).

The above changes in the political landscape by UNIP as well as other factors, coordination at the district level increasingly folded up. The situation was aggravated by the proliferation of parastatal bodies, whose local staff fell entirely outside the authority of the district secretary. To amend the alarming situation, the 1968 Working Party's report included

proposals for a more provincial and district government staff as well as a higher quality of staff, to be achieved by channeling most new graduates entering the public service into provincial and district government. (iii) More powers to the district secretary, especially over rural councils; (iv) and freedom from political control (Zambia, 1979: 25).

However, President Kenneth Kaunda did not accept most of the administrative reforms as he saw them as advocating for the return to the colonial system of local administration. In the new reforms, which took effect in January 1969, Dr Kaunda rejected the proposal for freedom from political control. More powers were given to the district governor who was appointed by the Republican president and was accountable to the provincial minister. The district governor became the chief government coordinating officer in the district, with reference to the tasks of political and economic development.

The governor replaced the UNIP regional secretary as chairperson of the District Development Committee (DDC) and other committees at the district level. Other major aspects of the 1969 reforms were the posting of a Cabinet Ministers and Permanent Secretaries to provinces and the creation of new administrative structures by merging offices of the provincial and district government division of the office of the President and the ministry of local government. The provincial Cabinet Minister was assisted by a Minister of State, who previously was the political head of the province. Administratively, the provincial Cabinet Minister was the Chairperson of the Provincial Development Committee (PDC) while the Minister of State was the vice-chairperson.

However, in January 1976, the provincial Cabinet Minister was replaced by a member of the UNIP Central Committee who subsequently became chairperson of the Provincial Development Committee (PDC). In this scenario, the Provincial Cabinet Minister became vice- chairperson of the PDC until December 1978, when the post of Provincial Cabinet Minister was abolished (Tordoff, 1980).

Although in his 1969 reforms, the President had merged provincial and district government with the Ministry of Local Government, as one may observe however, this move did not alter the nature of the relationship between central government and local government units, because the latter were left intact as a separate sub-system and continued to operate independently.

The 1969 reforms were not politically successful because the administration at local levels continued to fail to provide an adequate level of coordination. Especially that the district governor was not explicitly empowered to give instructions to local civil servants and the fact that the district governor had no formal powers over the parastatal staff operating in the district. In the same context, the district governor's position as chairperson of the District Development Committee (DDC) had one major problem because the District Development Committees operated without formal statutory mandates. The DDC therefore, had no authority to make binding decisions about administrative activities and on committee membership. The members of DDCs were not answerable to the committee.

And as already alluded to, although this study is confined on community participation in a decentralised set up, it also takes great cognisance of political context of the various administrative changes in Zambia. Again, borrowing from R. Mukwena 1992 in Fesler (1965:550), the observations have been that several scholars have exemplified the administrative changes in Zambia arising not only from the need to improve or strengthen the country's administrative system but also from causes of a more directly political nature (Manda, 1988; Chikulo, 1981; and Mwape, 1980).

The 1964 re-organisation of provincial administration and the abolition of native authorities raised several concerns for improving the state's capacity to manage the economic development of the country. Changes emanated from practical pressures and the need to provide affordable social services to the public. Therefore, Dr. Kaunda being the leader for the newly independent Zambia wanted to show case of the much-anticipated development as well as part away from colonial type of administration.

The above scenario was however, without problems and political conflicts. The 1969 reforms for example, emanated from the analysis of events that followed during UNIP general conference at Mulungushi in August 1967. In the elections to the UNIP Central Committee at that conference, UNIP was split into two main groups; a Bemba-Tonga Alliance under Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe and a Lozi Nyanja-Alliance led by Reuben Kamanga. This split was very destructive to both the party and government, and by February 1968 the internal differences within UNIP had become so severe that President Kaunda briefly resigned as both UNIP and Republican President (Tordoff, 1970). Although President Kaunda withdrew his resignation, he was now more anxious than before to strengthen national unity. Arising from

those fracas, President Kaunda announced in November 1968 his “decentralisation in centralism” reforms which he defined as a measure whereby through the Party and government machinery to decentralise most of the Party and Government activities while retaining effective control of the Party and Government machinery at the Centre in the interest of unity" (GRZ, 1968:19).

The above political administrative information is complemented on the understanding that numerous literatures have been written in view of the highly centralised and exclusive structure and systems of government inherited from the colonial era. The subject of decentralisation as a matter of both objective necessity and popular demand has taken a central place in nearly all government programmes on democratisation and economic development. And over the past decades, several countries and scholars have been focusing their attention on decentralised governance and its impact on socio-economic development.

Therefore, the New Development Administration as a decentralisation mechanism implies giving every citizen an opportunity to actively participate in constructive public work, besides the franchise in a democracy. It also refers to participation in specific action by which the citizen registers their involvement in public affairs to achieve community objectives. In this context, the reinvented concept of decentralisation has been the most significant for activating a variety of development functions, ranging from peoples' involvement to better management of grass-roots development. The trends which have dominated the thinking and the application aspects have been very crucial, as these act as the guiding posts for the concerted development of the idea of 'decentralised governance', moving away from the top down' to 'bottom up' approach in the development process encouraging and ensuring stakeholders' participation in communities for local development and poverty eradication.

In this modern era of the administrative state, many writers have also voiced concern over the problem of responsiveness of the administrative state to the norms of democratic procedures. To safeguard individual liberties against bureaucratic or arbitrary abuse, an increase in people's vigilance and participation in politics has been advocated for as vital. Modern states consider assigning each person's needs equal weight in policy deliberations to make as broad as feasible the opportunities for people to participate in the decisions that affect their livelihoods (Sharkansky 1991).

Political scientists unanimously agree on the fact that the main utility of extensive public participation in politics is to ensure that the stakes of the privileged do not prevail over the interests of the majority. And to guard against such possibilities, adequate measures of public accountability and ventilation of public grievances should exist besides avenues of citizens' participation in governance.

By decentralising, the state apparatus opens new channels for popular participation inside the political system. The idea of decentralisation is closely identified with the creation of democratic units as well as effective and efficient administrative structures at the grass-roots levels (Haque 1997; Schonwalder 1997:756; Smith 1985:186; Friedman 1983).

Moreover, the contemporary communitarian concerns are also similar. There is an increasing demand to bring in people and local communities for more participatory and direct action-oriented democracy. Communitarians believe that under the New World Order of market individualism, social and political power is concentrated even more in those in command of material wealth. What is based at the heart of the communitarian objection to market individualism is the latter's alleged cancerous effect on community life. Human beings who are in control of more economic resources than others can set the agenda for everyone from a privileged bargaining position. They can make substantial private donations to those in the government, they can distort public opinion by buying control of the media, they can subdue all those who are dependent on the employment, investment or purchases they offer by threatening to withdraw them. Selfishness becomes a moral creed. Individuals are encouraged at every turn to put their own interests first, and to demand the freedom to make their own choices regardless of the implications for the civic order.

An alternative to individualism and authoritarianism comes communitarianism which sets out the way in which social and political practices are to be reformed in relation to their contributions to the development of sustainable forms of community life. Such life is fundamentally based upon reformed power relations at every level in society so that all those affected can participate as equal citizens in determining how the power is to be exercised. This means that questions about the collective action to be taken for the common good are considered through informed community discussions and are not to be left to the political elite, who are rarely answerable to their fellow citizens (Tam, 1998:202; Casfir, 1993:25).

The argument is that decentralisation is intended to bring numerous social improvements and efficient public administration that shifts public service closer to the people with more opportunities to participate more actively in decision making process of local policies and activities than in centrally decided ones. Participation contributes in improved accountability of public services because people scrutinise local governments more closely than central governments. The arguments given are that services are delivered speedily than in the case of a centralised administration because decentralisation reduces lengthy bureaucratic procedures for decision making and implementation. Kasfir has also suggested that, in a decentralised system, services become more responsive to the people and tailored for different needs of different localities.

However, experiences of several nations including Zambia have indicated that the pronouncement of decentralisation in the 1960s still witnessed the clawing back of the power by the center with attempt to exert even greater central control over local decisions. Turner and Hulme (1997:164) like Conyers (1982) have indicated that there is no evidence that recent policies on decentralisation have significantly reversed the post-independence trend of governance.

Another author whose work is of relevant to this study is R. Govinda who focused on the decentralisation of the management of education and observed that “decentralisation lexically implies moving away from the centre” (Govinda 1997:5). Depending on the specific context and circumstances, this can imply a spreading of central control to local units or a greater empowerment of these management units. Govinda refers to various forms of decentralisation but prefers to adopt the concept of trends. He identified three main trends in decentralisation process. The first trend is reflected by the decision to add to the existing political and administration structure of several deconcentrated or decentralised bodies either at the local level alone.

The second trend according to him is delegation which relates to the transfer of some decision-making powers to bodies outside the government bureaucracy rather than NGOs. This generally involves parastatal entities created by the state itself to handle special areas of public concern (Ibid 1997). A third trend is the one linked to devolution which Govinda considers as the most genuine form of decentralisation of management functions. In this case, he explains that specified powers are transferred to sub-national units through appropriate

legal reforms. Generally, these units consist of local self-government constituted through democratic means. As with Manor, in the case of privatisation, Govinda argues that there is no evidence supporting the idea that a certain service can be completely handed over to the private sector and that the government should continue to exert some form of control on essential public services.

Several tasks and responsibilities can be transferred through decentralisation to the local level, therefore, analysis of Govinda helps to focus on management and community participation in that way. Coming back to the objectives of decentralisation, it has been observed that proponents both of greater decentralisation and greater centralisation rationalise their positions based on equity and efficiency (Ibid 1994). For Turner and Hulme (1997) reality shows that centralisation and decentralisation represent hypothetical poles on a continuum that can be standardised by many different indices.

They have observed that none of the forms of decentralisation may be found alone, but rather interlinked when specific circumstances of a country are considered. Accordingly, decentralisation does not imply that all authority must be delegated. The central government must in fact retain control over essential national matters and re-organise the decentralised units. An additional problem is what Turner defines as 'piecemeal decentralisation' where different forms of decentralisation result from initiatives planned by separate ministries in different sectors leading to policy coordination problems and discrepancies.

However, development theories describe the role of the state and the set of institutions that are conducive to accelerated growth and socio-economic development in different ways. Accordingly, Thorbecke (2000) suggests that the state has acquired the role of facilitator in building an institutional environment based on the principles of good governance and democratic participation as a necessary ingredient to achieve sustainable development.

2.3 Decentralisation, Development and Community Commitment

The decentralisation programme has not been fully understood as a means of associating it with the process of economic development, democratisation and the participation of general populace and or civil society in public affairs. To some extent however, decentralisation phenomenon in the two provinces has been understood that local authorities are the closest

tier of governments to the citizens and therefore represent at best the actual instruments of responsibility and accountability to local communities, as well as constituting a reliable means for delivering public policies and public services more efficiently due to the fact that community members are more aware of local problems and the social services required in order to uplift the livelihood and to resolve various problems which affect local people. At best, the contention brought forward and as a matter of common knowledge, community members have the advantage of knowing exactly what they need, and in some instances, they may in case if political will prevails be able to deliver the services to areas where they are mostly needed.

An analysis of decentralisation policies in Northern and Muchinga provinces like in most developing nations reveal several bottlenecks and limitations. There is enough evidence to support that the implementation of decentralisation programmes since independence has in a way failed to realise its objectives. Among others, the lack of accepting about the nature of the decentralisation process, its intentions and the rationale that supports its implementation (cited from Conyers 1983, Bennett 1990).

The process of decentralisation is the result of many factors within which the political will of national governments which UNIP, MMD and PF have thrived to engage. In most of these governments, it is a general acceptance that the implementation of a legal framework that could adequately support decentralisation has been somehow neglected. Conversely, the obstacles that local and central governments face in performing their functions have been the order of all political cries. Enadequate resource transfer from the central government to local authorities for them to carry out their duties has been a common problem for the country like elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa. This does not only demonstrate a problem but the process of decentralisation. There have been overwhelmed pressing issues such as lack of planning expertise at the local level, lack of political will to even contemplate carrying out decentralisation and lack of effective legal frameworks to support institutional changes.

Despite the evidence of these experiences and a host of others which could have been provided, arguments that support the implementation of decentralisation policies are still enormously valid. The argument put forward is that there is a challenge for policy makers to create the necessary conditions for the process to work appropriately. This is so to ensure that

institutional, financial, political and technical factors are present in the design of decentralisation processes (Robinson, 2007:13).

Political commitment is a key element in the success of the implementation of decentralisation policies. This aspect not only creates a political platform for the process to work, but also encourages participation by the communities on issues that affect their livelihood. Political competition can also bring positive effects to decentralisation efforts, by mobilising and widening the participation of civil society in this process, it can lead to more responsible, efficient and accountable institutions.

Northern and Muchinga Provinces do not present effective mechanism to encourage community participation in public matters. There are no governance values that the process of decentralisation can offer in the two provinces especially in rural areas. Community participation and the decentralisation process in all the four districts has indicated that the implementation of a range of devolved functions require an engagement of local communities in designing, consulting, and putting into practice public policy programmes.

The decentralisation process and the local government have not really proven that institutionalised participation through institutional arrangements designed to facilitate public engagement is an important element in improving decentralisation processes. Factors to mention here are that there aren't enough financial resources and technical capacities which are essential elements in the decentralisation process. It is a matter of fact that the accessibility of financial resources does not only affect the quality and quantity of services provided by local councils, but it widens the capacity of local bodies in deciding what would be the best use of these resources (Robinson, 2007). There is a necessity to have a fair distribution of financial resources to support abundant goals if beside the transfer of responsibilities, local authorities become the beneficiaries of enough financial resources. It is without saying here that it is a necessity of avoiding inequalities within different regions through a fair distribution of financial resources (Franco, 2004).

Another factor that influences the implementation of decentralisation in Muchinga and Northern provinces of Zambia is the capability of local civil servants to provide public services. It is a matter of fact that improving the capacity of local officers will remain and it is a key element in improving the implementation of the decentralisation process and

strengthening local institutions (Robinson, 2007; Rondinelli, 1983). Decentralisation per se has not only been instrumentalised as a development strategy to increase efficiency or improve the effects of national policies, but as we have argued in this study, decentralisation is intended to encourage popular participation and to intensify the processes of democratisation. This can be achieved by incorporating the members of the communities in planning processes, leading to the implementation of national programmes and policies. Facilitating effective popular participation in the planning process enhances the implementation of public policies in a more profound way than envisaged in the provinces as far as decentralisation programmes are concerned. In this regard, the participation of local communities in the process of decision making is seen as the best way to ensure that those decisions really reflect local needs (Ibid, 1983).

In Zambia, the process of decentralisation has been envisaged as restructuring the implementation of public policies particularly those of a social in nature. In this regard, the introduction of locally implemented social policies have occurred from the end of the universalistic style of state led policy implementation during the import substitution period, and a change to a new development paradigm that argues that problems cannot be resolved by one entity but have to be resolved by the inclusion of all kinds of institutions present in a given country (Franco, 2004).

Another factor to consider in the successful implementation of decentralisation processes is the quality of inter-governmental relationships (Jordana, 2004). It is widely accepted that decentralisation can be effectively done where tensions between levels of government usually caused by the lack of clear definitions of responsibilities at each level and by the distribution of financial resources to lower levels is minimised. The first element in this scenario refers to the problems that is caused when the implementation of public policies is distributed across different levels of government and the rules to supervise the execution of policy are not clear (Jordana, 2004).

The second element is the frequent determination of central governments to control the policy process by imposing its dominance over the implementation of public policies and the financial resources allocated to them (Jordana, 2004; Bennett, 1990). The ultimate situation is obviously to reach an equilibrium between central and sub national governments, and to define and institutionalise rules to coordinate the relations that must be established between

them because those relations constitute a necessary element in the functioning of decentralisation in any political context, and they must progress parallel to the progress of decentralisation (Jordana, 2004:149).

Among other factors that have also been identified as elements that can enhance decentralisation includes the size of decentralised units and the number of levels, the quality of central local relations, the implementation of mechanisms for citizen engagement, the availability of financial resources and the impact that service delivery might have on poverty reduction and corruption (Devas and Delay, 2006).

The Zambian experience with decentralisation particularly in Northern and Muchinga provinces has so far portrayed the characteristics triggering some fundamental features and outcomes. The first positive sign as envisaged in the implementation is that decentralisation has championed the officials in government with some degree of levels of accountability to their constituencies and therefore more aware of local issues. Although this process has not been able to reduce inequalities due to reasons such as the lack of enough financial transfers to support the transfer of responsibilities and the frequent lack of interest from national policy-makers who tend to favour national policies over local ones. One important aspect of decentralisation is that it is a strong process because it underpins democratic processes.

In the areas of the study for example, a range of decentralisation arrangements comprise elements of delegation and deconcentration. The question remains as to which schemes should be classified as decentralised or merely deconcentrated and what criteria could be established to measure the extent of decentralisation and to allow for comparison between different experiences as indicated by Conyers, 1983 and Smith, 1985.

An important complicating factor in differentiating the degree of decentralisation that Zambia as a country has embarked upon is the dichotomy set by the terms centralisation and decentralisation which does not allow the establishment of any connection between the two. This suggests that government is either centralistic or decentralised (Conyers, 1986). And to address this question of measuring the level of decentralisation in a Muchinga and Northern provinces, there are eight features that can help illustrate the balance of power between different levels of government. These features are termed as functions, delegation, revenue,

creating area governments, dependency, political parties and the structure of the system (Smith, 1985).

Although the use of this list should not exclude the identification of other factors that might interfere in the classification of decentralisation policies, and while it may not be suitable for application in all circumstances, they do represent a set of variables against which other variables can be compared.

When responsibilities are clearly divided between different levels or tiers of government, the assessment of the degree of decentralisation can be clearly predictable, but on the contrary however, if responsibilities are shared by different levels of government, like education or health policies, the definition of the level of decentralisation is unclear (Smith, 1985).

Dependency and revenue are firmly connected because the first is associated with the amount of revenue raising power developed by sub-national units and the restrictions on raising their own funds that those units might have in connection with the legal framework (Wolman, 1990). This issue leads to consideration of the level of dependency that these levels of government have on grants and financial transfers from the central government. This suggests the degree to which some scale of control over sub-national government might be present (Smith, 1985). Functional, revenue and dependency variables are measured through constitutional and legal provisions, or through the shares in public spending amongst different tiers of governments (Haggard, 1999).

Delegation symbolises that sub-national governments must take and implement decisions rather than having to ask for authorisation to supply some services. The matter here is the degree of control that central levels of government have over local governments (Smith, 1985). Creating area governments refers to the creation of decentralised political areas by the state whose institutions could be partners or agents of the central government. The main subject here is the source of the legal status that might be bestowed by executive or legislative bodies or any kind of legal arrangement established between central and sub-national governments (Smith, 1985; Wolman, 1990). Smith (1985) suggests that decentralisation processes will be widespread if the status comes from the legislative branch of government.

An important question here is the size of local government's territory since larger urban areas have a greater source of revenues and the possibility to create better institutions and are better prepared to challenge central control than smaller municipalities (Smith, 1985).

The domination of the same political party in all levels of government might affect the level of decentralisation. Agnew (1987) gives a justification that political parties can play a particularly important role when they become an instrument for political organisation and mobilisation of civil society to channel common political and social dissatisfactions and give political legitimacy to state actions.

2.4 Other Countries experiences on Decentralisation and Community Participation

In the Western World, decentralisation for community participation emerged as a concept of devolution of power to the people when there was no adult franchise. The British system of local government found in South Asia, Africa, Australia and North America was conceptualised as a devolved local self-government with characteristics of a representative elected council. In Europe, North Africa, West Africa and South America, decentralisation has been distinguished by deconcentrating executive dominance and rigid government hierarchy.

Like in Africa, decentralisation in America and Europe is conceptualised as a deconcentrated administrative programme for relieving administrative congestion since overcentralised governance do not have a way to explore what is needed to be done for different places. The planning of development is carried out in far greater detail and with a great deal of understanding by the people of those areas who particularly are concerned with their welfare. The United Nation study have indicated that, decentralisation of government relieves members of the legislature and of the national executive from involvement in many purely local issues, frees key officials from onerous and detailed tasks and increases the speed and effectiveness of the administration at all levels. The UN study has indicated that decentralisation is especially important in developing countries where rapid expansion of public services greatly increases the number of government transactions and consequently the hindrances and wasted efforts resulting from over centralisation of controls' (UN 1962:6).

Accordingly, the UN study has pointed out that, with time and population growth in developing countries, states increasingly face problems like widespread unemployment,

poverty and diseases leaving the administration crippled and ineffective. The New It is also important to make some reference to development administration when one talks participation and decentralisation. The New Development Administration as espoused by western worlds Africa inclusive talks about ensuring and institutionalising people's participation through the process of decentralisation. The contention is that decentralisation, results in political elasticity by means of devolution, the legal establishment of locally elected political authorities and deconcentration, the transfer of allocative and implementable decisions to local authorities.

This new mode of development administration is based on the experiences of such welfare-oriented governments whose development strategies failed miserably due to the government's limited capabilities and therefore, people and civil society were to be brought in as alternative and complementary institutions and or mechanisms for augmenting development processes.

However, one case of interest for our study can be drawn from Seila on the institutionalisation of Village Development Committee in Cambodia. Cambodia has good local self-government. There are 20 provinces and 4 municipalities with 183 districts with one thousand, five hundred ten (1510) communes and one hundred eleven (111) Sangkat. However, like Zambia, the villages are not considered as administrative division of rural areas. However, like Zambia, the current administrative structure in Cambodia has its origin in the colonial period when the centre extended its control and influence on the periphery through centrally appointed officials. The provincial governors and district chiefs are appointed by the government.

Seila notes that the origin of decentralisation in Cambodia can be traced from 1992 and the Cambodia Area Rehabilitation and Regeneration Project (CARERE), a joint initiative between the government, the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to implement reconstruction.

Regarding community participation, Seila has observed that since then, there has been an institutionalisation of Village Development Committees (VDCs) as the foundation of the rural development structure and autonomous committees that work to ensure coordination and communication between the village, civil society and government institutions.

However, according to a study by German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and the Ministry of Rural Development, among the approximately 8.000 VDCs that have been established, only those that receive external funding through Seila or NGO projects seem to be active. In Cambodia, participation is seen as the basis for the design of the general decentralisation reform that are marked by the elections of Commune Councils or Sangkats. Reverting to the definitions by Manor (1999), Seila has achieved administrative deconcentration, but has produced only a limited transfer of political power and decision-making authority to lower level authorities like the decentralisation policy being implemented in Zambia.

It is important to note that Commune Councils election in Cambodia successfully marked the beginning of decentralisation reforms despite limited initial donor support. The Cambodian government has been determined to pursue decentralisation through community participation by emphasizing the notion of local self-planning. The reforms' main objectives are the promotion of democracy, equity of life and good governance. Seila has stated that the reforms aim at giving ordinary people greater opportunities to determine their future for sustainable development.

Other important aspects to note is that the Commune Council's role and functions in Cambodia are stated in rather general terms in the law and include among others, maintaining of public security and order, arranging for the provision of necessary public services and to ensure the proper implementation of the decentralised services. The commune council promote and encourage the comfort and contentment of residents including promoting of social and economic development and upgrading the living standards of citizens. The commune council protects and conserves the environment, natural resources, national culture and heritage, reconciling differences of opinion and encourages mutual understanding and tolerance between residents and to undertake citizens' general affairs to meet the needs of Citizens (RGC 2001).

Accordingly, Seila states that the Local Area Management Committee is not very clear in its description of the mechanisms that could enable greater consultations and participation by villagers in local development and local governance. Besides mentioning the mandatory selection of village chiefs known as the Mephum to represent all residents of the village and to act as a main link between the village and Commune/Sangkat Council. Also, the Mephum

participates in meetings of various commune committees in which they share views on matters relating to the village and regularly consult with residents of the villages. Taking into consideration of this arrangement, unlike the Zambian set up, the concerns describes how Cambodia links decentralised structures by establishing two clear links: a horizontal bridge between village chief and villagers on matters of village development, and a vertical link with the Commune Council.

Citizen consultation is described in sub-decree which prescribes the Commune/Sangkat Council to actively promote and facilitate the process of developing mechanisms to consult with Commune /Sangkat residents and community organisations. The main spaces for citizens' participation described in the LAMC are the annual Commune where every Commune/Sangkat resident can attend but cannot vote, (RGC Chapter 3, Article 30, 2002).

A survey conducted in 2004 indicated that citizens perceived commune performance positively and trusted them more than the district or provincial authorities (Kim Ninh and Henke 2005). However, as Turnor (2002) puts it, the main problems encountered by the reform so far were the absence of specific organic law on decentralisation which had resulted in government relying on sub-decree to regulate specific aspects of the reform and confirm the perception of an incremental and non-unitary approach to decentralisation.

In that context, one can assume that the distinctive policies that underline the present reform in Cambodia has led to a perception that political decentralisation and administrative deconcentration are separate policies progressing at a different pace. Communes have no financial autonomy and receive limited grants from the central government. The general tone of the law can be seen to have avoided the establishment of formalised and rigid spaces for participation and successfully limit the perception of an extension of the state into the realm of civil society. It is unclear about how to involve already existing bodies like the VDCs thereby limiting local initiatives since it is not explained in more detail about how participation can take place within the existing legislative framework.

As common in developing countries, Latin America is probably the region where due to cultural factors and the colonial heritage like in Zambia, the central administration remains the strongest. Turner and Hulme (1997), citing Harris (1983), argue that concentration of

decision-making within central government ministries is a fundamental characteristic of Latin American governments.

Turning back to Colombia for example, Fiske (1996) has stated that the first steps of the decentralisation reform in Colombia dates to 1985 with the mayors' election at municipality level. Unlike the Zambian system of decentralisation, municipalities are granted a greater role in health and education management. Considering education for example, the strategy adopted by the government is described by Fiske as two-folds: Municipalisation of education and enhanced local school's autonomy. The first objective was reached by transferring resources for education to municipalities; the second by granting schools more decision-making power in managing personnel, designing aspects of the curriculum and finance. Fiske points out that while communities and parents are more involved in school activities, the implementation of the plan encounters strong resistance from bureaucrats, politicians and teachers' unions favoring national negotiations of contracts. As a result, the reform has been re-drafted considerably reducing powers of municipalities and local schools.

As pointed out by Marchelli (2003), EDUCO (Education con participation de la comunidad) is often cited as a successful example of decentralisation of education and community participation in schools. Marchelli (2003) states that EDUCO started in 1991 as a major strategy to access pre-school and basic education in poor rural areas. Under this programme, groups of parents are organised to form non-profit community education associations responsible to manage schools finance by the state. The programme after a pilot in six districts received support from the World Bank and was expanded. The fact that the programme became World Bank- sponsored, it contributed to its continuity despite frequent changes in government administration. The importance of EDUCO was based on the fact that the design of the programme was based on the experience of peasant communities that had created local schools separately from the state ones.

Through EDUCO, the central government gained control of the popular schools that were established outside the state system and had provided additional resources that communities were willing for in education. At the same time, the Ministry of Education had also helped to institutionalise the approach by signing partnership agreements with the community education associations once established. This helped to define clear roles and responsibilities in the use of funds transferred from the central government. Other Associations'

responsibilities included the hiring of teachers and support staff and the purchase of classroom materials. Marchelli points out that association members were not paid for administering the services, but their main incentive was based in the socio and economic development of their community through education.

However, an EDUCO assessment by World Bank found that with close community monitoring and the potential sanctions not to re-engage teachers who could not perform, teachers and student's absenteeism became lower than in traditional schools, though student achievements in EDUCO schools was no different from that of traditional schools.

From the social cohesion point of view, EDUCO had provided the main benefits. Di Gropello (2006) has noted a growth of social cohesion in the communities where parents' empowerment was strengthening democratic participation as well as the relations with schools and local government bodies. Considering the above, EDUCO had contributed in fostering community unity, social development and democracy, making the school a community centre for education and social development.

The study has also drawn some lessons from Asia especially by looking at the study which was done by the United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) on community participation. The study took note that government in power initially placed its emphasis on national unity and economic stabilisation. In this context, Indonesia has since 1970s placed its emphasis on national unity and economic stabilisation through community participation. The government in Indonesia has paid increasing attention to economic growth, regional development and decentralisation. Indonesia's widely dispensed territory advocates for a unifying central state to hold the country together and for extensive decentralisation to match government to local needs.

Equally, a study on Pakistan has observed that the new local government system was introduced with the intention to ensure genuine democracy at the grass root level. In Pakistan, power is transferred to the people's representatives at all levels along with responsibility and administrative authority with checks and balances to prevent the abuse of power. In this system, community participation has also been encouraged through village and neighborhood councils and citizen community board (CCB). Citizens are ensured with all

developmental activities and are mandated to keep monitoring the performance of district councils.

In India, the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts (CAAs), passed in 1992 represent important landmarks of Indian decentralisation. The CAAs mandate gives a clear role for local bodies as independent institutions of local governance with important service delivery roles. Relating to rural and urban decentralisation respectively, the CAA defines the required structure of local government as well as the broad functions assigned at different levels. In India, there is a requirement for direct elections on a five yearly basis and minimum seat reservations are made for women as well as for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes.

The institution of the State Election Commission (SEC) is defined with a mandate to oversee organisation and management of elections. Similarly, the State Finance Commissions (SFC) are constituted on a five yearly basis to make recommendations on the fiscal relations between state governments and lower levels of government. The CAAs introduced a minimal level of decentralisation across the country. Individual state governments require to pass enabling legislation for the CAAs to implement the detailed political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation making such adaptations to the provisions of the CAAs as necessary local contextual factors for community participation.

It is important to note in the study that the CAAs were passed by the Government and whilst all state have passed the required enabling legislation, there has been some variation in the commitment of state governments to the principles of decentralisation, and as well as in the implementation of decentralisation reforms. For example, some states like Kerala have shown considerable commitment in developing both functional and financial responsibilities to lower tier of government. There is an increase in both the proportion and absolute levels of un tied grants like the case of Madhya Pradesh which has been active in the promotion of village level democracy through the concept of gram swaraj thereby granting greater powers of planning, consultation and accountability to the local authorities and communities as well. West Bengal is also seen as actively promoting rural reforms from the period prior to the enactment of the CAAs and has activated the District Planning Committee as well as

established a Cabinet style “Mayor in Council” system within urban local government. The parallel devolution of funding and human resources has however been less evident.

In India, political decentralisation are the most successful of all reforms. New changes included regular elections at all levels of government. The State Election Commissions reserve seats for women and other marginalised groups and there has been a significant progress in promoting more grass roots democratic process. Like what World Bank (2000) puts it, following the CAAs, several states have held elections more frequently with representation as per constitutional requirements and the levels of participation have been generally high.

In reviewing rural decentralisation performance in India, the Institute of Social Sciences stresses that significant challenges remain in promoting participation and transparency. Johnson (2003) has also stressed the dangers of local elite capture in rural community participation. He focussed on the tension that exists between a formal model of democracy and its implementation within a society in which power relations and politics are primarily determined by informal socio-cultural factors which embrace the notions of inequality and domination. Whilst functional responsibilities of different levels of government have been defined within legislation in almost all states, consideration of decentralisation in practice on a state by state basis suggests that, functional responsibilities have generally remained more centralised often with the same functions being assigned to different tiers of government with no effective co-ordination mechanisms which are likely to result in duplication.

There is also a clear knowledge gap in relation to the determining the appropriate functional assignments to each level of local government including block and villages. In addition, associated transfer of personnel and resources to lower levels of local government has often been limited, nor have such functionaries generally been brought under the control of local government.

Another important factor influencing functional decentralisation has been the role of the non-elected bureaucracy. Like Zambia, shaped by the colonial legacy, India’s administrative machinery is large, and led by the Indian Administrative Service often working in a centralised manner because of “Regulation and command” management style. Many rural areas, state government, line departments retain considerable implementation powers in some

cases with control over local government resources. Thus, given the centrality of this dimension, fiscal policy lies at the very heart of devolution as the key to ensuring that rural and urban local governments have the financial means to fulfill constitutional and/or legal mandates.

Within the Indian context, there is also a focus on fiscal policy because selected state finance commissions have shown a reasonable degree of innovation in the design of fiscal devolution frameworks and transfers. However, this study observes that despite the wide variation, the system of decentralising expenditure seems to have very little improvements in basic services because the local authorities have proved to be ill-equipped to implement development programmes and projects. It has been also noted that the strengthening of local capacity can improve the professional standards of central officials stationed at lower levels of government and not those at the local level. Most importantly it is worth to note that since local government officials are paid out of central government allocations and their promotion and pay depend on central government decisions, any real devolution of decision-making is difficult. This study further observes that by standards, the real degree of decentralisation in developing countries remains low.

It is also imperative to note that greater decentralisation is inevitable as the economy becomes more complex and regionally specialised. Such a movement, among other things enhances the efficiency of local tax collection to provide local governments with additional revenue and autonomy.

A country Report prepared by Dainis, under the auspices of the Economic and social commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) in collaboration with the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) and Asia-Pacific Region (ASPAC) noted that the financial position of local authorities in Sri Lanka is not sound enough to plan services for a larger geographical area as this involves large investments. This is more apparent in urban local authorities where the urban poor, living in shanties and squatter settlements do not pay any rates. The report also observes that there is excessive financial dependence on, and influence of, the centre in terms of local government finances.

There are regular delays and shortfalls that further exacerbate the negative effects of dependence on the centre. We argue in this thesis that financial autonomy exemplified by

adequate own financial resources and supported by the receipt of adequate and regular disbursements from the centre is very critical to the effective performance of decentralisation and community participation in various developmental programmes at local level.

The observations made by the Sri Lankan Country Report, therefore, are indicative of the universality of some of the critical problems facing most local authorities and local communities in development arena under decentralisation. These observations are of great interest to our thesis as we also note that the ability of local communities to participate in development and deliver adequate quality services depends on the availability of adequate finances.

However, the generality of Dainis' work makes it substantially different from our case study approach and our emphasis on the examination of how problems of community participation in a decentralised system impact on development that are at different levels within the same government. This difference in the study design and emphasis is very critical to the effective understanding on issues related to decentralisation and community participation for development.

Another country Report prepared by Akbar Zaidi under the auspices of ESCAP in collaboration with IULA and ASPAC, noted that the new local government system in Pakistan was introduced with the intention to ensure genuine democracy at the grass roots level. In this system, power would be transferred to the people's representatives at all levels along with responsibility and administrative authority couples with checks and balances to preclude the abuse of power or authority. In this system, community participation has also been ensured through village /neighborhood councils and citizen community Board (CCB).

The citizens are given a monitoring opportunity by being ensured information about development activities. Citizens play their direct role in monitoring the performance of district councils and the departments through the Citizen Community Boards (CCB). To ensure transparency, it is obligatory to display information on various development activities by the local council for the public knowledge.

Therefore, good governance at the local level can, among other things, be guaranteed if community participation in the affairs of local communities is encouraged and nurtured. Such

participation can enhance the effective and efficient delivery of public services, by local authorities, in a transparent and accountable manner. The importance of the characteristics of the Pakistan local government system, made by Zaidi in the country's report cannot, therefore, be overstated. However, Zaidi's work is more of a general nature capturing, among other things, the importance of public participation in building local democracy and good governance in Pakistan.

More importantly, jurisdictional decentralisation may well be the political path for catalysing functional decentralisation. At one level, by devolving powers to sub-national governments can play an important role in supporting incentives for lower tiers to reform their service delivery. In South Africa, for example, the central government has implemented a conditional grant aimed at providing incentives for reform of urban services for large cities after having devolved powers to city governments (Ahmad 1996). In the United States, given that municipalities have devolved authority over service delivery, state governments can credibly play the role of an independent regulator. In contrast, in Indian states, the fragmentation of responsibilities between states and municipalities has created a situation whereby policy makers at the state level have very little incentive to devolve powers to providers or local governments.

In addition, during the process of devolution, the transition period between centralised to decentralised systems, upper tier governments have the chance to enforce functional decentralisation at the sub-national level. For example, in Pakistan the federal government has offered fiscal incentives to the provinces to restructure their education services. During an early stage of decentralisation when sub-national governments may not have the requisite capacity and there are political incentives to show success in service delivery, such fiscal incentives can provide the incentives for sub-national governments to restructure their services in ways that separates policy making, provision and regulatory functions.

The study has so far revealed considered expectation of comprehensive reform on one hand, but reluctant of central government to effect significant change on the other hand. Although local government systems have different histories, their similarity in the end is marked. They all must relate to higher levels of government either state or provincial level, or to national governments. The higher levels by and large dominate relations. The study has noted that being a line agency of higher levels of government does not in itself constitute local self-

government. In the Korean case, for example, it has been observed that even having freely elected councils does not mean self-government if all the local politicians administer central commands. Central control even to the determination of local authorities themselves is marked in Sri Lanka. Local dependency on centrally allocated funds reinforces the respective weakness and strength of the two levels.

The study undoubtedly provides a lot of information regarding the problems and prospects of decentralisation in general and the difficulties that communities and local authorities encounter. A cross-national comparison naturally poses a great challenge regarding the determination of the nature as well as the amount of data that need to be considered in the study. What this means, is that the probability of overlooking certain data and or over-emphasizing various issues at the expense of other is much higher. The study has provided a comprehensive understanding of the problems and prospects of decentralisation and community participation for development being experienced in Zambia by respective local authorities and citizens.

Ghana is also another interesting country to explore literature on the implementation of decentralisation. Ayee (2000) states that in Ghana, the local government councils introduced in 1952 were composed of two-thirds elected members and one-third traditional leaders (chiefs), and this system was reaffirmed in the decentralisation reforms of 1974. And although the 1988 reforms, under Rawlings regime banished the chiefs from the formal local government system, the same proportion of elected and appointed members was retained to strengthen central government influence. Ayee (2000) points out that the main argument in favour of one-third appointees is on the understanding that the system promotes merit since it is necessary to ensure the inclusion of members with requisite skills and expertise such as key professionals.

Accordingly, and in practice however, the presidential appointment system provides central government and the party in power with the opportunity to appoint party loyalists and thus strengthens party influence in local areas. It also provides the President with a means by which to patronise elite groups in the district, such as those in business and traditional chiefs. The allegiance and accountability of appointed members is unlikely to be downward to the electorate but upward to those in central government to whom they owe their position.

Ayee in Nkrumah (2000) has explained that the lack of a fully elected district administrator (DA), inclusive of an elected DCE is a significant deficit in the system of democratic representation and in the accountability of local representatives to the electorate. In this manner, according to Nkrumah, the democratic principle of popular control is severely compromised.

One important aspect to note is that local authorities are not completely dependent on central government because local authorities have some revenue-raising powers. Such local taxation is limited, however, with Nkrumah (2000) he states that the “lucrative tax fields such as income tax, sales tax, import and export duties all belong to the centre, while local government has access only to low yielding taxes such as basic rates and market tolls.

Given the extensive responsibilities decentralised to district authorities, it is generally recognised that local authorities’ financial position is weak. Local government has little fiscal independence rendering them overwhelmingly dependent on central government for its financial resources with limited revenue raising ability. Oyugi (2000) suggests that the dependence of local authorities on central government funding leads to a loss of operational autonomy with local initiatives undermined.

The consequence of a fiscal crisis for local government generated by central government is the inability to deliver public services in line with new responsibilities. This scenario weakens the DA’s legitimacy in the eyes of the local electorate. Any notion of popular control is undermined by the truism that ‘he who pays the piper, call the tune’, the DAs respond less to local taxpayers and more to the requirements of central government.

The decentralisation of decision-making and public service provision in specified areas entails a related rise in public expectations of local government. Yet a common problem is that existing local government structures do not have the necessary capacity to undertake new and expanded responsibilities, with a resultant failure to meet such raised expectations and erosion in the support for local democracy. The DA system in Ghana like the District Commissioner in Zambia, appear to suffer from legitimacy gap.

Afrobarometer, a public opinion survey discovered that citizens were more likely to consult traditional chiefs, faith-based leaders and other notables than go to local government representatives or public officials. Only about 56% of respondents were satisfied with the

performance of local government representatives compared with 65% with traditional chiefs (Bratton et al. 2001: 243).

Thus, capacity building of district level institutions is clearly essential if the legitimacy of democratic local governance is not to be undermined. Issues of district level capacity concern deliberative legislative and executive functions. Deliberation and legislation occur in the District Assembly itself, inclusive of its committee structures. As a relatively new institution, the DAs remain quite weak. There is a need to strengthen the DA as a key institution of democratic politics at the local level. For instance, through training programmes for DA members and staff as well as strengthening of committee structures and infrastructural development and the enhancement of human resources. Clearly multilateral and bilateral development agencies could contribute towards such capacity building.

Regarding executive capacity, the key issue concerns the creation of a Local Government Civil Service. Despite this being constitutionally mandated and the relevant bill being drafted, public officials working at district level remain under the control of deconcentrated central government ministries and agencies. Bratton et al (2001) indicates that the lack of a competent civil service under DA control undermines its capabilities to assume responsibility for socio-economic development in local areas as intended in constitutional provisions and to discharge its roles as institution of local democratic governance.

The failure to establish a local government civil service means that the position of the District Co-ordinating Director (DCD) is particularly anomalous from a democratic perspective. As the highest-ranking civil servant, he/she should be appointed by and accountable to the DA as the head of the local government service, as would appear to be the constitutional intent (Article 240, 2(d), with government officials in the district accountable to him or her. Concerns are expressed regarding DAs' capacity for financial management, described by (Ayee 2000: 38) as "seriously inadequate", with evidence from three case study districts. As an institution with responsibility for significant amounts of public funds, DAs must possess the capacity to put such funds to efficient use. Otherwise its case for an additional percentage of national revenue and its legitimacy in the eyes of the electorate is undermined.

The question of local government capacity can take on a 'chicken and egg' character (Conyers 1990: 30, cited in Ribot 2001: 45). Central government is frequently reluctant to

transfer power and responsibility until local government has the requisite capacity to fulfil such tasks, yet no attempt to strengthen local government capacity is made until it is ceded such powers. Ribot (2001: 58) argues for power before capacity, precisely as the means for gaining capacity. What is certain is that the legitimacy of democratic local government is undermined unless there is serious attention to strengthen the quality and quantity of its human and technical resources.

Ribot (2001) has indicated that the democratic principles of popular control and political equality only become meaningful where local government has the capacity to implement policy choices and to deliver public services. Without capacity building, the alternative scenario is that of setting up a system merely to fail. A perceived benefit of democratic decentralisation is the enhancement of political participation in processes of political decision-making and socio-economic development at local levels. Moreover, participation is clearly a key element of effective popular control over government. Popular local participation in local decision-making is explicitly stated in the Constitution of Ghana as an objective of decentralisation.

An initial examination of issues of civil society participation is provided highlighting concerns regarding the representation and participation of women. There are no legal or political barriers to participation in democratic local governance in Ghana despite having an informal exclusion through poverty, illiteracy and rural isolation. Culturally, the persistence of gender stereotyping and of male power hinders the participation of women.

However, making an analysis of decentralisation in detail about Ghana, it seems that decentralisation measures in Ghana have not really enhanced the level of citizen participation in local decision-making and in local development initiatives. (Ayee 2000: 34) believes however that the opportunities for participation are moderate but growing while his own evidence and that of others have also indicated that such opportunities for civil society organisations and the electorate at large remain limited.

There is evidence of some consultation procedures in the formulation and implementation of local policies and programmes through village meetings. Yet (Ayee 2000: 36) observes that such procedures are not standard practice and that more commonly the DA representatives suggest programmes or projects at DA meetings without any prior consultation with the

electorate (Ibid: 37). In his publication, Ayee notes that projects financed from the DACF are mainly determined either by the central government or in a few cases by individual DA members without the involvement of the local people.

The local self-help projects have been stimulated by the DA system, often in collaboration with national and international NGOs, such as the construction of schools, clinics and latrines. Ayee (2000) notes that such NGO activities have expanded both in scope and intensity under decentralisation. He has further stipulated that, although decentralisation may provide a more favourable environment for such efforts, the involvement in local development activities of NGOs from outside the communities is hardly new, and it is questionable as to whether the expansion of such activities is linked to democratic decentralisation. Alternatively, the increased operation of NGOs at grassroots level as noted by Nkrumah could be due to the withdrawal of the state both central and local from local service provision. Also, as encouraged by donor-driven agenda of neo-liberalism coupled with the increased availability of donor funding for NGOs. Further questions concern who participates and whether participation is restricted to a subset of the populace with others relatively excluded. Consultants for USAID indicate that local professional organisations such as those of teachers and nurses exert more influence on DAs than other groups possibly due to relatively high socio-economic status and involvement in their respective communities (USAID 2003).

The USAID report indicated a sense of powerful local notable business-people or other entrenched and dominant interests exerting disproportionate influence on the DCE (Ibid 76). This not only suggests a degree of elite dominance but also the by-passing of the District Assembly and its more democratic structures seeking direct influence on the powerful of presidential appointee. There is a lack of formal mechanisms to channel civil society input into local government decision-making and local development planning as well as to undertake oversight functions to participate. As a result, decentralisation has not been able to wholly stimulate the enthusiasm of the ordinary people in Ghana” (Ayee 2000: 37).

Constraints on participation and the prevalence of elite dominance respectively limit popular participation in Ghana. Elite control over government is most effective where various forms of participation facilitate the expression of public opinions through elites and oblige governments to listen to the people. Problems of elite control are familiar in representative

democracies and dominance by local elites is common in Ghana. And with rural poverty and economic inequalities presenting strong obstacles to political equality and the more equal distribution of influence among different social groups, citizen participation is not effective. Nevertheless, efforts have been made to encourage the more active involvement of poorer people and to reduce the differential access to political processes.

The poor representation and participation of women in democratic local governance is a particularly an acute issue. Both quantitative figures and qualitative impressions confirm that the representation of women in the DA system is low. Ayee (2000: 34) states that the dominance of men in the work of the DAs is overwhelming with low statistics for the lack of representation of women. About the civil service, women constitute 24 per cent of those in local government predominantly in secretarial and clerical posts, and only twelve percent are in administrative decision influencing class (Ibid: 4).

The lack of female representation both at the political and administrative levels inevitably has an adverse impact on the ability of community-based groups to voice their concerns to DAs, and on the responsiveness of local government to women's needs and to issues of gender inequality. Both practical and cultural factors are notable evidence as obstacles to women participation include time and financial constraints. The former pertains to women's multiple roles as wives, mothers, workers and community activists while the latter relate to a lack of access to the funds required for campaigning especially on an individual non-partisan basis. The gender gap in education is another impediment to women's participation but deeper-seated cultural beliefs are probably of more consequence. Ofei-Aboagye (2000:4) points out that gender stereotypes of men's and women's roles include the widely held perception that political activity is 'dirty' and not for decent women.

Essentially the political arena is seen by many men as their sole preserve with many husbands reluctant to have their women in the public eye" (Ibid 38). Women are intimidated by their husbands and by society in general from participating in the District Assemblies (USAID 2003: 10). Further, Ofei-Aboagye (2000: 4) cites direct instances of the assertion of male authority and power in Assembly meetings like that of women being shouted at or being ignored by the Presiding member when intending to make interventions.

The principles of popular control and political equality are both severely undermined by the evolution of acute gender inequalities. The equal right of all citizens, women and men to stand for public office and to be represented in government is seriously impaired by the male domination throughout the DA system. The idea of popular control by all citizens is seriously impaired in situations where women's concerns and needs are at best marginalised.

Ofei-Aboagye (2000) suggests two approaches, one targeted at enhancing women's capacity to participate in the DA system, and the other at changing the relatively hostile environment for women in local government institutions.

Enhancing women's capacity entails measures to encourage women's representation and to encourage women's groups to engage with local government structures. Fostering an improved environment for women's participation involves increasing their awareness of local government, at both political and administrative levels of women needs and concerns and of issues of gender inequality.

In contemporary Ghana, as in other countries, there is an elite consensus in favour of decentralisation as a positive force for democracy. These are not specific to Ghana but common to most if not all countries including Zambia and the so-called developed countries. Nkrumah (2000: 53) observes that Parliament, the government and its agencies, donors and international institutions are supposed to be interested in decentralisation as a process towards a more democratic society in which enhanced and sustainable human development should be possible." In this context, decentralisation is regarded as an important programme that it enjoys constitutional guarantees and open bipartisan support. The post-independence history of decentralisation in Ghana has been characterised as one of deconcentration as successive governments from President Nkrumah onwards. Both civilian and military sought to strengthen their control through the presence of central government ministries and officials at local level. The contemporary period of the Fourth Republic overseen by the 1992 Constitution does involve a step towards more democratic decentralisation despite the degree of devolution appearing to be limited.

The earlier emphasis on deconcentration remains evident especially with the failure to transfer deconcentrated central government departments to local government control. However, a degree of fiscal decentralisation has occurred particularly with the creation of the

District Assembly Common Fund despite the inadequate of financial resources transferred to local government which is severely questioned. Further, the democratic control over financial matters is limited by the sizeable proportion of unelected DA members despite some devolution of power being apparent given the clearly stated principles in the 1992 Constitution.

However, like elsewhere in the globe, decentralisation practice in Ghana has several constraints on democratic local governance regarding key actors in the DA system. There are several shortcomings with respect to their representativeness and downward accountability. Despite the constitutional provisions that implied an autonomous and lead role for local government in initiating and coordinating local development policies. Evidence of the degree of central government control and the lack of local government autonomy undermines any notion of domains of discretionary power.

There is little to suggest that DAs have become the principle authority providing direction and supervision to all other authorities in the district including central government departments and agencies as outlined in the constitutional and legislative provisions. On the contrary, central government appears to remain dominant at district level in terms of top down policy direction and guidance from the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. Two related processes can be identified here, the combination of which undermines the effectiveness and legitimacy of democratic decentralised government. On the one hand, DAs have too much responsibility bestowed upon them including in areas where they have little or no power but are merely the implementing agents of central government policies.

Central government has been able to shift the burden of public service provision to local authorities particularly convenient in financially constrained times. On the other hand, DAs have too little capacity both in financial and human terms to undertake such extensive duties. DAs' lack of power and capacity undermines their ability to execute these newly acquired responsibilities in an efficient, effective and democratic manner. In turn this threatens the legitimacy of quasi democratic institutions especially given the raised expectations of the local populace. Their limited capacity is best concentrated on the minority of areas where they have devolved powers.

The implication is that decentralisation is not structured in ways likely to deliver the presumed benefits of development. Therefore, the working hypothesis that emerges is that the 'constraints on democratic development are likely to have negative implications for pro-poor outcomes.

In ending up exploring our literature review, it is imperative to learn some lessons from Uganda. Today probably, Uganda has the most appropriate legal framework for decentralisation in the African continent because the government of Uganda is deeply committed to decentralisation. To begin with, when the National Resistance Movement (NRM) took over-power in 1986, it instituted a five-layer hierarchy of Council and Committees from village to district levels which later in 1995 renamed as the Local Council (LC).

One important factor to note as far as decentralisation is concerned in Uganda is the number of financial resources transferred to local government. Fiscal decentralisation is one of the highest in Africa. As Lolojih (2008) puts it, the experiences in Uganda's decentralisation efforts informs us that decentralisation is a long-term learning process involving various stakeholders in which trials and errors takes place in various aspects.

Uganda has seen to it that decentralisation is implemented in a much broader attempt to transform the wide range of social interactions among different stakeholders. Unlike Zambia, Uganda's decentralisation is clearly not a simple social engineering based on blue print which can be used for everywhere, the Ugandan model shows that decentralisation is complex and that the complexity includes the state itself but the state itself is affected by other stakeholders.

The process of mutual interactions under decentralisation in Uganda is a mix of some improvements and new challenges. Several positive signs are noted, firstly, the relationship between central government and local government changed from the one of center being the controller over the latter to that of mutual partnership. As noted earlier on, in the Ugandan case, participation of local stakeholders has been given prominence especially regarding community participation at village level. In addition, some service delivery ministries at the center have been reorganised to cater for the new relationship. This is considered to enhance

responsiveness from the centre to local authorities. Secondly, significant strategic relationship between the government and the private sectors also has tremendously grown at the local level.

2.5 Conclusion

The main findings of this literature review are that there are gaps between the benefits that proponents of decentralisation on community participation have claimed on decentralisation reforms as a policy objective on effective service delivery, economic development and social cohesion.

The literature has provided several critical issues of local governance and citizen participation that are of great relevance and interest to our study. These issues among others include the observation that the ability of local authorities to control their own finances is the hall mark to self-government. Also, the dependency on central government for resources and need for local authorities to be transparent and accountable to the communities are fundamental aspects of decentralisation that cannot be ignored. The lessons learnt so far provides a gap in many aspects especially for administrative reforms that would enhance effectiveness and efficiency in local decentralised system of government. We have noted that several reforms conducted in many of the countries of the study signifies a mere transfer of administrative responsibilities and not a move toward genuine local governance that compels citizen ownership in programme implementation. These are indeed fundamental issues whose examination by policy makers and other stakeholders interested in ensuring an effective, efficient, transparent, and accountable local government system should be based on.

In accordance to the literature, Northern and Muchinga provinces of Zambia have shown that while the reform has somehow broadened the ability of community members to be engaged in community development, it is difficult however to quantify service delivery improvements. Primarily, the move is understood by majority of citizens mainly for political reasons. The expected benefits of decentralisation for economic development have not been fully realised. And although the difficult aspect of researching this area means that it is hard to draw a definite conclusion on the matter, we make suggestions that there is no pure decentralisation because of lack of consensus on what constitute decentralisation in totality. Whilst literature

does not refute claims that decentralisation can improve community participation for development, we are compelled to reiterate by emphasising in this study that decentralisation if properly executed can bring some levels of development especially in rural areas. However, it is also imperative to note that the literature has revealed that decentralisation can be a panacea for development if community members are well informed or have resources and capacity to implement the reform because decentralisation if well harnessed can cure the ills of developing countries in terms of poor and depressing service delivery, weak economic development, low social cohesion and high levels of poverty.

Decentralisation reforms should not be always affected by the political context in which they are implemented because as indicated in the literature, decentralisation reforms are highly controversial and contested as most of such reforms determine the decision-making power and sometimes disrupt the already established power relations. It is therefore vitally important to engage in political economy analysis and understand the context of reforms to fully appreciate how they can be designed appropriately from a developmental perspective.

As already found in the study, critical interrogation of the literature has reviewed that decentralisation and community participation in Zambia has been implemented on the backdrop of centralism thereby providing challenges on accessing written information on community participation, but again a good critical primary research especially for Zambia on community participation. Similarly, while there are examples where decentralisation and participation has taken place, several studies have indicated that decentralisation is a political jargon because of the lack of adherence to the concept of decentralised community participation. This in principle resonates as to why it was imperative to undertake this study because it would help to provide or enhance both literature in theoretical terms as well as evidence on the actual determinants of community participation and the challenges facing the implementation of decentralisation reform with an aspect of community participation for development in Muchinga and Northern provinces of Zambia.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

The methodology which was adopted during the study described the overlapping areas between research activities and community involvement in various decentralised activities. The aim was to focus on the research methodology by comparing and triangulating the characteristics of the qualitative and quantitative research paradigms and to present reflections on participatory research. First, the study methodology contains the research design and the rationale for adopting a qualitative approach through a case study. Second, the study clarifies the instruments used to gather information such as the semi structured interviews, focus group discussions, non- participant observation and various documents in a bid to discuss how and why they were selected and used.

To effectively address the research objectives, the study took note of the extensive debates on the various research paradigms so that the methodology could be informed by a specific research philosophy. Details of these philosophical reflections were later explored based on various investigations.

Two main reasons informed our choice for overall qualitative methodology. To begin with, the complexities of socio-cultural issues predominantly found in Muchinga and Northern provinces cannot adequately be addressed using the dominant quantitative research methodology through questionnaire surveys. In this regard, the study recognised the complexities of multiple realities and the need for negotiated knowledge production and contextualisation of such knowledge (Pottier 2003; Briggs 2005: 103). Secondly, our key interest in the study was to combine research with development action by actively involving the research participants in such a way that the knowledge jointly generated could extend their understanding of issues and stimulate some desired follow-up actions to improve their participation.

We are compelled to state again that this research adopted largely a qualitative method approach consisting of semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions and observation.

Exploring community participation, peoples' actions and perceptions in every-day thoughts prompted us to employ a qualitative approach as a more appropriate method. It is imperative to note that there are areas of social reality which statistics cannot fully interpret. The main advantage with qualitative research is the ability to study and describe experiences and social phenomena (Silverman, 2006). And because the objective of the research is to investigate and evaluate the nature and extent of community participation on decentralised activities, an exploratory research design was chosen to provide insights and comprehension to issues on community participation. This approach is particularly useful when researchers lack a clear idea of the problems they will meet during the study (Blumberg et al, 2008: 201).

During our fieldwork, the concept of communal concern evolved more clearly during the research. The thought of communal concern was suitable since we wanted to find out what was going on socially within the communities, the meaning behind their actions and their communal concerns or issues regarding community participation for development.

3.2 Study Design

In social sciences however, quantitative and qualitative approaches are the main traditional approaches to viewing the social world in search of reality. These have significant variations depending on the theoretical orientation of the framework that guides in the searching for reality. Quantitative research which is associated with positivism on the other hand tends to favour the idea that reality must be measured by the 'right' research instruments and that the objective facts can only be understood and mastered by statistics and experiments. In contrast, qualitative research maintains that realities can only be superficially touched on by research and that the role of the researcher is to try to make sense through interpretation, to explore, elucidate and then interpret bits of reality (Bryman, 2004). In other words, the social world is seen from the point of view of the actors where reality is subjective, socially constructed and facts and values are inextricably linked.

Considering the above therefore, the study opted to mix quantitative and qualitative approaches referred to as mixed-methods research. The main idea was triangulation and complementarity between research approaches (Bryman, 2004). However, the study was aware that some ideas could not necessarily be shared between approaches, so triangulation meant to carefully scrutinise the information which was appropriate for this kind of research.

In this context, triangulating or complementing data within one approach was favored but in collaboration with the other method as a control measure. This is when the data to address the same phenomenon is investigated using two or more research methods, tools, or strategies (Scott and Morrison, 2006). Above and beyond, Bryman (2007) has discovered that researchers who claim to use mixed methods end up reporting or basing their findings on one of them.

However, it should be noted that the choice of approach for studying the social world depends on the nature of the social problem or phenomenon under study and thus the researcher's primary concern becomes the central base (Wellington, 2007). This means that if the concern is to explain and predict, then a choice of quantitatively oriented methods may be appropriate. However, if the researcher wants to understand the experiences of phenomena from the actors' perspectives, a qualitative approach must be applied. This study adopted a qualitative approach to explore the nature of decentralisation and community participation in the provision of social services in Muchinga and Northern Provinces of Zambia where participants' perspectives and understanding of the phenomenon was significant due to its location.

We are therefore compelled to repeat that this research study largely made use of the qualitative methodology. As already indicated above, qualitative research methodology enabled us to engage our research participants to review their real-life experiences and feelings. Using this method, it was possible to review what people knew and the reasons why they understood the issues surrounding community participation in that way. In this context, the study explored real life experience of the communities. The qualitative approach enabled community members and key informants to tell their own stories on the research topic. In this way, it facilitated the researcher to value and appreciate local people as key informants of the study.

Further, the study being both explanatory and descriptive in nature, provided an account descriptive of the characteristics of the four districts about decentralisation and community participation in general. As a result, various causal relationships between some variables were examined which have impacts on community participation with a view to collecting as much data as possible in two districts from each province.

It must be remembered that existing sources of information is influenced by the political orientation of authors, official documents relate to specific regimes and ideologies. Government documents tend to emphasize the positive results and achievements over policy failures and donors' reports were balanced against their specific aims. By reviewing different sources, the study attempted to present different perspectives about decentralisation history and development in Zambia as well as the traditional norms and values that shape community participation in general.

It is also important to note that when carrying out qualitative research, some data were presented in quantitative format such as percentages. This is what researchers encounter when collecting data on various research problems even when dealing with qualitative design. It is thus imperative to explain that both qualitative and quantitative data operate in a continuum of mutual respect. They reinforce each other and very useful in data collection and analysis of the findings.

3. 2. 1 Qualitative Approach

The choice of a qualitative approach for this study was based on the following reasons.

- (i) A qualitative approach is determined by the objectives of the research under study (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). In this study, the central aim was to examine the effects of decentralisation opportunities from both rural and urban communities. These included the views of ordinary people and government officials, bureaucrats and other leaders in districts, town and Villages.

Therefore, the perceptions, feelings and experiences of those who participated were valued as worthy of investigations. Again, the qualitative approach was chosen because it offers the possibility of a thorough description and richer explanation of complex problems especially that community participation is an elusive social phenomenon to be studied in everyday context. In this context, an appropriate and carefully framed questioning procedure was outlined that allowed participants to disclose their perceptions and experiences about decentralisation and community participation. The design for this study method was open and flexible enough to manage the complexity of participatory issues. The use of semi-structured interviews

along with focus group discussions and open-ended questions allowed free, open and deep discussions regarding community participation issues.

- (ii) A qualitative research is about interpretation of the social world. The interpretivists believe that reality is in the mind of people and is socially constructed through interaction and thus its interpretation is based on the definitions people attach to the phenomenon in the social context (Sarantakos, 1998). Through qualitative research methods, which favour an in-depth investigation of a phenomenon, this study captured the actual voices of community members about decentralisation and community participation.

3.3 Data collection methods

The research as described above was largely qualitative and employed a mixed method approach to investigate the study questions and objectives. The mixed methodology was chosen because of the variety of questions under investigation and because different methods and sources were needed to validate participants' perspectives with data and research findings from other sources including literature review that best suit with our ontological and epistemological positions of the research. The study also made extensive use of secondary data.

The study also used an in-depth interview to supplement other methods for gathering primary data from various categories of individual participants. Interviews were aimed at exploring individual beliefs, perceptions, attitudes and opinions on a face to face basis either as individual or in groups. The research employed questionnaires which were specifically designed for different categories of respondents. Some questionnaires were semi-structured as a way of soliciting more information on study objectives than having merely specific and or close-ended questions.

The interviews were mainly guided by open-ended questions arranged by thematic order such as developmental benefits, formal and informal institutional relationships or local governance issues. The semi-structured interviews meant that the participants were asked categorised queries but with the flexibility for adjustment in response to its development. Questions could

be altered, and additional questions added when necessary. All the interviews were conducted either in the local languages such as Bemba, Mambwe, Lungu, Lambya, Nyika, Namwanga and Tumbuka. English language was used when probing government and NGOs officials. For this reason, we had to translate the questionnaires from English to various local languages. Interview sessions lasted from thirty minutes to one and half hours depending mostly on the category of the respondents.

Interviewing members of the communities in all the four districts appeared somehow challenging for various reasons. First, despite explaining to the respondents about the doctoral study using the introductory letter from the University of Zambia about the research project, several participants thought that the research was just consuming their time, and that the study had hidden intention other than the actual stated purpose.

This perception from the respondents culminated into two potential expectations; Firstly, some residents started to view it as a way of solving their community development problems and thus started to participate positively rather than focusing on the thematic questions. Secondly, some participants became reluctant to share information because of fear that revealing sensitive information might create personal problems to their local and traditional leaders. However, the researcher had to openly assure participants that the interviews were confidential and purely based on fulfilling the PhD research purpose by explaining more about the research activities. In addition, given cultural social settings, it became difficult to interview female participants. In such cases, several interviewees of different sexes had to be present during the interview sessions as a way of ensuring participants were actively participating in the discussions.

Further, the study was verified by collecting primary data through structured and semi-structured interviews with various participants such as Chiefs, members of communities, traditional leaders, decentralisation Secretariat officials, Faith Based Organisations, Councilors and other key informants.

The information collected through desk research mainly focused on various documentation on decentralisation, local governance and community participation.

3.4 Sampling Frame and Selection of the Target Groups

The study being multi-dimensional in nature, multiple sampling techniques were used for specific groups of informants. For government and other formal institutions for example, multi-staged sampling was done, which began with developing a sampling frame with all possible government departments in the area listed in the *Zambian Yellow Pages*. Thereafter, purposive sampling was done to select only those ministries the study had an interest in. But regarding individual households and members of the communities, cluster sampling was used in combination with systematic sampling methods.

In this context, the areas were divided into various geographical zones. Thereafter, divided into defined geographical areas depending on the system present in the locality such as townships, villages and so on. The defined geographical areas were assigned numbers and a sample was randomly chosen from them. Individual households and people were thereafter picked systematically using the 3rd number.

Participants in the focus group discussions were chosen on the basis that a person stayed in the study area or community.

Government line Ministry officials, Council officials, staff from community based organisations (CBOs), ordinary residents in the selected four districts and some local traditional leaders participated in the study. Interviews were conducted to other key informants. And a sample size of one thousand (1000) community members or end-users were interviewed through questionnaires in the two provinces of Zambia. Of the total number of one thousand (1000) end users, two hundred fifty (250) respondents were drawn from each district namely, Kasama, Mbala, Chinsali and Nakonde. The respondents were drawn from Urban and Rural areas in the communities with a view to have a well-informed research. The study mainly analysed among others the spaces for community participation created by decentralisation that the government of Zambia had undertaken through its decentralisation reform.

The study objective was arrived at because government had implemented decentralisation programme, hence the supposition is to channel programme and project funding in a way that creates the right incentives for locals and other agents to properly target benefits to the poor.

Further, community members are the recipient of services provided by government and are thus the major stakeholders of all the projects and programmes at the local level. The research acknowledged that the inclusion of residents in the study could provide useful information to the understanding of the effectiveness and efficiency of community participation within the context of decentralisation. The focus was aimed at seeing to it that residents were captured from urban and rural areas in the Northern and Muchinga provinces.

The selection of the two provinces simply represented the analysis on decentralisation concerning areas which are perceived to be less developed and far away from the administrative city. One of the reasons for the study was to deduce whether the rural areas had a bearing on administrative decentralised activities so that one can ascertain that the findings were a true reflection of other outlining areas in the country in general.

Community Based Organisations (CBOs) are very critical in the development of communities because they facilitate community development programmes. Their inclusion was because the study had to ascertain the level of their participation in decentralised system. It is widely acknowledged that Community Based Organisations (CBOs) play a major role in community development and they also expect governments to create an environment which is conducive for their legitimacy recognition to the general populace for service provision.

In the same context, the Traditional leaders in Zambia are greatly respected by both government and local communities and are thus custodian of community development. Traditional leaders guide the community and government on many issues and get involved in the organisation of their subjects for spearheading developmental programmes and projects.

3.4.1 Semi-structured interviews

Open-ended, flexible or non-structured interviews were generally used in interviews. The essential part here was to actively listen allowing the respondents to talk freely and ascribe meanings while keeping in mind the broader aim of the research. In some interviews, we used a more standardised technique, yet most of the research questions occurred freely and randomly.

3.4.2 Focus Group Discussions

Unstructured interviews were held with groups of people being focused on. The groups were selected either as experts such as civil servants or community members within specific areas or from cooperatives to provide their views by discussing various questions and topics which were intended to solicit information from them. The disadvantage with this method, however, is the danger of people holding back their own opinions if they get influenced or intimidated by others in the group. Hence, it can be looked upon as biased since it might consider only most of the group's feelings and ideas. However, the advantage with focus group discussion is the actual interaction between the participants and the researcher since group members build their thoughts upon the contributions made by others through brainstorming about a topic together. In this way, members inspire one another and create new and more elaborated ideas through an active discussion (Blumberg et al., 2008).

Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were used to explore community participatory issues that could not be explained using statistics such as opinions and views on citizen participation. The (FGDs) were useful in providing insights into different opinions among the various residents regarding community involvement in development processes. Groups of 8-16 participants were gathered to discuss local level participation. The researcher guided the discussions and took notes while helping the groups to engage in an open but orderly manner to address the objectives of the study.

As already stated above, the strength of the FGDs was that it allowed the participants to agree or disagree with each other which provided insights into how people in those groups thought about the issue of decentralisation for community participation and development.

The FGDs also gave insight into several opinions and ideas as well as inconsistencies and variation that existed in communities in terms of people's experiences and practices. It is important to note that groups of about twelve to sixteen participants were conducted in different areas with different group members in each district. Table 2 shows the composition of respondents in groups in each district.

Table 2: Categories of Participants in Focus Group Discussions

Name of districts	Groups	Activity
Kasama, Nakonde, Chinsali and Mbala	Group 1: Fifteen Community Members in each district. Group 2: Twelve Senior Council Officials in each district Group 3: Fifteen Central Government officials in each district; Group 4: Eight Civic leaders in each district	Information gathering regarding community participation in collaboration with central government and local authorities.

Source: Some Category of Respondents in the fieldwork.

3.5 Data analysis and reporting

The data that was gathered in the study was mainly qualitative and hence the discourse analysis on working with texts and aural analysis was applied. The quantitative analysis utilised Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) from which the interpretation blended the arguments in support of the theories and approaches because SPSS is equipped with all the tools for statistical analysis including cross-tabulation which was essential for this type of study encompassing narrative and statistical information.

3.6 Limitation of the study

Three sets of issues challenged the research process: Translation, lack of respondents' perspective in the research design and reliance on actors' narrated experiences rather than on long time systematic observation of projects and services. Translation occurred at two levels; Zambia being a British colony but with several languages, meant that most secondary data were originally in different languages as well as in English. A large quantity of literature was excavated in Zambian languages.

For research purposes, rendering them from different local languages to English relied on the multilingual ability of the researcher. The second level of translation was based on primary

data, particularly for respondents who spoke only local languages. Reports were written in the respondent's language first before being translated into English. While a few anthropologists perceive serious limitations in translating informants' views and prefer to quote original interviews alongside their translated versions, the study abandoned this technique for redundancy but conveyed meaning as exactly as possible in instances of translation.

The other limitation relates to geographical coverage of the study, which focused on selected communities in Kasama, Mbala, Chinsali and Nakonde. While several lessons and inferences can be made based on data from these communities, they may be unique and could limit the extent of generalisation of the findings.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated details of the research methods used to answer the research objectives and questions of the study. It has shown that the research was both exploratory and narrative in nature and the use of mostly qualitative methods for in-depth understanding of the research problem has been justified. To conduct a study involving different people in a multi-disciplined and multi-contextual phenomenon as well as in different environmental settings, several inquiry methods were used. The triangulation of multiple sources of data proved to be particularly helpful in analysing complex issues. This chapter revisited the existing methodological knowledge to develop a conceptual and theoretical framework for making analysis on community participation and decentralisation intervention to address the research questions.

The choice of a qualitative approach for this study was based on the understanding that the central aim of the study is to examine the effects of decentralisation on community participation and opportunities thereof. Therefore, the perceptions, feelings and experiences of participants was valued as worthy of for this type of study. Again, the qualitative approach was chosen because it offers the possibility of a thorough description and richer explanation of complex problems especially that community participation is an elusive social phenomenon to be studied in everyday context. In this manner, an appropriate and carefully framed questioning procedure was outlined that allowed participants to disclose their

perceptions and experiences about decentralisation and community participation. The design for this study method was open and flexible enough to manage the complexity of issues through in-depth investigation of a phenomenon to capture the actual voices of community members about decentralisation and community participation.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE CONTEXT OF POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION AND PARTICIPATION IN NORTHERN AND MUCHINGA PROVINCES

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, we will first briefly focus on the political history of administration in Zambia with a view of providing the actual context of the study area on the nature and development of decentralisation in Zambia. Secondly, to appreciate the dynamics of community participation in the context of decentralisation in the two provinces, we will provide a profile of each province in terms of demographic representation, social and economic features of the study areas.

4.2 The History of Political and Administrative Structures

The country Zambia, formerly known as Northern Rhodesia, became known to Britain through the exploits of David Livingstone when he became the first European to see the Zambezi falls, which he sanctified Victoria Falls. His journeys in the 1850s were enthusiastically followed as he embodied the qualities that Victorians respected. A devout Christian, an anti-slavery campaigner, inquisitive and wanting to discover what was on God's earth, he became the Christianity of the third century of British imperialism.

In the same context, the British South African Company endeavored to discover gold north of the Zambezi River. They obtained mineral rights from the Lozi in the Western province. The Ngoni in the Eastern province however, resisted signing over their rights until defeated in the battle by the British South African Company (BSA).

In 1911, the British South African Company (BSAC) was able to provide enough of infrastructure to combine the North Eastern and North Western areas into a single administrative unit. In 1923 the charter for the British South African Company (BSAC) rule was revoked throughout the entire area of Northern Rhodesia in return for a cash payout. With a higher density of white settlers, Southern Rhodesia was awarded a significant degree of self-government. Northern Rhodesia became a colonial office protectorate with its capital at Livingstone. However, the economic prospects for this colony were soon to change as

copper was discovered in the North of the colony in 1928. These were huge deposits and would diversify the agrarian society to a considerable degree. Northern Rhodesia would become one of the largest producers of the copper in the world. Sooner than later, the British government was having problems clawing back some of the rights it had given to the white government because denying self-government to a black Legislative Council would smack of racism and worry other African colonies with similar demands for independence. There were plenty of communists and nationalists who were running out of patience and would seize power if it were delayed too long.

Zambia, is currently officially called the Republic of Zambia, and landlocked or land linked country in the Southern part of Africa. Zambia's neighbours includes the Democratic Republic of the Congo located to the North, Tanzania which is located to the North-East, Malawi to the East, Mozambique found to the South East side, Zimbabwe and Botswana both situated to the South, Namibia to the South West and Angola to the Western side of the country. Zambia has ten provinces including Muchinga and Northern provinces. The capital city is Lusaka, and it is in the South-Central part of Zambia. The population is concentrated mainly around Lusaka province in the South and the Copperbelt Province to the North West. The Copperbelt province is the core economic hubs of the country.

Originally inhabited by the Khoisan people, the region was affected by the Bantu expansion of the thirteenth century. As already alluded to, after visits by European explorers in the eighteenth century, the region became the British protectorates and it was called Northern Rhodesia. For most of the colonial period, Northern Rhodesia was governed by an administration appointed from London with the advice of the British South Africa Company (BSA).

On 24th October 1964, Zambia became independent of the United Kingdom and the Prime Minister Dr David Kenneth Kaunda became the inaugural president. President Kaunda's socialist United National Independence Party (UNIP) maintained power from 1964 until 1991. From 1972 to 1991 Zambia was a one-party state with the UNIP as the sole legal political party under the motto "One Zambia, One Nation". President David Kenneth Kaunda was succeeded by Frederick Chiluba of the social-democratic Movement for Multi-Party Democracy in 1991, beginning a period of social-economic growth aiming to spearhead decentralisation. In the 2011 elections, the Patriotic Front leader Mr Michael Chilufya Sata became the fifth Republican President. Upon his passing on, new elections were held and on


20 January 2015, Dr Edgar Chagwa Lungu was elected as the Sixth President of the Republic of Zambia. It is during the reign of Patriotic Front Government that many districts have been created including Muchinga province which was created by splitting Northern Province into two. The argument for the creation of the province and various districts is to ensure a decentralised government where citizens become champions for development.

4.3 Northern Province: Political Administration, Population and Features

Northern Province of Zambia is located mainly on the great Southern African plateau which has been uplifted to an elevation around 1200 metres above sea level. The Provincial administration is Kasama and is set up purely for administrative purposes. Like any other province in Zambia, the Province is headed by a Minister appointed by the President. The administrative head of the province is the Permanent Secretary who is also appointed by the President. Provincial government is setup purely for administrative purposes. The administrative head of the province is the Permanent Secretary, appointed by the President. There are Deputy Permanent Secretary, heads of government departments and civil servants at the provincial level. Province is further divided into districts and all the district headquarters are the same as the district names. There are district councils in the province, each of which is headed by an elected representative called the councilor. Each councilor holds office for three years. The administrative staff of the council is selected based on Local Government Service Commission from within or outside the district. The office of the provincial government is located in each of the district headquarters and has provincial local government officers and auditors. Each council is responsible for raising and collecting local taxes and the budgets of the council are audited and submitted every year after the annual budget. The elected members of the council do not draw salaries, but are paid allowances from the council. The councils prepare schemes that encourage community participation.

Figure 1 shows location of districts in Northern Province.

Figure 1. Map of Northern Province of Zambia showing location of districts.



Source: SCO; 2013 and Wikipedia encyclopedia

4.3.1 Kasama District

Kasama is situated on the Central-Southern African plateau, approximately 856 kilometres (532 mi), by road, north-east of Lusaka, the capital and largest city in Zambia. The district is located on the Great North Road from Mpika through Kasama to Mbala and on to Mpulungu, at the tip of Lake Tanganyika. kasama district/city lies at an average elevation of 1,374 metres (4,508 ft), above the sea-level

Kasama district is in the heartland of the Bemba ethnic group whose Paramount Chief Chitimukulu maintains his Headquarters about nine kilometres from Malole and about 51 kilometres east of Kasama town.

In 1898 a crisis over the succession of the Chitimukulu led to Bishop Joseph 'Moto Moto' Dupont gaining the agreement of Bemba chiefs to the British colonial Administrator of North-Eastern Rhodesia, Robert Codrington taking control of the area. Codrington established a British Overseas Military Administration (BOMA) at Kasama and the town's central location as well as its closeness to Chitimukulu's court led to it eventually becoming the largest and dominant town of the North-Eastern part of what became Northern Rhodesia, then later, Zambia.

Kasama town has a few modern facilities and most people in Kasama are not formally employed and they run small businesses to earn a living.

4.3.2 Mbala District

Mbala district is formerly known as Abercorn was established in 1890. The name was changed to Mbala district in 1968, and it became a Municipality in 1996. The district is 1,071 Kilometres from Lusaka, the capital city of Zambia and 167 Kilometres from Kasama the provincial Headquarters of Northern province.

Mbala district is the oldest district in Zambia and was the administration capital for North Eastern Rhodesia. The district was first established as Tanganyika district under Central African Authority (CAA) in 1890. It was later declared a crown administration under the British South African Company whose offices were called British Overseas Military Administration (BOMA). The vision of the district as a prosperous district is because the district has a comparative advantage over other districts as it is strategically located as a transit district for people traveling to Mpulungu as well as those travelling to Burundi.

There are various rift valleys in Northern Province extending around the province from the north-west to the south. These rift valleys are also located outside the borders of the province especially the Luapula Mweru valley to the north-west but the escarpments of the Lake Mweru-Wa-Ntipa, the Lake Tanganyika rifts in the north, and the Luangwa Valley rift in the east and south-east are just within the province. In places the rift valleys have pushed up

highlands stretching up to Mbala above Lake Tanganyika as well as the Muchinga escarpment above the Luangwa valley, and the highlands along north-eastern border with Tanzania and Malawi which culminate in the Mafinga Hills and Nyika Plateau.

These features produce a diverse landscape that varies and poses different challenges, particularly to highway construction, as one moves from one part of the province to another. Various streams and rivers crisscross the province in abundance, posing great challenge to easy movement of people, goods for trade and services. The most prominent river on the eastern side is the Luangwa, which has its source in the Mafinga Hills, and which has no road across its valley for a distance of about 800 km. Africa's second longest river, the Congo, has its source in Northern Province via its longest tributary, the Chambeshi River, which rises in the hills south-west of Mbala and divides the province diagonally as it meanders to Lake Bangweulu in the south-west.

During rain season, these rivers, particularly the Chambeshi and Luangwa, spread across flood plains often several kilometres wide, and create large tracts of both seasonal and permanent lagoons and swamps along their valleys. The Chambeshi feeds the largest wetlands of all, the Bangweulu Swamps and floodplain in Mpika and Chilubi districts, known for its Lechwe and birds among other wildlife.

Northern Province also contains three large natural lakes; Lake Bangweulu and its adjacent wetlands sharing with Luapula Province, the Lake Mweru-wa-Ntipa in Kaputa district, and the vast Lake Tanganyika in the north which forms part of Zambia's border with Democratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania.

According to the 2010 Census of population, Northern Province has a population of 1,105,824. The annual population growth rate is 4.3%, which is the highest of all the 10 provinces. 50.5% of the total population is female and 49.5% is male. Children below the age of 15 make up 49.5% of the population in the province. Kasama, the provincial capital, is home to 12.8% of the population, which is the highest of all the districts (SCO; 2013).

Before the province was divided into two parts, it covered approximately one fifth of Zambia in land area. As seen in the table below, currently, the province is made up of 9 districts, namely Kasama, Chilubi, Nsama, Kaputa, Luwingu, Mbala, Mporokoso, Mpulungu, and Mungwi. Nsama is a newly created district, and as such the 2010 census did not take account

of its population because it was part of Kasama district by then. Currently, only Kasama and Mbala have attained Municipal status, while the rest are still district councils.

Table 3. Population of Northern Province by District

Name	Status	Census 1990	Census 2000	Census 2010
Northern	Province	580,545	809,400	1,105,824
Chilubi	District	44,350	66,338	81,248
Kaputa	District	53,403	87,233	119,514
Kasama	District	125,492	170,929	231,824
Luwingu	District	72,164	80,758	122,136
Mbala	District	110,980	149,634	203,129
Mporokoso	District	54,888	73,929	98,842
Mpulungu	District	44,533	67,602	98,073
Mungwi	District	74,735	112,977	151,058

Source: Central Statistical Office; 2013

Northern Province is widely considered to be the heartland of the Bemba speaking people, one of the largest tribes in Zambia, other tribes include the Mambwe and Lungu of Mbala and Mpulungu respectively. As already briefly alluded to above, Notable landmarks in Northern Province include the Lake Tanganyika, Lake Bangweulu, Lake Mweru-wa-Ntipa and several waterfalls including Lumangwe Falls, Kabwelume Falls, Chishimba and Kalambo Falls.

Efforts are being made to increase the visibility of the many natural and historical treasures in the Province. However, lack of infrastructure along the vast distances between major points of interest make visiting this part of the province by people difficult. However, the government of Zambia has embarked on an ambitious programme to improve people's living standards through various developmental programmes within the decentralisation reform. To that effect, several development projects are being implemented in key social and economic sectors such as education, health, agriculture, roads and tourism.

Among the development projects which government has continued to invest in a large scale in the Province has been the construction of Kasaba Bay Airport runway, upgrading the Lunzuwa power station as well as roads construction and rehabilitating of schools, hospitals and other facilities across the province.

4.4 Muchinga Province: Political Administration, Population and Features

The area comprising Muchinga Province was until October 2011 part of Northern Province. The creation of Muchinga province was announced by President Michael Chilufya Sata in October 2011 just after he was elected as the fifth President of the Republic of Zambia. The administrative center of the province is Chinsali, and while the name of the province originates from the Muchinga Mountains, the province was formed from the existing Northern Province. The Provincial administration is known as Chinsali and is set up purely for administrative purposes.

The Province is headed by a Minister appointed by the President. The administrative head of the province is the Permanent Secretary who is also appointed by the President. There are heads of government departments known as civil servants at the provincial level. Muchinga Province is divided into eight districts, namely, Chama District, Chinsali District, Isoka District, Mafinga District, Mpika District, Lavushi Manda district, Nakonde District, and Shiwang'andu District. Lavushi Manda is a newly created district which was part of Mpika district in 2010 census of population. All the district headquarters are the same as the district names each of which is headed by the Council Secretary. The administrative staff of the council is selected based on Local Government Service Commission from within or outside the district.

Table 4. Population of Muchinga Province by District.


Name	Status	Census 1990	Census 2000	Census 2010
Muchinga	Province	400,492	524, 186	711, 657
Chama	District	55, 172	74, 890	103, 894
Chinsali	District	89, 779	128, 646	146,518
Isoka	District	-	57, 239	72, 189
Mafinga	District	-	42, 080	65, 969
Mpika	District	123, 099	146, 196	203, 379
Nakonde	District	49, 879	75, 135	119, 708

Source: Central Statistical Office; 2013

Muchinga province is elongated from South-West to North-East and is located on both sides of the Muchinga Mountains (Muchinga Escarpment), which serve as a divide between the drainage basins of the Zambezi River (Indian Ocean) and the Congo River (Atlantic Ocean). The main rivers of the province are the Luangwa River, a major left tributary of the Zambezi, and the Chambeshi River, a tributary of Lake Bangweulu, in the drainage basin of the Congo. The source of the Luangwa River is found in the province. Three national parks are in the province. These are Lavushimanda National Park, North Luangwa National Park, and South Luangwa National Park. The latter is shared with Eastern and Central Provinces.

The creation of a province was announced by President Michael Sata in October 2011. The province consisted originally of five districts. Chama District was transferred from the Eastern Province, and Chinsali, Isoka, Mpika and Nakonde districts were transferred from the Northern Province. In 2013, Mafinga District was created by splitting Isoka district. Shiwa-Ngandu district was created by splitting Chinsali district. Figure 2 shows the location of Muchinga Province and its districts.

Figure 2. Map of Muchinga Province showing Location of Districts.



Source: SCO; 2015

4.4.1 Chinsali District

Chinsali district with headquarters at Chinsali is located in Muchinga Province of Zambia. It lies on the watershed between the Chambeshi River in the Congo basin and the Luangwa River in the Zambezi basin. Situated in a remote part of Zambia, Chinsali district was historically a battleground for two competing Christian missions; the Roman Catholic Missionaries of Africa (the White fathers) from 1934, and the United Free Church of Scotland, based at Lubwa from 1905. One of the Lubwa Missionaries was David Kaunda, father of Kenneth Kaunda who became the first President of Zambia in 1964.

The North-Eastern half of the district is relatively flat plateau, especially along the Chambeshi, of about 1200 to 1300 Metres elevation but the South-Western half has an

attractive landscape of granite hills with an elevation of 1500 to 1600 Metres where the country estate of Shiwang'andu is located.

4.4.2 Nakonde District

Nakonde is a town in Muchinga province of Zambia. It is the principal commercial and political centre for Nakonde district. Nakonde is located just opposite of Tunduma, a small town in Tanzania's Songwe region. The dominant ethnic group in Nakonde district are the Namwanga while about 60 kilometres east of Nakonde are the Lambya, the Nyika, the Wandya and Tumbuka ethnic groups.

4.5 General Physical Features and Ethnic Groups of Northern and Muchinga Provinces of Zambia

Generally, Northern and Muchinga Provinces are mainly located on the great Southern African plateau which has been uplifted to an elevation around 1200 metres above sea level. The Rift valley in the province extends clockwise around the province from the North-West to the South. These features (rift valleys) are sometimes outside the borders of the province, as in the case of the Luapula-Mweru valley to the North-West and the Lake Malawi rift valleys to the North East, but the escarpments of the Lake Mweru-wa-Ntipa-Lake Tanganyika rifts in the North, and the Luangwa Valley rift in the east and South-East are just within the province. In places the rift valleys have pushed up highlands, around Mbala above Lake Tanganyika, the Muchinga escarpment above the Luangwa valley, and the highlands along North-Eastern border with Tanzania and Malawi which culminate in the Mafinga Hills and Nyika Plateau. These are now in Muchinga Province.

These features produce a diverse landscape that varies and poses different challenges, particularly to highway construction, as one moves from one part to another. The Mafinga Hills, which include the highest point in the country at 2301 metres above sea level, once formed a formidable barrier between the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Rivers, streams and dambos crisscross the province in profusion, posing yet another great challenge to easy movement of people, goods, and services.

The most prominent river on the eastern side is the Luangwa, which has its source in the Mafinga Hills, and which has no road across its valley for a distance of about 800 km. Africa's second longest river, the Congo, has its source in Northern Province via its longest tributary, the Chambeshi River, which rises in the hills South-West of Mbala and divides the province diagonally as it meanders to Lake Bangweulu in the South-West. During times of very heavy rains, these rivers, particularly the Chambeshi and Luangwa, spread across floodplains often several kilometres wide, and create large tracts of both seasonal and permanent lagoons and swamps along their valleys. The Chambeshi feeds the largest wetlands of all, the Bangweulu Swamps and flood plain in Mpika and Chilubi Districts, known for its Lechwe and birds among other wildlife.

The two provinces have several tribal groups speaking different languages and dialects. However, the language mostly spoken across the province is Icibemba, which is one of the mother tongue of the largest tribal grouping, the Bemba people of Chinsali, Kasama, Mungwi and parts of Mporokoso and Luwingu districts. Other prominent languages include Icinamwanga, spoken by the Namwanga people of Nakonde and Isoka districts, Icilambya of the Lambya people of Isoka East and Nakonde East, Tumbuka, spoken by the Tumbuka people of Muyombe and Lundazi, Icinyika of the Nyika people of Mafinga district in Thendere and Mulekatembo, Mambwe and Lungu, spoken by the Mambwe of Mpulungu and Mbala districts icibisa of Bisa people of Mpika.

Despite its size and the diversity of languages and dialects, the people of Northern and Muchinga Provinces generally share a common culture. And each of these tribes has its own traditional leadership headed by either a paramount or senior chief assisted by junior chiefs and village leaders. The most prominent of the chiefs in the province is Chitimukulu, the Paramount Chief of the Bemba. Others include Senior Chief Kopa of the Bisa, Senior Chief Muyombe of the Tumbuka, Senior Chieftainess Nawaitwika of the Namwanga, Chief Mweniwisi of the Lambya people, Chief Mulekatembo of the Nyika people, Chief Katyeteye of the Batambo people, Sub-Chief Mwenimpangala of the Wandya and several other sub-Chiefs.

Over the past years, the civil society participation in Muchinga and Northern provinces has come up to very prominence and widely linked to various themes such as decentralisation, participation, civility, social capital and community characterised by norms and values. There

has been also an association with a set of values and norms entailing principles of participation, social order, pluralism and solidarity.

However, although established participatory process has been placed high and on top of the current government agenda, little at represent is reflecting valid channels for involving the members of the community in public affairs. The validity is to increase the political will to improve the process. The creation of new districts and re-alignment of ministerial portfolios is evident enough for a more decentralised government system. However, the attitudes of civil servants should play an important role in this process. As earlier alluded to, there is need to disentangle unequal relationship between planners and communities. Currently, the scenario in Muchinga and Northern provinces is that there isn't much existence of power-knowledge relationship which is flamboyantly reflecting a positive manipulative system because the process of planning is dominated by technical facts leaving little space for local experience and common knowledge.

On the other hand, it is important to establish an effective balance between state responsibilities and community involvement. Participatory practice should not be considered as a burdensome process, either because it demands excessive requirements of participants or because it is seen as a way of relieving the state from much of its duty. Society should not see this process as an obligation of central government because governments globally are overwhelmed by the amount of responsibilities that they carry out.

Community involvement and the willingness to take part in the different stages of planning procedures is important. In Muchinga and Northern provinces, despite the advocacy of participatory planning and implementation which encourage citizens to involve themselves in developmental programmes and consequently improve their livelihood, it appears that there is little in place as effective mechanisms that can encourage participation particularly at local levels. Decentralisation should be assumed as a major state reform that implies the transfer of responsibilities to local governments be the improvement of political legitimacy or to implement development policies. At best, decentralisation should pin-point a change in the relationship between the state and civil society by opening new channels for participation and control of public administration with a notion in mind that community participation is a complementary process.

Alongside, requires a more philosophical argument for the importance of community policy-based emphasis on the community participation concept. There should be a reappraisal of the voluntary and community sectors as partners in the provision of services traditionally performed by the public sector in the two provinces. The shift of the role of the voluntary and community sectors should mirror a more general move towards 'governance' rather than 'government.' In practical terms, the shift of government to governance should result in the outsourcing of functions previously performed by government to voluntary or community organisations in the areas of community development.

The Patriotic Front (PF) like was the case with the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) and the United National Independence Party (UNIP) indicate in the manifesto, a policy agenda that complex problems need holistic, multi-agency responses. This implies a partnership between government and the local communities working together to solve the problems of poverty and under-development. All these approaches involve community members helping to implement the agenda by being differently placed in terms of power that it must steer the overall course of community work by expecting outcomes to be delivered cheaply and independently of government.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has provided the actual context of the study area by exhibiting the historical, political, economical and physical profile of both Muchinga and Northern Provinces of Zambia. It made analysis of institutionalisation of provincial administration as a creation of central government political structural administration system.

It has been observed in this chapter that since Zambia's independence, there have been observable high levels of political supervision over community development by bureaucrats from the central government.

CHAPTER FIVE

LOCAL AUTHORITIES AS FOCAL POINTS OF DECENTRALISATION AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

5.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to establish the extent to which the local authorities in Muchinga and Northern Provinces of Zambia have effectively facilitated the participation of communities in development efforts. As the level closest to local communities, local authorities are institutions where citizen involvement is supposed to happen, and it is often purposefully structured to promote this engagement. This entails that, the local governments are increasingly being considered as arenas for offering opportunities to local citizens to influence the development agenda. As shall be understood in this chapter, for local government system to live up to its potential, it depends not only on availability of skilled personnel and financial resources but also on the role played by communities through community and council structures.

In light of the above, this chapter has among others generally discovered and indicated that the limited role that communities play in the local government system in Muchinga and Northern provinces of Zambia accounts in part for the current stalemate by the council not to effectively provide the services as expected under the umbrella of decentralisation.

It is imperative to note that notable best practices incorporating community development require local governments to offer outstanding leadership and strong engagement with community members in the development process at the local level. In Muchinga and Northern provinces, in a bid to engage community members, the Ward Development Committees (WDCs) are structures which are autonomous elected institutions entrusted to serve as an interface between local citizens, and centralised government institutions thereby creating partnerships between communities and the public sectors and ensuring that community members have some control over local development.

The WDCs therefore are conduits in the actual local service delivery functions as established local level participatory structures at community level. The WDCs have the capacity to influence local governments to encourage and manage collective action on the part of

citizens. The findings of the chapter therefore, is an exploration as to whether the much-needed autonomy has been built into the decentralisation process at the community level by examining community members' participation in collaboration with councils through among others, the established local level structures.

We want to categorically state that, decentralisation is inadequate without local authorities to champion the process. Suffice to mention here that the Constitution of Zambia and the National Decentralisation Policy (NDP) has emphasised the importance of community participation in the development process at the local level through the devolution of personnel with matching resources to the local levels. In that context, citizens are supposed to exercise control over local affairs to foster meaningful developments which require that some degree of authority is decentralised to provincial, district and sub-district levels for efficient and effective service delivery. In this regard, decentralisation through devolution has been the most effective form because it ensures technical efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery and popular participation.

As already stated, the fundamental reasons for adopting "devolution" as the form of decentralisation in Zambia is enshrined in the basic law of the land and supported by various pieces of legislation.

- (i) Firstly, the Constitution of Zambia recognises the equal worth of men and women in their rights to participate and to freely determine and build political, economic and social systems of their own choice. The Constitution further resolves to uphold the values of democracy, transparency, accountability and good governance; and
- (ii) Secondly, the governments have been emphasising the need for effective decentralisation of selected functions and responsibilities from the central government to the provinces and districts and ultimately for the councils to facilitate democratic governance and delivery of quality and demand-driven services to local communities. There is no contention in understanding that the local people are best placed to know the exact nature of local needs and how they can be met in a cost-effective manner.

Therefore, the decentralisation policy in responding to the Republican Constitution has provided for the establishment of Sub-district structures such as the District Development Coordinating Committees (DDCCs) and the Ward Development Committees (WDCs) which

are utilised as legal platforms for people's participation in the development process at the community level. In that regard, the local authorities are thus recognised as being synonymous to decentralisation and as conduits of community participation for development. Considering the above, this study, finds suitable to explore in detail, the participation of citizen in development process at the local level through the established sub-structures at the local level. More importantly, it is worth noting that among other participatory mechanisms, the District Development Coordinating Committee (DDCC) as a sub-structure at the district level is a technical advisory committee whose overall aim is to coordinate the implementation of district development programmes. The functions of the DDCC includes:

- (a) Providing a forum for dialogue and coordination on development issues between the local authorities, line departments, donors and NGOs in the districts;
- (b) Receiving project proposals from various development agencies in districts;
- (c) Recommending on request, the commissioning of feasibility studies on projects relating to discretionary finance such as constituency development funds;
- (d) Receiving up to date financial reports on capital projects relating to discretionary finance from the district councils' finance departments;
- (e) Consolidating districts draft plans for consideration and adoption by councils;
- (f) Facilitating and coordinating the implementation of development plans at district levels;
- (g) Monitor and coordinate sub-district community participatory planning activities and ensure that reports from these bodies reach the councils;
- (h) Prepare consolidated reports on implementation progress for the Council with copies to PDCC and other relevant national institutional institutions such as the Ministry of Local Government; and
- (i) Receive minutes of its Sub-Committees, consider their recommendations and propose action to be taken by the DDCC members.

The responsibility to facilitate and coordinate the establishment of the DDCCs and the Ward Development Committees (WDCs) falls under the Council whose composition arise from the election of Zonal representatives. On the other hand, the WDCs constitute members appointed from appropriate institutions at the Ward level at the request of the Council. The members of the WDC includes:

- (i) One extension officer from the department of agriculture;
- (ii) One officer from education;

- (iii) One officer from health;
- (iv) One officer from community development;
- (v) One officer from local Non-Governmental Organisation in the area where applicable;
- (vi) One representative from Faith Based Organisation in the area;
- (vii) One representative from the Village Council (Chiefdom Development Council); and
- (viii) Ward Councillor.

Arising from the above, it is understood in this study that decentralisation in Muchinga and Northern provinces of Zambia is being pursued as a development concept like it is worldwide. In that context, this chapter explores as to whether decentralisation has created avenues for community participation in Muchinga and Northern provinces of Zambia at the local authority level.

We have already explained that local governments are a product of devolution, a dimension of decentralisation because local authorities are part of the whole government of a nation which have been formed by communities having a common interest and common history. Meyer (1978) defines local government as local democratic governing unit within the unitary democratic system of a country with prescribed, controlled governmental powers and sources of income to render specific local services and develop, control and regulate the geographic, social and economic environment of defined local areas. It is imperative to note that, whilst local governments are not independent of central government control, they enjoy only relative autonomy due to the division of responsibilities for services between central and local government and it should be understood that the division of these responsibilities is a political or policy issue.

The existence of local government has always been defended on the basis that it is a crucial aspect of the process of democratisation and mass participation in the decision-making process. It is furthermore argued that no political system is complete and democratic if it does not have a system of local government.

5.2 Local Authorities and Decentralisation

We still emphasise once more that local authorities are the basis for decentralised community participation. Councils are conduits of participation and development at the local level

because without local authorities, we cannot talk of community participation and decentralisation. The responsibility to facilitate and coordinate community activities are established at the local level by local authorities. In that regard, the study findings have shown that community participation in collaboration with local authorities in Muchinga and Northern provinces through the local established structures at local level follow the pattern of local established structure at community level.

The study indicates that the intended role of local authorities to coordinate plans and programmes at the local level in collaboration with community members has not produced the much-desired development results. During the interviews with community members, it was found that council operations at community level in line with government policy on decentralisation was very inoperative. Various research participants during snapshot interviews explained as follows:

There is no significant demonstration of government's commitment towards full implementation of decentralisation through local authorities. Rather, the notion of community participation through the implementation of decentralisation is a figment of imagination. There is no clear conceptual framework to provide the engagement and interaction between the various development activities initiated by the councils in collaboration with local stakeholders in communities (Snapshot interviews, 25th September 2013).

The above submission is a recognition by citizens that local authorities despite being permanent local government institution which can be utilised as development institutions and as channels of communication between district level institutions and communities, have not significantly played the role as development facilitators to communities. In addition, local authorities have not fully provided legal support of district development facilitation efforts. The District Development Coordinating Committees (DDCCs) to which local authorities are members despite having potentially rich human resource base have not exploited the development potential for improved collaboration among members and communities.

In this context, it is imperative to state that, local authorities are still struggling for efficient engagement of the local people for community participation and effective implementation of decentralisation. We have already explained in this study that the government of the Republic of Zambia is cognizant that to overcome various constraints of development, it is necessary to

transfer power from the centre to local authorities. Accordingly, it is important to understand that the distribution of power to the local level improves community participation which is considered as key to sustainable development. In this context, local authorities as functional points for decentralisation can improve community participation for both urban and rural areas because decentralised government is responsive towards local needs.

In this process, community development at the local level involves awareness raising, building self confidence and expanding choices as well as increasing access to, and control over resources. The important instruments of community development include empowerment, information and networking activities by both the councils and community members. In a nutshell, this process involves people acquiring knowledge, skills and a willingness to critically analyse their situation and take appropriate action to change the status quo in communities. Therefore, empowerment involves practical measures aimed at enhancing community member's participation in decision-making and in governance processes, generally to uplift their status through literacy, education, training and raising awareness on issues such as poverty reduction and education programmes.

In other words, community participation in local governance should be understood as a cornerstone for community development. To qualify 'good' governance, the local governance system must be participatory, transparent and accountable to attain equity. However, findings show that there is poor institutional framework at the local level coupled with inadequate coordination between the local people and the council.

In a bid to understand community participation at the local governance level within the context of local government, the highest governance structure at local level is the District Development Coordinating Committees (DDCCs) which is purely a technical advisory body to the District Council. Its functions among others is to assess projects and other proposals from a purely technical point of view and to ensure that relevant information about development programmes and objectives in the districts are adhered to and are available.

The DDCC submits recommendations to the Council and thereafter, the final decision is made by the council which comprises councillors. The decisions are not only limited to approving projects but even the utilisation of funds under the Constituency Development Fund (CDF).

Information gathered has shown that most development programmes at the district level are initiated and implemented without adequate consultations and coordination among various key stakeholders operating at the local level in the districts. Stakeholders are tools or instrument for community engagement at the local level.

Councils are institutions with mechanism for real power, however, for a genuine sense of decentralisation, councils have not effectively involved the governance structures at the local level. This scenario indicates that community members are not fully involved in local development programmes and as such do not trust the decisions made by local authorities because decisions are based on council community diagnosis. The local authorities have not really created spaces as forum for brainstorming and as initiative spaces for local programmes.

Information obtained from the research through Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) revealed that the District Development Committees (DDCCs) and the Ward Development Committee (WDCs) have become more political in nature. They are no longer considered to be exclusively a brainchild of local governance system. And as such, the local governance structures are perceived with mixed feelings by community members. The following was submitted by the FGDs during the interviews:

It seems that the WDCs and DDCCs are just on paper to show that they are part of local governance structure rather than as a mechanism for increasing community participation and development in local areas. The roles of the WDCs and DDCCs do not constitute power structures established as social networks and entities which councils can utilise to involve the local people to effectively spearhead development in communities. Political parties have taken over the agendas of committees and local governments. (FGDs, 30th September 2013).

However, in contrast, the Council Secretary in Kasama explained that the operations of the local structures at the district level vis-à-vis community involvement in development effort was well established and that the DDCCs and the WDCs represented the optimum instruments for public participation at the district. He however explained that despite the well-established local governance structures, the participatory legal framework was weak for community participation and for the local structures to function properly. The main drawback according to him was the lack of recognition by community members who considered local authorities as being poor and outside the mainstream of civil service. Community members

thus accused councils to lack the commitment and to fully utilise the Committees as instruments through which communities can take part in the local development planning process for decision making and overall district development. Apart from the lack of proper legal foundation by the DDCCs and WDCs to fulfil various community programmes and to function according to what had been established, the local structures also lack financial and institutional support to act independently with dignity. It was discovered that the Committees face political interference, institutional moribundism thereby politically centralising institutional structures for their administration purposes.

And about community participation in social and economic development activities at district level, community members explained that social and economic development had since witnessed a lack of effective coordination between community members and local authorities. The study discovered that there was a general lack of effective monitoring and reporting systems on the overall development effort at the district level and that the mechanisms for ensuring government's responsiveness to local needs in service delivery left much to be desired. In Chinsali district, community members explained that the work of the DDCCs was not very good because it was not advisory in nature and its coordinating role in the implementation of the district development programmes was unsatisfactory because of failure to adequately provide a forum for dialogue and coordination on development issues between local authorities and other stakeholders in the communities.

The members of community in Mbala equally explained that they were not fully involved in consolidating district draft plans for consideration and adoption by the Municipal Council. They explained that the DDCCs and WDCs did not effectively facilitate and coordinate the implementation of development plans at district level on behalf of communities as explained by community members below:

The DDCCs and the WDCs are good establishments at the local level, but the major problem towards their operational which we have observed is that they are not active enough to involve community members. We have no idea of what they do and how they involve other members in the communities. They only talk during election campaign just because they smell some money from contenders, as at now they are passive (FGDs, Chinsali, 4th October 2013).

However, as pointed out by the community members, it was found that there were no tangible rules to compel both the council and committee members to follow, there was equally no


clear and tangible piece of legislation to enable the DDCCs and WDCs to carry out their mandate without any interference. The above problem hindered progress and even frustrated those attempting to mobilise the required resources and community members in the participation of development activities. Accordingly, the lack of clear legislative mechanism did not allow the implementation of local programmes in an effective manner. And the failure of committees to mobilise, function and uphold their mandate was not only attributed to the lack of capacity by the councils for implementation of community/council driven programmes, but also the influence of political bias and programme in communities. Communities were not sufficiently informed about their purpose and functioning in the local governance structures.

During the interviews with local people, participants brought out three major factors as being crucial to the functioning and successful community participation in collaboration with the local governance structures. It was heard that the work of the local established governance structures did not demonstrate their effectiveness to the community because there were no tangible results. Information gathered from the study indicated that the political will existed with impunity which did not allow effective implementation of various community programmes in the district. There were little opportunities to provide community members with freedom to properly get engaged in local development through various Committees.

The research findings from community members in the four districts indicated also that there were several reasons for failure by community members to participate in collaboration with councils in community development. Among the failure as we shall see in chapter seven includes the mistrust people had against council performance in development effort. People had negative perception towards council performance mainly because of poor council financial base, the lack of participatory information between community members and local authorities. In some instances, the political inclination by counsellors discouraged some community members to fully support development initiatives.

Figure 3 shows in percentage terms information gathered from the study on reasons as to why community members fail to fully participate in collaboration with local authorities in local development.

Figure 3. Reasons for collaboration failure with Councils in local development



Source: Field data

As can be observed in the figure above, community members had the perception that the local authorities were poorly managed and had no capacity to engage communities in development programmes in collaboration with communities. 98% of the respondents cited poor council image as reasons for not participating with councils in community development. About 69% did not trust the local authorities as entities to work with in development while 80% did not have information on participation with local authorities. 71% said local authorities had no resources to spearhead local development.

Apart from the reasons given above by the community members through questionnaires in the four districts, it was discovered as well that the continuous changes in the leadership of committees at local level resulted into a lot of confusion about how community members in liaison with councils and new committee members worked. The interference of politics at the local governance level in the formation and functioning of the local governance structures was found to be very disruptive because it reduced the enthusiasm of residents to participate in proposed local governance initiatives and development programmes. Participants during FGDs in support of the above statement explained as follows:

There is an increasing political interference at the local level. Civic leaders are giving a lot of directives to councils. The increasing politicisation of the process renders the local level democracy worthless and very invalid. Due to strong guidance and influence

of the politicians and government officials at the local governance level, the committee members are not getting engaged in community work properly (FGDs – 4th October 2013).

Several community members doubted the effectiveness of local authorities due to political inclinations. The respondents indicated that they were very discouraged because political reasoning was the norm of council operation instead of that of service delivery. It is important to note that motivation constitutes a powerful factor in the participatory process and is therefore a fundamental factor for proper community engagement in any community activity.

The findings thus indicate that participation by community members through committees without legal backing and ignoring the importance of the work that various local level structures are intended to carry out through councils, have brought about an erosion of support for, and even poor decentralisation activities at the local governance level.

The ineffectiveness of the implementation of various local community programmes through the established local governance structures, and particularly in terms of enhancing community participation, shows that under present circumstances, where community participation is promoted via the local government, it is difficult to establish whether this type of participation particularly through the DDCCs, the WDCs and or ADCs have achieved the objective of the establishment of these local governance structures, which in principle should be to increase community participation at the local level. The link that is created between the councils and communities does not effectively respond to local governance but is virtually instigated by local or central government involving local communities.

The mechanism that can work better is to involve local people themselves and incorporate them properly in the local structures. Again, one can attribute the failure by looking at the constitution which places its emphasis to Zambia as a unitary state. In a unitary state, sovereignty is not equally shared by the state with its peripherals hence the dismal performance by local authorities.

This is so because although the legislation provides for establishment of local level structures, it does not provide a framework to enable citizens to participate with a clear programme vision without control from the central government.

5.3 The Capacity of Local Authorities

Capacity has from time to time been misunderstood to mean capability and or training. Several scholars think that local authorities have no capacity to carry service delivery effectively.

However, in a more holistic manner, capacity is a living organism which is born, nurtured and strengthened. The capacity of councils in terms of the number of employees and of professional experience to determine the success of councils in generating local development opportunities through policy making, and the acquisition of resources for programme implementation does not in any way show a declining trend in Muchinga and Northern Provinces.

In a more general terms, local authorities do not lack qualified personnel but how communities consider the performance of councils in implementing their mandate can best be understood by the notion that huge part of council mandate is public in nature. Offering public good is a problematic venture anywhere in the world. In Chinsali, although information gathered through FGDs had indicated that from 1991, there was a steady decline of professional employees who used to work for various community development programmes in councils, the real situation was that Chinsali district had expanded drastically since independence.

The situation above has since then negatively affected the implementation of various programmes and projects including the ability to mobilise resources. The study evidence shows that the mobilisation of competent human resource as well as the administrative capacity in councils seems rather ineffective. In other words, the local government model as portrayed in Muchinga and Northern Provinces of Zambia depicts a less potentially powerful mechanism which can create an effective establishment of the various local governance structures such as the District Development Coordination Committees DDCCs, the Village Development Committees (VDCs) and the Area Development Committees (ADCs) for effective community engagement.

The findings indicate that, the functions of committees are seriously hindered by the lack of legitimacy in their task to control the actions of local authorities. It is also discovered that

councils do not provide adequate information to ADCs and VDCs on programmes or projects earmarked for community development. In the same context, committees do not have financial resources to exercise and implement their mandate effectively. In general, the implementation of decentralisation through community participation in local governance structures through local authorities in Muchinga and Northern provinces has not exclusively resulted in local governance that is much more participatory.

Although the decentralisation model provides space for communities to participate in local development programmes, the model fits the urban governance system more than the country side. Therefore, it is not difficult to measure the impact on council programmes in comparison with the activities of community programming and local development for each local authority. Equally, the frequent transfers of Council top leaderships such as the Council Secretaries and other management staff as witnessed in the study, does not only result in the loss of expertise, knowledge and institutional memory for the councils but also results in the change of council visions. This entails that, in some cases, the change of council staff leads to a situation where their successor would want to leave their own mark on local authority performance.

Decisions made by their predecessors are usually abandoned and planned projects cancelled while replacing them with their own cherished programmes. It is however clear in the mind of community members that citizens do not have enough resources to execute various activities and provide the social services needed. To this effect, Northern and Muchinga Provinces have shown a passive local community involvement that waits for the central government to make decisions. This phenomenon portrays societies as incapable of contributing to real sustainable community development through their local governance structures.

Our findings so far have shown that the bottom-up planning process is not effective as described in the decentralisation reform programme. On one hand, the local communities though capable of being part in the development of their localities, have little to offer to councils because their concerns are not really considered by councils despite the identified needs by communities. Decisions at the district Councils are not in most cases determined by the local people because all programmes are planned by councils through the central government guidelines.

However, in terms of development, there is variation in district development such that some communities within the council jurisdiction are somehow developed while those outside are either moderate or less developed. This is mainly because the country side areas are ignored especially that the bottom up planning process is apparently not given the required platform to contribute in the realisation of equal development opportunities at the local level.

The failure by councils to fully recognise local planning initiatives entails that development is not in any way supported by planning in combination of the council's plans and plans from local initiatives. In this regard, the local initiatives and external financial sources which are cardinal for development are not associated with the bottom-up planning process.

The findings have shown that community development is mainly dependent on local initiatives with little or no combination with external financial sources. Initially, it is anticipated that development decisions at the local authority level are supposed to be based on grassroot preferences expressed through the bottom planning process. However, the findings have shown that there is little relationship between the development preferences expressed in village or ward plans and the decisions contained in the council plans.

These discrepancies indicate that real decisions are made exclusively by the district councils without the involvement of the local communities. This can be attributed mainly by the design of the planning process and the nature of the relationship between the district councils and the local communities. During Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), with community members in Nakonde, it was found that planning at the council level was not inclusive enough. Below are participants' views about the planning process at the local level.

As members of the community, we are not fully involved in various development plans for our communities in collaboration with local authorities. Quite often, council employees formulate the agenda and programmes they intend to execute without necessarily consulting community members. The management at the local authority simply considers issues pertaining to the welfare of the council and not those of the communities. We expect that our preferences should be identified and discussed by the council in full attendance of community members so that community plans are compiled into local development plans. This process is supposed to be done by both the council and community members (FGDs, 15th June 2014).

The above views by community members show that local authorities do not consider the wishes of local people. Information obtained during the study also revealed that local

authorities write plans in technical way which in most cases does not fit the community plans and the wishes of the community members. As a result, development preferences expressed by the local communities do not reflect in council plans. This also shows that the preferences in the council plans and development agendas do not reflect the actual needs of the local communities.

The inability of the local authorities from identifying the local preferences and needs seems to lessen the confidence and concern of local people in the bottom-up planning process. The study found that the lack of inclusiveness in the planning to include community members or the local representatives by the council management meant that council plans were only used as instruments of fulfilling council internal requirements. The local people considered the bottom-up planning as a government process to collect local information for the sake of central government, instead as instruments to develop communities.

According to respondents in the four districts, it was found that there was no better way to enhance community participation because council officials and community representatives did not make any effort to engage local people into participating in the development of their areas. Community members were not involved in the planning process and as such did not consider decisions at the district councils as binding.

In the same context, the local government officials considered community members to have very little policy relevant information as well as little expertise to implement community work diligently thus considering the village and ward plans to be of little significance. Community members in Muchinga province explained as follows:

These officers have very little regard for us in communities. They think we are illiterate and unable to plan for our local development. Officers think that the local people and the local governance structures have no capacity to develop sound plans and manage development projects and programmes (Community members, 15th June 2014).

It can thus be deduced that the relationship between community members at the grassroots level and the district councils was not cordial enough to trust each other for community work. On one hand, although community members were willing to participate in development activities in collaboration with the local authorities, the local authorities did not involve them

in planning and executing programmes. This perception was reinforced by the attitude of the council officials who thought that they knew what was best for the communities and eventually could not take the local plans seriously. Local authority officers in Muchinga responded as follows:

The local people have no capacity to manage development programmes and projects including resources. My experience at the council clearly shows that community members have no capacity to develop sound plans and manage huge financial resources especially for development programmes and projects (Council officials, 19th June 2014).

This approach in accusing community members to have low-level competencies implies that council officials at the districts had little or no confidence in the local governance structures. It is thus a clear indication that the decisions made at the council level were mainly based on knowledge of the officials about their daily routine work and not the desires of community members through the bottom-up planning process.


In other words, council officials considered the local inhabitants that they were unable to develop sound plans and manage development projects. This scenario is like blaming the victim who is affected and not the perpetrator who has committed a crime. The role of the Councils and the establishment of the Local government service commission as well as the decentralisation secretariat were mainly to make sure that the lower local governance structures had the capacity to perform their roles effectively and efficiently. Besides, the local government structure performs devolved functions. And officials at the lower governance levels at village and wards levels are appointed by the councils and are directly accountable to the local authority.

As indicated earlier in this study, the objective of decentralisation in Zambia stems from the need for the citizenry to exercise control over the local affairs and foster meaningful development which requires that some degree of authority is decentralised to provincial, district and sub-district levels. Therefore, to remove the absolute control by the centre, it is necessary to transfer authority, functions and responsibilities with matching resources to lower levels, so that participation is enhanced for community development. However, our study showed that the existence of various participatory mechanisms was not compatible with

the vision of decentralisation. There were no safeguard mechanisms to ensure that the entire community was involved in developmental plans.

Figure 4 shows the level of Community and Council collaboration in implementing development programmes at district level.

Figure 4. Community and Council Participation in Development



Source: Field data

As seen above, about 80% of respondents in Kasama indicated that they did not participate in development planning in collaboration with local authorities. Mbala indicated 78%, Nakonde 62% while Chinsali had indicate 75% of non- participation. The participation level of about 38% was recorded in Nakonde and was the highest of all the districts with Kasama indicating only 22% percent of community members having participated in development planning with local authorities.

Concerns on the relationship between the district councils and the communities on decentralised governance through devolution, proclaimed also a certain degree of discretion for the local authorities in the formulation of council priorities and to allocate development

resources. Equally, concerns by local authorities on planning procedures claimed a certain degree of discontentment. Community members claimed that councils used detailed guidelines and directives for community members making it difficult for community members to comprehend.

Also, local authorities accused the central government that it provided councils with technical guidance in a manner that the local authorities found it difficult to operationalise. Though in some way the directives from the central government seemed to yield greater influence on the communities, the local authority officials and leaders did not consider the guidelines and instructions as supportive or advisory enough. Council officers explained as follows:

These guidelines from central government are not community oriented, they are merely instructions and orders that must be followed. The central government has its own development agenda which in most cases conflict with community and or council development plans (Council officials, 19th June 2014).

The above explanation by the council officers show that central government has a lot of impact in determining the development interventions at the local level. The council decisions are mainly based on central government policy aspirations and not the preferences of the local people especially on financial matters as explained by council officers below:

The guidelines are not developmental in nature, there is nothing whatsoever in the categories for the preferences of the local communities that can be included in the community plan budget (Council officials, 19th June 2014).

The above explanation shows that councils have little financial resources to plan and implement local preference programmes in collaboration with community members. It is obvious that the transfer of funds from central government is often earmarked for specific policy areas, or specific types of activities from central government preferences. This limits the scope of discretion of the officials at the council to consider the preferences of the local communities. The argument given by officers at Mbala municipal council shows how local government officials rely mainly on central government funding and directives.

The above scenario clearly shows that councils have limited choices to ignore central governments rules. Most of the officials at the local authorities just dutifully execute the central government programmes as provided in the guidelines, in most cases the national

priorities have a more political background. The various guidelines are prepared by council officials without any collaboration with local people's development preferences, in practice however, council choices are mainly determined by the central government. The central government as usual gives directives, guidelines and instructions which determine and affect the decision-making procedure.

5.3.1 Council Business: Agenda documents and decision making

The agenda papers issued for committee meetings in which invited community members and other participants are involved concentrates on council operations and management. In most cases there are criticisms of failures for councils to implement activities developed by community members. Elected counsellors complain also that they have problems with the format of the agendas. Equally, there are criticisms too of domination by council officers who, whether deliberately or otherwise, produce documents that only they understand. No effort is made to make the items on the agenda more users friendly. Civic leaders explained as follows:

We don't really understand some of the proposals before taking side to agree on various issues tabled for council decisions. One must flap the item on the agenda amongst the papers to find the content. Issues on the agenda are presented in a manner that we find difficult to comprehend, some items are presented in form of graphs making it very difficult to understand (Civic leaders, 24th June 2014).

The above explanation by participants is evident to note that, the Council committee meetings are not participatory enough to enable communities have a say in decision making. The content of the items on the agendas are structured in such a way that does not encourage participation by non- professional staff in the council meetings. Topics are thus not relevant because issues discussed are only appropriate to the council and not to community members at large.

This scenario works against discussing issues in detail which affect the local people in general. The council meetings are not very transparent in nature, there are secret pre-Meetings before presenting the agenda to the Council for discussions. During the FGDs with the local people in Chinsali, members of the FGDs explained as follows:

By the time, the items appear on the agenda, it means preliminary discussions have already taken place amongst management at the council. Any plan will have been

developed by council officers. As such, decisions will have already been made and agreed up on. The local people are brought in just at final stage, this scenario reduces participants' inputs because the community members are usually not present during the formulation of programmes at the beginning (FGDs, 26th June 2014).

The findings have shown that most community members are not cognisant of the mechanisms in place for agenda setting in Council meetings. The highest ignorance amongst non-participating in community development at the local level is found mostly in rural areas. Equally, the local people displayed a very low acquaintance with the means for community members to gain access to the council meetings.

And whilst some of the constraints to participate will be considered in the next chapter, the ones to be considered here are of a practical nature in councils, such as the low funding to local authorities as clear from our findings elsewhere in the two provinces. Under funding results into failure by councils to implement decentralised local programmes in collaboration with the local people. Too little thought is given to the need to fit the new reform meaningfully into the mind of the people as well as the rest of the authority's decision-making process. The devolved functions and community participatory mechanisms remains ambivalent and the impact often being of little individual commitments.

The study has found that, although central government departments conduct developmental meetings with councils, there is no proper interface at the district council with central government units. The local authorities have in a way remained operating in different platform, this makes the attendance and consensus during the meetings problematic.

But more significantly the study shows that there is a degree of hostility between central government operations with those of councils which spills over into their attitudes towards each other's decentralised structures as well as the lack of participatory practices of the local people. In the same context, central government has exerted financial restraints on the decentralised structures which in turn affect the capacity of community members to participate effectively. And regarding the structures themselves, decentralisation, which itself incur additional costs especially if the centre is not slimmed down, has been upscaled against a backdrop of ever-increasing central government restrictions on local authority budgets.

The consequence is that there are fewer and fewer opportunities for meaningful decision making over financial matters as services become reduced to only those where there is a statutory obligation to provide.

And as a result, the local people have little access to council programmes and poor network with grassroots giving rise to fewer opportunities available for local people to work with councils in development. And to crown it all, sometimes council officials and councilors are not very friendly about community suggestions. Some of the community comments obtained from community members during interviews are as follows:

Employees under the local authorities usually do things on their own, they implement different development programmes following their own development agenda and not the local community's aspirations. Councils are too political. No tangible developments are realised from councils because local authorities are not part of central government and are too poor to spearhead any meaningful local development at the local level. I don't think local authorities have the required human resource which is qualified to spearhead development in communities" (Informants, 4th July 2014).

The above sentiments from the local people suggest that the support from the council can make a very positive contribution to the performance of community members where trust has been established. The other aspect concerns the nature of decentralisation practice in Muchinga and Northern Province in terms of external enforcement legality which hampers the devolution of resources and powers which also affect the performance of the devolved units. The council choice of participating areas is dictated by resource constraints which restrict community members input as well.

Taking council and community participation by considering funding and support for local engagement, it is possible to begin to construct a ladder of resources loosely based on Arnstein's famous Ladder of Citizen Participation Theory described earlier in in this study.

At the bottom in this case, at community level within council jurisdictions, no great allocation of resources or funds to the community is received for them to participate effectively. Their lack of resources becomes more and more a constraint to fully participate in devolved development activities, at the top, in this case at provincial level where information is available, participation is somehow pronounced. It has been found that councils fail to carry

out their mandate diligently in collaboration with the local people and that their resource sharing efforts do not cater for community needs as would be in a decentralised set up. This is again evidenced by what community members explained when they were describing council performance:

The council performance is just rhetoric. Local authority has never worked to champion development in our communities and no tangible result has ever been realised from the council to the communities. Even empowerment programmes will never happen because councils are very poor to successfully implement such schemes. Whenever officers from the council talk of economic development, the story ends at consultation level. Local authorities have no resources for empowerment activities” (Informants, 24th July 2014).

The quality of comments from participants indicates a much greater dislike of the local authority service provision and the advocacy for empowerment, whilst emphasising on decentralisation. There are serious community accusations that community voices and aspirations are not being heard. In considering these comments it should be borne in mind that the research found it easy to assess the reliability of the comments which could also easily be cross-checked with other respondents because each had similar sentiments.

The Ladder of Citizen Participation Theory best explains what happens at the lowest level in communities. There is no proper community action, the effect of which mostly is to ignore the local level voices.

In the absence of community engagement, it is obvious that issues which the communities wish to discuss are seldom included as items on agendas for discussions. No wonder councilors and community alike see the use of jargon as a deliberate strategy to keep community members at a distance.

The purpose of the unclear agenda is to disguise what is coming up so that communal programmes which should be very significant for communities are not questioned. This is a means of avoiding community members to perform their obligation. Similarly, to claim that there are insufficient funds in the budget is to curtail arguments since it is illogical for the outsider to counter any issue which has not been funded due to scarcity of resources.

During FGDs, community members responded as follows:

You cannot expect community members to express themselves freely during the meetings. Decision making by councils involve very lengthy agendas with a few minutes for each item. Usually, in such meetings, only few selected community members attend. To crown it all, only Council officers dominate the discussions on the agenda. Local knowledge is not fully appreciated and in most cases the community is invited when it is too late in the process of decision making. (Informants, 26th July 2014).

Taking the responses above from community members, the presumption is that the district councils pursue their own management programmes without involving community members through local development committees which should be effective advisory bodies in decentralised decision-making.

There are no forums at local level in collaboration with councils for a genuine consultation. Therefore, participation is essentially seen as a top-down exercise controlled by the local authority, but with very limited scope for the community to take part in decision making process. Community members are relegated below their guaranteed level of participation without having any particularly clear view on which form of decentralisation and participation to embrace as outlined in Table 5 below.

Table 5. Evidence of Inadequate Participation by Communities

Underlying factors	Proximal factors	Outcomes/Impacts
Lack of legal interpretation, recognition and control over council resources and finances	Poor capacities and attitudes of the local people, and their relationships with councils	Poor participation due to poor allocation of resources by councils especially to the disadvantaged areas for development
Less information.	Poor communication, and information flow to communities	Less responsiveness and participation for service access and provision by community members in collaboration with Councils.
Policy frameworks, including links to communities and	Un clear Procedures, mechanisms and evidence	Poor inter-linkages and coordination with

other sectors.	used for transparency of decision making, and uptake of community inputs.	communities
Bleak technical sources and recognition of community input by councils.	Poor informal formation of community decision-making organs.	Poor community knowledge of decentralisation and participation. Less actual community involvement and inclusion of local priorities.
Non-vibrant environment and poor influence on community participation	Less local programme implementation.	Poor community input in collaboration with councils
Poor council image	Poor organisation capabilities	Poor community and council partnerships

Source: Field data.

5.4 Socio Economic Context of Local Authorities

The influence of socio-economic context on local governance and local development opportunities, the population size, economic structure and the poverty level play a significant role in community participation. The decentralisation model in Zambia discerns only one criterion for the allocation of funds to the district councils. The criteria in terms of poverty, the Human Development Index (HDI) or economic potential are decentralisation model offering possibilities for redistribution of resources between resource richer and resource poorer local authorities.

In fact, it has been found that the current criteria deepen the existing differences because larger and more prosperous local authorities or municipalities are able to benefit more through the larger proportion amount of funds transferred. Consequently, the size of the Council is expected to influence the contribution of decentralised community participation, since smaller councils are expected to have a disadvantaged position regarding the amount of funds available and the mobilisation of funds as well.

An explanation regarding the above arguments can be attributed to lack of correspondence between population size and budget size whereby the larger councils usually receive more money from the central government and generate more on local resources, the share of

external funds is much more important for the budget size. This explains the assumption that the capacity to generate own resources depends much more on the economic structure, the existing tax base of certain councils, than on the size of the total population.

The study found that the base for tax collection is small in most rural Councils like Chinsali because the tax system is not broad enough and taxes on rural properties are not levied. This implies that the raised taxes stem from non-agricultural activities, such as urban property and the retail trade. Kasama Municipal Council and Nakonde district Council have a relatively diversified economic structure than Mbala and Chinsali districts. However, Chinsali and Mbala districts have an agriculture system which forms a major important source of income for the communities, while the share of retail, industry and services in Kasama and Nakonde are considerably higher than they are in Chinsali and Mbala councils.

Also, the economic structure has an impact on the occurrence of a multiplier effect. It has been found in the study that, a more diversified economic structure in any area might impact positively on development and people's participation. An analysis of the multiplier effect in the construction industry in Northern and Muchinga provinces of Zambia shows that the effect is quite high in Nakonde and Kasama due to relatively higher number of economic activities.

Another aspect is the relation between the poverty level of local authority and the type of investments. An analysis of the type of investment programmes in relation to the poverty level in the four local authorities indicates that, there are no differences between the poorer Councils and the richer ones. This is attributed to the fact that all local authorities in the study are faced with the same constraints such as deficient facilities in the provision of services and deficient road infrastructure within their jurisdiction.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter endeavored to investigate the relationship between citizen's levels of participation in local development in collaboration with local authorities. Councils are considered as conduits and enablers in the process of community participation for development at the district level. Based on the findings, it has been discovered that the district councils are the highest and focal points in local decision-making at the district level.

Any decisions taken by government to support local initiatives must be made by local authorities. This hypothetical scenario about councils cannot be questioned because support in the success stories on community participation world over shows that councils are closer to the grassroots. In this regard, the planning procedure requires for communities to identify their needs and to state their wishes for councils to support community requirements.

If staff members in councils are unable to respond to citizen's demands, participation by the local people is not practicable because local development depend on two groups of stakeholders, mainly the community members and councils, it is important therefore that the two entities work in unison.

Councils should consider decentralisation as an opportunity for local democracy and community empowerment through adopting a flexible community driven development approach which should be responsive and innovative to local citizens. And the local government structure should provide the framework of both technical and administrative support within which, sustainable development can take place through the promotion of community engagement in the various established structures at the local level.

Development through community participation should be characterised by an effective communication between different role players. The importance of community involvement in local governance should be captured effectively in the legislative framework as an ideal notion of integrating development planning at the local level. Ideally, local government must be committed to work with citizens and groups within the community to find ways to meet community's social, economic and physical needs to improve the livelihoods of the local people as well as foster development. Failure to recognise the importance of community orientations may undermine the core value for community participation.

The DDCCs and Councils should be seen committed to decentralise development planning to the local people up to the village level to realise tangible results. So far, this study has shown that very little attempt has been made by local authorities to integrate efforts to improve the impact of decentralisation intervention on community participation for beneficiary communities.

The DDCCs' capacity to mobilise resources and provides services to the public must as well be enhanced. This will in turn result into communities to have confidence in the DDCCs' and community structures. The Council structure at district level should have capacity to foster participatory communication and provide an appropriate environment in which members of communities could unite and develop confidence to participate in community development activities.

Local authorities have poor image often perceived by citizens as being outside the Public Service hence the unwillingness of community members to venture into partnership in local development programmes. Similarly, the dismal community development and poor participation by the community members among others is also because of negative historical attitudes about local governance in the country. Local authorities have poor revenue base and poor infrastructure and systems.

Although the relationship between the central government and local authorities has now become closer for the stimulation of local development, the reality however, suggest that councils would operate more effectively if dependency and control from the central government were eliminated. The strong hand of government has been found to be the creator and champion of development agenda in local development thereby rendering local authorities as well as community development initiatives moribund. Therefore, central government control has not in any way strengthened the financial position of Councils through fiscal decentralisation.

Whatever the future holds for local authorities under any successive government, the study has found that currently, government has been navigating operations of local authorities, and if local authorities remain part of the navigated political governance system, the participatory process will for ever remain a rhetoric political jargon.

This study has therefore shown that, decentralisation intervention for community participation has just provided formal mechanisms and spaces between the central government and community governance structures, but the space has failed to reconfigure relationships from the transformative perspective which could enable citizens to become planners and implementers of community development programmes.

CHAPTER SIX

COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES

6.1 Introduction

This Chapter has discussed central government sector decentralised structures regarding the provision of services in collaboration with community members. It has presented a detailed analysis and discussions on the findings of the study on community participatory structures in selected sectors and existing network ties especially those created at the local level as well as whether these mechanisms and structures have enhanced participatory development activities in communities.

Thus, the chapter has attempted to critically explore and examine community engagement at community levels including the characteristic of structural power balance in communities. The chapter has examined the degree of community participatory activities in various local groupings because some communities are traditionally involved in community activities while others are not. In this regard, a careful examination of community structural implication is necessary to successfully deduce participatory issues regarding community level engagement along with central government sectors.

The overall understanding of the chapter is on social service provision within the realm of decentralised sectoral mandates in collaboration with the local people. The study has argued that due to the absence of precisely defined duties and responsibilities, community members and representatives are left to perform their responsibilities according to their individual initiatives and commitments.

The study has shown that the lack of precisely sectoral defined participatory mechanisms, informal means of participation automatically emerges to enable community members to participate in sector programmes.

The discussions focussed on the findings regarding community participation in the Ministry of Health (MoH), the Ministry of General Education, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services.

As shall be discussed later in this chapter, the research findings show that participatory development has been driven by central government planners and not necessarily through the process of bottom-up approach under which the jurisdiction of local development planning can be assigned to the communities that require various services through the participatory mode of development approaches and mechanisms.

6.2 Local Structures and Participation in the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services.

The primary mandate of the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services is to promote and ensure improvements in the living standards of both the rural and urban communities through various programmes and initiatives. In that regard, community members participate in community activities which are very important for local people's wellbeing. Suffice to indicate that, there are various social support programmes implemented by the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services in which the poor and the vulnerable seek help. Among others, the programmes includes the Social Cash Transfer Scheme, the public welfare assistance scheme, the social protection fund and the food security pack to mention but only a few.

These schemes provide cash to vulnerable families to enable them to provide basic needs to their households. The schemes are currently being implemented in various districts by households on critical areas such as education for the children, food, health, livestock and shelters.

Like the social cash transfer, the Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS) targets mainly the incapacitated, terminally ill and other vulnerable individuals. However, unlike the Social Cash Transfer, the beneficiaries are provided with rations and other welfare needs. In this scheme, beneficiaries are not given cash like the case with the social cash transfer scheme. Instead they are provided with the needed goods and services.

The Social protection fund on the other hand is a scheme which is implemented to help the vulnerable but viable individuals and families with some form of empowerment to engage in income generating activities. Clients under this scheme category are helped once with a view to graduate later from government assistance.

The Women Empowerment Fund is an empowerment fund scheme that encourages women to form clubs and cooperatives through which support is provided to enable them to engage in viable activities. While the Food Security Pack only targets vulnerable but viable individuals and families that seek to engage in agricultural activities by giving them support in form of inputs to improve household and national food security.

In a nutshell, the social support schemes are designed to be implemented through government but more power of implementation to community established structures at the lower level of society. This implies that there are government officials at the lower sub-centre who are privileged enough to engage the local people on a routine basis including their problems and challenges.

In investigating community participation for development in government sector structures, and how people are made to be aware of the governance structures at the local level, the study explored among others, structures such as the Area Coordinating Committees (ACCs), the Community Welfare Assistance Committees (CWACs) and the District Welfare Assistance Committees (DWACs) under the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services. It has been found that, the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (MCDSS) has the mandate of facilitating community participation in the provision of socio-economic empowerment and social assistance to the poor and vulnerable citizens through the established structures.

One of the most important decentralised programme implemented by communities through these structures is the Social Cash Transfer Scheme initiated in November 2003 by the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (MCDSS) in collaboration with German Technical Assistance (GTZ).

It is evident that in Muchinga and Northern provinces of Zambia, there is an increasing number of poor households who encounter new economic and social challenges. The major problems faced by most households includes chronically sickness and death of guardians.

The widowed women and even grandparents in some cases remain caring for sick relatives and children/orphans. And due to lack of able-bodied labour force, these households cannot be reached through classical self-help approaches of development policies, food or cash for

work, micro-finance, public work programmes, promotion of microenterprises, agricultural extension activities which are labour based approaches.

Considering the above and because of high level of generalised poverty and the ongoing societal changes occurring in most communities, extended families and communities become overburdened. In that regard, the obligation to support a growing number of destitute relatives and community members is to rely on government so that the poor people become engaged in productive activities and to ensure a decent livelihood of their families. Suffice to indicate that development policies by government such as the decentralisation reforms are aware of this problem. Some proposals about the social protection approach are introduced to address this new challenge to ensure the survival of the neediest households and to manage community schemes and cash transfers without discouraging community-based efforts.

The social safety net schemes, therefore, are development-oriented community development programmes which were introduced because of widespread food poverty and vulnerability at households suffering from both critical levels of food poverty and high dependency ratios, as such unable to respond to any development opportunities that arise. The Scheme is designed to distribute transfers to beneficiaries through the decentralised group identification and pay mechanisms. The Area Coordinating Committee (ACC) is established as liaison entity in Communities in the identification and allocation of scheme resources for vulnerable community members. The District Welfare Assistance Committees (DWACs) are represented from government departments and non-governmental organisations which approves the budgets and allocate resources to the disadvantaged groups in communities.

As indicated above, the Social Cash Transfer (Scheme) is financed by the Government of Zambia in collaboration with German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and implemented by Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS). The Scheme has the following objectives:

- (a) Reduce extreme poverty, hunger and starvation in the 10% most destitute and incapacitated (non-viable) households;
- (b) Focus mainly; but not exclusively on households that are headed by the elderly and are caring for orphans and other vulnerable children (OVC) because breadwinners are chronically sick, or have died due to HIV/AIDS or other reasons; and

- (c) Generate information on the feasibility, costs and benefits, and all positive and negative impacts of a Social Cash Transfer Scheme as a component of a Social Protection Strategy for Zambia.

However, despite the Ministry having local governance structural components in the discharge of its mandate like the District Welfare Assistance Committees (DWACs), the Community Welfare Assistance Committees (CWACs) and the Area Coordinating Committees (ACCs), it has been found in this study that the participation by communities is not coordinated effectively. Communities have not been fully enlightened to engage themselves in entrepreneurial activities for generating income to sustain their livelihoods and ultimately uplift their standards and contribute to national economic development.

In a bid to explore the operations of the local level structures, we conducted interviews with various community members through unstructured questionnaires. It was found that the District Welfare Assistant Committees (DWACs) work with various stakeholders at the district and comprise line ministries from social sectors such as education, health, agriculture, community development, local authorities, victim support unit (VCU), Zambia Association of People Living with Disabilities (ZAPID), Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and Faith Based Organisations (FBOs). The members of the DWACs divide the district according to the location of suitable partners. The study found that there were about nine (9) to thirty (30) areas per district. Areas follow boundaries of health centre catchments, education zones, wards, Chiefdoms, geographical features or any other way of dividing the district.

To explore if community members knew the composition of their local structures, the following information was obtained from the FGDs:

Each area contains several CWACs. The number of CWAC usually is between five (5) and twenty (20) and the population of a CWAC is usually but not limited to between fifty (50) in rural areas and five hundred (500) people in urban. The CWACs are at the lowest level followed by ACCs that already exist often as part of the partner organisation, such as the Area Development Committees (ADCs). The CWACs or their members usually show a prior record of voluntary community work such as church work, other community projects and or micro projects. Community meetings are held to inform all residents of the new programmes and get their agreement. The CWACs is responsible for identifying beneficiaries as well as leading other activities in the locality. (FGDs-13th May 2013).

Therefore, from the above FGDs submission it can be seen clearly that the DWACs, ACCs, and CWACs) made important decisions on behalf of the whole community on resource

allocation as well as programmes planning and implementation. However, to some extent, the committees worked with all community members and leaders to ensure that their decisions were understood and supported. It has been found that the committees ensure that information was communicated effectively to Chiefs and local traditional leaders, as well as to elected Councilors.

The study results have shown that the District Social Welfare Officer (DSWO) timely provided information on what resources were available for Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS). The DSWO divided the resources between the areas according to the ceiling and informed each ACCs of what resources were available and then as well informed the CWACs. The resources available throughout the provinces came from the central government through the Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS) budget, as well as from Cooperating Partners and or local resources. The PWAS funds according to the findings came from the central government budget.

And in probing further, community members explained that the Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS) was one of Government's Social Assistance Programmes aimed at alleviating the problems of the poorest and most vulnerable people in Muchinga and Northern provinces. The Scheme (PWAS) promoted community capacities for comprehensive responses to challenges of vulnerabilities. Government through the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services implemented the scheme in collaboration with community members. Officers under the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services explained as follows:

The Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS) target 10% of the population in Muchinga and Northern Provinces for those who fall in the lowest life category. These are the poor of the poorest in the provinces. These groups are targeted because they are the poorest because their income is very low. Many households in this category lack self-help capacity and cannot be reached by labour-based programmes like micro credit schemes, Fertilizer Support Programme or Food for Work because they may be too old, too young, too sick, disabled or have no source of external support. PWAS provide better services by reducing starvation and extreme poverty in the most destitute and incapacitated households and individuals (Social Welfare Officers, 13th May 2013).

In supplementing the above findings, information gathered during desk research and through residents and from Community Development Officers, it was found that PWAS had six principles that were essential for achieving its objectives.

As found in the study, the PWAS pursued the principles through its implementation strategies and capacity building activities through decentralisation by allowing the communities to identify the most appropriate people for welfare support. This was because the local people knew all the members and their true situations better than any outsider in communities, and as such, community members decided for themselves how to allocate resources to eligible beneficiaries. Equally, the local people knew the resources which were available and as such the PWAS principle was to enable communities to decide using widely known criteria that were understood by the locals and not subjected to directives from outsiders. This was so because Muchinga and Northern provinces are socially bound by community links based on Christianity and traditional activities.

Communities also have some resources to contribute to vulnerable members. The first of such resource to contribute is commitment of time. The vulnerable groups depend on voluntary activities at community level. There are some people who always want to work for free while others also work to assist vulnerable people in society. These activities include voluntary labour for community development, helping elderly people, donations of food, putting up a basic structure for a disabled person or assisting in ploughing of farms for elderly and disabled persons.

In working with central government, the study found that in traditional set up, discussions of voluntary community work are arrived at informally during communal gathering or during traditional ceremonies and games such as the ones found in Muchinga province like the game of piercing a fast-thrown moving object- semi hard round rhizome known as “unyongwe”, and traditional music played during marriages popularly known as “Vipikililo”, and or during the annual festival called “Chikunka”, and the popular traditional dance ceremony performed by the Balambya tribe of eastern Isoka known as “Mampenenga.” These activities are also practiced by the Nyika tribe of Mulekatembo and Nsami including the Tumbuka and Namwanga speaking people. The games and festivals above are avenues through which communities discuss development programmes with central government official thereby finding bonds and bridging participation on mutual support.

The above scenario give rise to solid bonds that bind the community to work together more than the adherence to superimposed laws and rules. These practices still survive without workshops, foreign aid and even without any material support. The traditional ceremonies and games are still in the hearts of the people.

In this regard, using the best of these practices to better social practices and to promote community participation for development has been part of community survival for generations. However, the cultural ethos which make community members to get united in all community developmental activities are being superseded and not given much attention due to modernity and erosion of culture and beliefs hence the notion of nuclear family which has resulted into community participation problems. As explained by the Mbalwe Village Headman below:

During our traditional ceremonies and traditional games, we discuss issues concerning community welfare. As members of communities, we know each other well. We take stock of weaker members to find ways of helping such members with food and shelter. With the help of officers from government under the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services, things become much easier or else the poor people would continue to depend on the communities for support. So, it is important that the Community Welfare Assistance Committees (CWACs) engages the village carefully to utilise the resources and time from the local people. In this way, the poor will benefit because the resources will be utilised effectively by the disadvantaged (B. Mulambya, 13th May 2013).

The above submissions by the Mbalwe village headman in a way shows that the responsibility for selecting recipients should be entrusted with the community. As already alluded to, community members know their neighbours and their situations better than anyone else. They know who is in most genuine need, and therefore, once the community is informed of what resources are available to them, they are better placed to identify the most appropriate people to receive these benefits as clients. Clients should be only identified for the resources that are available to avoid building false hopes because resources are usually not enough to provide full assistance for everyone in need. Communities are thus better placed to choose between deserving candidates and explain their decisions to other members in an amicable manner through their local kinship ties.

However, the study results from all the four districts indicate that the creation of the community-based committees at community level does not really emphasise enhancement of community involvement and control of programmes at community level. The promotion of community Committees as a mechanism for citizens to have a say in their communities for community development in spearheading community programmes and projects has been found to be frustratingly cumbersome and weak. The established Committees have very limited roles to play despite being within geographical areas.

It has been found that decisions are not really passed by community members themselves because they are not made through a process of discussion and consensus by holding of various developmental committee meetings in communities. In most cases, the study results have shown that decisions usually promoted by government officers that exercise direct administration of public policies anticipating accomplishing the needs and aspirations of the local people. One striking factor for ineffectiveness of community-based committees is the non-paid volunteer structures and hence reluctant to devote their time on community work.

The research findings attribute poor administration of the social cash transfer scheme to mismanagement and problem-solving capacity of staff of the scheme who do not effectively engage the beneficiaries at the local level. Comparing to the high standards required, there are shortcomings regarding the utilisation of the scheme at the local level. In addition, there are several problems that have been observed in the study as given below:

- (i) Participants complain that in most cases, they find the office closed during office hours with no indication where the officers will have gone and when available. Sometimes the office is closed for a full day;
- (ii) To arrive at the pay office, beneficiaries travel between 20 and 80 kilometers under hazardous transport conditions like open vans and spend almost half of the benefit for transport costs. And when they are not served, their whole effort is wasted, and they return to their homes without money. This results in delays of up to 3 months for beneficiaries to access funds for the scheme;
- (iii) If the beneficiary household dies or is no longer able to travel to the Pay Point, the CWACs must submit information on Form 16 which is then used to make a DWAC decision on either to terminate the transfers to that specific household or approving another head of household. However, it has been found that during all that time, the

DSWOs do not put such issues on the agenda of the DWAC meetings and no actions are taken despite being reminded by the Local Advisor. In most cases, DWAC meetings are not properly recorded. There are no minutes that are recorded in a transparent manner to show the applications which are approved, and which have been disapproved by the DWAC.

- (iv) The forms which are constantly needed are not stocked, as a result, functionaries of the Scheme are frequently told that a certain form is out of stock with insufficient funds to have a stock of all forms available.

Suffice however, to explain that the social cash transfers relieve beneficiaries to some extent but do not change their poor conditions significantly. Beneficiaries are still in a problematic situation and in most cases still depend on handouts from family and community members. At the same time, beneficiaries are still perceived destitute by their community members and are thus still assisted with food.

The scheme does not seem to intervene considerably in community structures and hierarchies although to some extent it offers destitute households a reliable little monthly income. In rural communities such as those in Muchinga and Northern provinces of Zambia, being poor does not mean being excluded from social relations or not being part of the community.

In the same manner, becoming too rich causes jealousy and bad feelings and can even be related to the use of witchcraft. However, the scheme's long-term impact on family and community structures seems to draw a lot of questions because the social cash transfer scheme seems to be driven by central government and not the community members themselves.

6.2.1 Programmes Awareness and Resource Mobilization

Programme awareness constitute an important component of programme success because citizens are the major stakeholders in programme functioning. However, from our study obtained during the interviews suggest that several community members were not very much aware of programmes which the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services was implementing in collaboration with community members.

During the interviews, the respondents could not exactly mention the names of programmes and projects which were being undertaken in their localities. The findings have shown that majority of the citizens were able to mention “Vimbusu project” or just the “latrine project” which was being spearheaded by the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services. In Some instances, some members in communities were able to recognise the name of the project by associating it with the name of the Chairperson of the committee.


However, community members located in urban areas such as Kasama and Chinsali were able to mention the name of the programmes and projects. In this context, it can be deduced that being aware of the name of the programme and projects signifies attachment of the community members with the programme activities. But in terms of resource mobilisation, group members expressed different views as far as resource mobilisation and allocation was concerned.

The difference in opinion by the community members shows the degree of ignorance of respondent’s knowledge about the available project resources, budget commitments, legislative limitations and areas of comparative value in resource allocation.

One of the main hindering factors in terms of project awareness and resource mobilisation can be attributed to accessibility. The accessibility problem has been understood in this study in terms of distance between the communities and the programme or project resource areas expressed in terms of hours, days coupled with the poor presence of roads especially in rain seasons. The findings indicate that accessibility affects the implementation of development in communities for several reasons because it influences the knowledge of the population about general aspects of services and development programmes which should be communicated to community members.

At the same time, with respect to the relation between the knowledge of community members, accessibility appears that the members of various communities and or villages in less accessible areas have less knowledge about programme and project planning and implementation. Figure 5 shows project awareness and participation levels by rural members in various communities of the study.

Figure 5. Project awareness and participation by rural community members



Source: Field data

From the above findings, it can be deduced that Community members in remote areas of Northern and Muchinga Provinces are not much aware of various programmes which government implement in urban areas. It has been found also that rural communities lack tangible resources for effective community participation, and because of the long distances the communities cover to acquire resources, their level of participation in developmental programmes and projects is relatively very low.

The problems associated with programmes and project implementation, explains the weak participation by various stakeholders and especially the beneficiaries of the projects at the local level. As already alluded to, for smooth implementation of programmes and projects, materials must be transported to the project sites. And since the transportation of materials to remote areas such as Chibeta and Nanyunyi involves a larger physical distance and only possible by making use of heavy-duty vehicles, the cost of programmes and projects are higher than those in more accessible communities located in urban areas.

In addition, community members have no capacity and the necessary experience to facilitate for programmes implementation resulting into delays or abandoning the programmes and projects as explained by community members on page 148 of this study.

We have never seen any person coming from NGOs here in our area. We only heard that there are some organisations which assist government in various community development projects and programmes. These organisations are only found near the towns in Chinsali and Kasama. We don't know them here and we don't equally know who sends them to help communities or to ask communities what to be done (FGDs, 25th August 2009).

The lack of government correspondence with community members hinders projects sustainability while the lack of funds hinders effective programme implementation. The local people are usually not at the forefront in fostering community development activities due to among other factors, unclear procedure to initiate and implement any programme and project, and to obtain the funds for programme sustainability by community members. In this regard, it is very difficult to spearhead local programmes in collaboration with other stakeholders as well. Equally, the performance of communities in the implementation of programmes and projects coupled with poor community infrastructure and investment to support local initiatives in most rural areas are some hinderances for programme implementation. Respondents explained as follows:

We face a lot of problems in the implementation of projects due to poor road infrastructure and the shortage of funds. There is poor relation between communities and government in the implementation of programmes. Government officers perform their duties just to fulfil their monthly planned schedules. Officers from central government work without effectively involving community members (Mr. Sikana, 25th August 2009).

Based on the findings, it is not realistic to assume that decentralisation has contributed to community participation and development in general. The implementation of decentralisation in the two provinces at the local level has not really resulted in community driven programmes implementation because it has not increased the participation of the local people. This negative scenario is strongly attributed in the way planning is designed by excluding community members.

The above scenario has not defined any local development strategy and mechanisms for the well-intended decentralised community activities. It is evident to note that communities tend to go their own way without using the participatory development strategy in the development of their areas. In some instances, communities are directed by government officials on what to do during the implementation of government driven programmes.

As attested by Sherry R. Arnstein in her ‘Ladder of Citizen Participation Theory’, citizens in rural areas are manipulated by professionals and other development specialists. In this context, Arnstein (1968) contends that community members can participate only to the extent of expressing their views but have no real say in the participatory process.

6.2.2 *Community Participation in Cooperative Projects*

Cooperative programmes are avenues through which community members gain skills and resources. Information obtained through interviews have indicated that the projects have no implementation guidelines, all the chairpersons, vice-chairpersons, secretaries and treasurers of these projects and the community leaders are just selected by the members with no specific criteria of selection.

The information from project members at Musufi Twikatane Co-operative project at Nzoche in Nakonde east indicated that project members select the group leaders and secretaries for their Cooperative project without using any secret ballot. Members of FGDs indicated that the implementation level was also marred with inertia due to lack of project guidelines and commitment by community members. The Project members explained as follows:

Our Micro-Cooperative project was formed in the year 2007. At that time one officer from the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services, used to visit our community regularly and conducted meetings with us. Then one day he appointed the current Chairperson to lead the Group. Some members including myself left the group because we did not see any sense to be a member in the group. Later in 2008 the group members asked me to re-join and become a Chairperson, all the community members encouraged me to be part of them so that the number of memberships can increase (Project members, 9th September 2009).

Another member, a retired Headmaster from Chaswata in Nakonde district explained as follows:

In my case, the chairman and the secretary of Twikatane cooperative with two community project members came to my house and informed me that I had been nominated as treasurer of the cooperative, they knew that my appointment would add value and because of the experience I have as a retired teacher (Mr Chisowa, 9th September 2009).

The above findings indicate that membership selection process is not consultative enough.

And although members are requested to give their opinion concerning nominees, the selection of leaders is not transparent as it is not done publicly either by raising hands or by saying yes or no through voting. This process narrows the scope for freely expressing choice because less powerful members do not express their views in the choice of leaders. Community members also indicated discontentment in the manner the selection process of leaders was conducted.

Thus, from the above findings on leadership selection process in the running of programmes and projects in communities, it is evident that the leadership selection is just a process of nomination of the privileged ones. Further, the unavailability of competent community members to serve as project leaders in the communities generally requires some level of human capability and skills (human assets), such as the ability to read and write and more importantly some kind of influence over other members in the community.

During the FGDs, participants indicated that the aim of community programmes were mainly to promote socio-economic wellbeing of the disadvantaged and the poor in the communities. The findings indicate that members of the community in collaboration with the ministry of community development and social services uplift and improve the living standards of community members. In support of the above findings, an officer from the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services in Northern Province explained that since most of the rural people needed some financial and material support, the ministry through the department of social welfare had the task of identifying vulnerable members in the community to whom assistance could be offered.

As a government ministry, we mobilise and organise community members in various activities. In skill acquisition, for example, we spearhead various skill training programmes in various communities for different age groups to inculcate appropriate technical and vocational skills for local people to uplift their livelihood. Programmes such as the Twafwane and Mwashibukeni, especially among the rural population and urban illiteracy groups are some of our programme components. However, mobilising and organising the recipients, especially the under privileged has proved to be very difficult. Our mandate in organising community self-help projects and to provide technical expertise in ensuring adherence to policies and programmes are followed strictly. (Assistant Community Development Officer- 8th July 2010).

In understanding community member engagement through structured questionnaire on collaboration between community members and government officials in various community programmes aimed at poverty alleviation and development effort, the study found a general perception regarding collaboration in service provision. The findings have shown that there is little collaborative effort between government and community members in community development programmes. Table 6 below shows the findings regarding community and government collaboration in community development.

Table 6. Collaboration in development effort between government and community members

Community and Government Collaboration	YES	No	Total
Mulakupikwa	121	129	250
Mwenzu	93	157	250
Lukasha	107	143	250
Senga Hill	98	152	250
Total	419	581	1000

Source: field data.

In the first place, 419 respondents out of 1000 explained that they did not participate in community development in collaboration with government officers. Information obtained from the survey which was validated by the interviews with members of FGDs, have shown that that the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services does involve community members in some selected programmes.

However, despite the ministry involving community members in programmes such as the Social Cash Transfer, little was achieved in ensuring that citizens participated effectively in activities that promoted their living standard in communities.

It has been found that community members do not effectively participate in entrepreneurial skills such as catering, dressmaking and or needlework. The study found that rural industrial skills training programmes had not been successfully implemented to inculcate the youth with the necessary skills to stimulate self-employment and improve their livelihoods. There is no proper training facilities and institutions to train the youth with the skills needed to improve

their livelihoods. The non-formal education activities targeting primarily the vulnerable groups focusing on adult education and extension services have little significance due to non-adherence to programme schedules by both the local people and government officials.

And in assessing the effectiveness of decentralisation and community involvement in development process through various activities which aim at increasing peoples' participation in the socio-economic development, community members from Mbala district explained as follows:

The Ministry of Community Development and Social Services has the capacity to assist community members involved in community development activities. This mandate is not fully discharged by the ministry. The Ministry in collaboration with other Ministries such as the Ministry of Local Government, should mobilise community members in various development work. Government through the Ministry of Community development and Social Services has not really played its key role in mobilising communities to collaborate in development programmes (FGDs- 10th July 2010).

As indicated by participants during FGDs in Mbala district, the results indicate that despite the well streamlined portfolios and collaborations with other line Ministries, the decentralised activities in the Northern and Muchinga provinces seem to have not been very effective.

Little has been achieved in improving the livelihood and creating opportunities in both rural and urban areas in curtailing the menace of poverty and under-development through local participatory mechanisms. Government financial support to the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services is poor. Information gathered from government officers in the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services indicate that, government remitted little funds to the ministry and thus the ministry fails to conduct community development work with the local citizens.


This is evident enough because government officials merely relied on adopted pragmatic approach to identify communities by focusing on a combination of indicators in the choice of programmes mainly, by evaluating the nature of the community, the appearance of the people in the community in terms of their attire, the way they speak, their health status, their access to safe and good drinking water, access to toilet facilities, access to energy sources such as

fire wood, access to food and nutrition, peoples' vulnerability during the rainy season and community's general levels of income. During FGDs, members explained as follows:

The selection of the recipients for assistance programmes by the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services lacks a working definition. The Ministry does not exactly have a proper definition of the term 'vulnerability and social exclusion'. There is no proper collaboration with stakeholder engagement, and the information concerning the programme is equally inadequate. The department of social welfare normally uses community entry strategies like Churches to solicit community 'buy-in' into their pre-determined programmes and interventions. Government officers determine the programmes with people who don't know the vulnerable groups in communities (FGDs- 11th July 2010).

From the above explanation by the FGDs, in most cases therefore, the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services implements various programmes whose impact are not properly assessed. It has been found that there is a general lack of community involvement and awareness as well as the lack of quantifiable objectives, clear-cut input, output, and outcome and impact indicators at the inception of the programmes. Figure 6 shows the findings from the general populace regarding government and community collaboration in the choice of programmes for the vulnerable in communities.

Figure 6. Participative collaboration in the choice of empowerment programmes.



Source: Field data

The above findings show that little has been done in collaboration with community members in the choice of empowerment programmes by the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services. As a result, the overall objective of community development programmes aimed at alleviating poverty and improve the livelihood of citizens has not significantly yielded its intended purpose.

Community involvement in the understanding of various community programmes has not been very effective as indicated by the responses from community members in the four districts of the study shown in Table 7 below:

Table 7: General involvement and understanding of Community programmes

Community	YES	No	Total
Kasama	92	158	250
Chinsali	87	163	250
Mbala	106	144	250
Nakonde	78	172	250
Total	363	637	1000

Source: field data.

From the above table, it is observed that of the selected 250 community members in each district, Kasama recorded only 92 community members having been involved in community work. Nakonde district recorded 78, followed by Chinsali district with only 87. Mbala district which had the highest had 106 of the 250.

On the other hand, the overall data indicates about 36% of community members as being aware of community development work. About 64% have not participated. As we shall see in chapter seven on the findings about obstacles to participation, being unaware or not being interested in taking part in various collaborative programmes with government is due to lack of information to understand the objectives of such community programmes properly.

This situation not only does it discourage participatory practice by community members but affect the social and political structures in rural communities and rural development initiatives.

During an interview with officers from the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services, it was discovered that the Department of Social Welfare under the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services recognises the fact that the PWAS and the Social Cash Transfer (SCT) programmes are not adequate to reduce the suffering of the poor and vulnerable as well as the mitigation of the impact of HIV and AIDS pandemic in the households.

The Social Safety Net programmes for the protection of the citizens was being implemented by government and that the programme was not implemented widely enough to cater for all the vulnerable members in the community. The findings below is a citation from officers under the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services:

There are various challenges faced by government to meet the objectives of the Millennium Development Goals here in Zambia. Just take a quick view of the people here in this province. Majority are very poor trapped in chronic poverty transmitted through generation to generations. Women, Children, those living with disabilities and older persons are the most affected members who in most cases are not captured when executing poverty alleviation programmes (Assistant Community Development Officers- 12th July 2010).

By the ministry are not inclusive enough to enable all community members to participate effectively and increase their incomes. The study found that various community activities that aim at engaging community members and the vulnerable in society were not effectively implemented. As already alluded to in this chapter, the Social Protection Fund which is meant to be part of a broader poverty reduction and the Social Cash Transfer (SCT) Scheme as well as the Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS) and the Food Security Pack (FSP) are not effectively implemented for vulnerable groups because these groups are not effectively involved in executing these programmes.

However, during FGDs with the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services officials, it has been found that, the Safety Net Programmes play an important role in redistributing income to the poorest and most vulnerable citizens.

The immediate impact is about poverty reduction because communities are supposed to participate fully. Information obtained from community members indicate that, the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services provides Safety Net assistance to the

vulnerable households on account that they request for assistance through the Office of the Provincial Permanent Secretary. However, as indicated by participants in the FGDs, the administration of the fund is usually problematic. In some instances, there are no social welfare reports generated after executing the Safety Net fund to community members. In most cases, there is a general lack of proper accountability and that the administration of community fund has no guidelines for effective implementation.

And in assessing the effectiveness of the programme, the Officers from the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services explained as follows:

Despite the Social Cash Transfer Programme having a minimum monthly transfer of households, and usually given whenever funds are available and adjusted by inflation levels annually. 'The transfer of the funds is based on the annual average price of a 50 kg bag of maize, which in most cases would allow a family of 6 to at least consume a meal in a day (Assistant Community Development Officers- 12th July 2010).

As indicated by the Assistant Community Development Officers above, the funds are usually given whenever available, also not only that the Safety Net Fund programme is inadequate but the programme is not implemented in all the districts to help the vulnerable survive.

There is yet another Social Assistance Programme that assists community members called the Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS). The programme has been designed by the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services. During Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with officials from the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services, it has been found that the effectiveness of the programme is undermined by erratic funding from government and as such, the scheme has not been able to realise its intended objective of providing regular assistance to clients who belong to the scheme. Information obtained during the FGDs indicated the following:

Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS) receives very little money from the central government. The community is unable to benefit well because of little funds. Some members who are vulnerable and qualify to be recipients do not receive as a result (FGDs- June 2011).

This shows that PWAS can change the livelihood of community members if enough funds were allocated to it. In the same context, though the funds might be meagre, accountability is

very crucial in social protection service delivery because it facilitate public confidence, acceptability and promote wide participation in the implementation of the programme.

The administration of the Social Protection Fund for example should be done in a clear and transparent manner. The decision-making process, especially on the selection, approval and the allocation of funds to the beneficiaries should be transparent to meet the objectives in mitigating the effects of poverty. However, the study has found that the selection criteria, payee and amounts given to participants are not clearly documented to warrant resource accountability and effective management and transparency for the programme.

6.2.3 *Participation in Project Meetings*

Project meetings are an important medium for community members to express their views. This entails that, for the project to be implemented efficiently, it requires proper agreed guidelines. Community level development meetings if well-handled hold abundant potential for changing the status of community's underdevelopment and may stimulate progressive social order and participation.

In this context therefore, community meetings with regards to project and programme development are basis for capacity building and as stimulant for critical thinking and for expanded and sustainable community development. In this respect, community meetings have the potential to provide an environment for discussion and negotiations. However, it has been found that the local people seldom get involved in project and programme meetings. In the same context, the failure by community members to effectively take part in meetings are mainly because the meetings in question have no fixed time schedule.

In addition, meetings are only held when officials from government request for them and or when government officers initiate new programmes. In this manner, community members find it difficult to attend. The failure by community members to attend project meeting ranges from personal to economic activities giving rise to most of community members to abscond from attending project meetings. It has been found in the study that in most cases, community leaders, the Village traditional leaders attended the meetings because they represent their subjects and are targeted by government officers.

A village headman at Mbalwe explained as follows:

I attend the meetings because as a community leader, it is important for me to know about the decisions made during the meetings. All community members value my contributions. I need to attend these meetings so that I can explain to my subjects later in village meetings. So, my presence is very important (Mr. B. Mulambya, Mbalwe Headman -17th September 2009)).

The above explanation by the village headman is a clear justification to understand that community members' motivation for attending community meetings depended on the importance of their contributions to the overall community populace. Hence, it is important to deduce the nature of the meetings in terms of who spearheads them and for what purpose. The other reason is to understand an analysis about the level of involvement of the participants and the type of decisions that are made in the meetings. In understanding the above statement from our study on the nature of community meetings, the following statement was presented by community members:

In the programme and project meetings, we discuss the amount of work each community or village is supposed to perform and how many days each community is supposed to be dedicated to that task. In case of moulding bricks for example, we allocate specific numbers of days and numbers of blocks to be moulded by each community. So, we write down the names of members from each community and the days in which each community would mould blocks. When responsibilities are assigned, we discuss how to go about them (Community members, 17th September 2009).

As provided for in the Ladder of Citizen Participation Theory by Arnstein, it can be deduced from the above discussions that powerful people in communities can trigger participation because they have power and authority. The topmost are the ones who make decisions to be adhered to by the lower segments of societies in the stratum. The leaders (headmen/women) generally belong to the top rung in case of decision making. In the theory, these belong to the level of citizen power.

These groups participate in decision making than the general community members who are found at the lower level or at the bottom of participation ladder, the grassroots are mainly manipulated and have no real say in the process. By moulding blocks already planned by the people at the top (citizen control), communities at the grassroots presume that participation is present.

6.2.4 *Participation in Project Design and Decision Making*

The membership of Cooperative projects depends on some intrinsic values for participating which includes the benefits to be realised from participating. The ability to participate in community programmes and share leadership that is facilitative and dynamic, makes community a learning organisation. This, therefore, entails that the motivation for participation compel community members to effectively participate in any community programme with a desire for the project to be sustainable.

In the same context, decision-making process is an important factor for community members to understand whether their presence and pro-activeness is vital. To understand participation of community members at the decision-making process, one should ask as to whether community members effectively participate in programmes decision making at the local level and who finally make the decisions about project design and implementation and on what basis are decisions made.

It has been found that community meeting discussions tend to ignore various pertinent issues such as the selection of community project beneficiaries and leaders. The above issues are very cardinal because they provide direct link with communities, resource mobilisation and programme sustainability. However, it has been found in the study that community decision making process in project management is not participatory enough to sustain community projects. Participants in the study explained as follows:

Usually, in conducting community meetings concerning projects and especially when government want to construct for example a bridge, a school and or a dip tank, community leaders are the ones who effectively participate, and the other community members are just informed. Government officers do not effectively engage all community members to participate in the activities. There are no guidelines to follow when participating in project meetings. It is not clear on what to do during the projects. What we think is that decisions about project development should be made by having a discussion with every community member, but this does not happen. And the sad part is that as community members, we cannot speak against decisions made by our leaders (FGDs, 17th September 2009).

In view of the above, the study found that in project planning and participation, decisions are imposed by leaders without proper collaboration with community members, the absence of community commitment and involvement in project decision-making curtails the rigorous


multi-channel information sharing in the community. And the scarcity of various resources makes participation of community members in the implementation of community projects very difficult and unmanageable due to lack of capacity by community members.

Capacity building by way of training and skill development of community members is one of the major components of the project sustainability. During the study, it was found that no single project document was used as a guide for other upcoming projects and as a learning point. The findings have shown that community members who attended to the initial project meetings with project facilitators became regular participants in other projects as well. These were in most cases civil servants working in local areas such as primary school teachers and traditional leaders. This phenomenon leads to the development of group management style where the elites and leaders play a perpetual dominant role in community projects.

Information gathered from community members during interviews and through FGDs, indicates that community members are not given the right platform to be part and parcel of the implementation. And because such projects are unique and represent a national character, community capacity is often low. The health posts for example, were seen to be collaborative efforts but the local people were not thoroughly provided with early and extensive information about the schedules of the projects. Equally, stakeholder representation has been found to be lagging because the failure by community members to effectively participate in project planning and implementation has resulted into poor coordination among community members as well as various stakeholders.

Community membership absenteeism has resulted into communities being just on lookers and recipients of government project outcomes without necessarily being champions and initiators of community projects and programmes. This situation has resulted into the crumble of projects because community members have little or no tangible inputs to contribute to project sustainability because project benefits are communal in nature thereby each member in community become aware that even if he or she does not actively participate in the implementation of the project in question, the services to be accrued from the project would benefit even those who did not actively participate because a clinic or a road are public goods in nature. Figure 7 shows the level of community participation in early stages of government driven projects.

Figure 7. Community participation in early stages of Government driven Projects



Source: Field data.

The above findings clearly show that only about 34% of community members participated in the design of projects in collaboration with government officers in Kasama district. Nakonde indicated 28% and Chinsali 32% while Mbala had only 25% of community members participating in the early stages of project design. This implied that the majority, about 80% of community members did not participate in the initial stages of project design. The highest participation in percentage was only 34% in Kasama district.

6.2.5 General Citizen Participation in Twikatane Cooperative Projects.

Communal projects can be viewed in socio-economic contexts as those revitalising local governance and economic participation. Well designed and inclusive community programmes give the local people authority and control over resources for development.

Twikatane community projects are local organisation structures found in all sectors at community levels. Although by name simply means “self help, or communal projects,” These projects are aimed at fostering joint effort and are attached to already established structures either in agriculture or under community development.

The Twikatane projects, therefore, are intended to promote the economic development of the rural population by promoting “self help” concept which simply means helping one another. The “twikatane” project focuses on the economic emancipation of the rural poor through

collective responsibilities of community members themselves and although sporadic, and usually through the help of NGOs such as Plan International Zambia and World Vision Zambia, in practice however, although aimed at rural empowerment, the Twikatane projects are confronted with poorly organised structural mechanisms because by nature they are attached to already established community structures but lack the legitimacy of ownership.

As a result, they appear to be of less importance. In Mbala and Chinsali districts for example, the entrepreneurial sector is limited to a few agricultural retail shops while in Kasama, a more differentiated picture in terms of participation engagement were seen. Equally, the role of the most of these projects and programmes seemed to be very minimal due to poor organisation. And because the twikatane projects are designed mainly to alleviate poverty from communities, members are mostly given resources to engage in agriculture entrepreneurial activities. The study findings have shown that, despite the well-intended objectives of Twikatane projects, the implementation of such projects is not successfully conducted because, among other things, there is poor accountability of funds as explained by community members during the Focus Group Discussions below:

The objective of twikatane project has taken a different direction. In the past, people received funds for poverty alleviation, but nowadays, the project leaders use the money for their own benefits. Funds are not used for the intended purposes. Being a member in the project is just for formalities. There is no accountability in the use of the project funds. We grow a lot of maize and beans for the project and sell the produce to Food Reserve Agency. Currently, the Chairman is organising us and giving us little money in our hands in the pretext that the project is beneficial to us. What is worrying is that community members do not even bother to ask how much was realised during the previous harvest and why the project seems to be folding up (FGDs, Chaswata-5th September 2009).


The above submissions illustrate the noticeable pattern about the failure of community participation practice mechanisms. Several community members are not aware of the underlying logic and long-term developmental goals of the project. The study thus deduced that the lack of awareness of the project objectives by participants as well as poor information to understand the project goals as factors for project failures. Other factors include the disorientation of community membership management process, poor group decision-making and the lack of resource awareness and distribution processes.

It is important to note that for any project to succeed, informed participation is important as a mechanism for inducing co-operation and involving people to work with each other rather than just bringing them together. Informed participation is vital for achieving purposive incentive through collective effort and other benefits.

Participants indicated that they chose to participate in community programmes because it provided an opportunity for them to learn various skills and that working together fostered unity. In the same manner, it was also found that participation by community members enhanced their financial standing at household level. Some community members could not express reasons for not being active in community activities. The assumption for some members not to actively participate may be attributed to the notion of ‘free rider’ because even if one did not participate, the service being provided at community level would still be enjoyed by even those who could not participate.

In this context, although community solidarity is one of the reasons why most community members participate, the compelling reasons for most community members to participate without having been forced or coerced to participate concerns economic benefits. Figure 8 illustrates the findings in terms of the motives for citizen participation in community programmes and projects.

Figure 8. Reasons for participating in Community Programmes and Projects.



Source: Field data.

As indicated earlier above in this chapter, the major reasons for community members to participate in programmes and projects mainly due to economic incentives.

In terms of percentage, about 87% of community members indicated that their participation was due to economic reasons. And participation due to solidarity was 82%, skill acquisition at 51% while group influence at 68%. In this context, the self-esteem factor and benefits associated with economic incentives are some of the major motivating factors for local people to participate in various development programmes and projects. Some participants during the FGDs explained as follows:

If one observes our lifestyle, you conclude that several community members are poor, so if community members become committed and participate in the local development programmes and projects, noticeable developments in our communities will be enhanced. The communities and individuals will benefit in the provision of self-health care systems in one way or another due to reduction in diarrhoea diseases through the construction of latrines for use by community members. The local people are supposed to take a lead in self-help community programmes (FGDs - 17th August 2009).

The above responses indicate how the local people attach the importance of community participation in community development. The local people consider their participation in developmental programmes and projects not only as a way of achieving community solidarity, but also as an important activity for developing their socio status aimed at uplifting their livelihoods. Study results have shown that community members participate in communal activities which are a source of income to them and as a way of building trust and kinship.

We all belong to a bond of trusted kinship with understanding of community cohesion, the culture and beliefs of our people make us the way we are, and our life style is a continuation of group cohesion and solidarity. Most of us also realise that by being actively members in society we can benefits a lot. We also believe that by being members of micro credit schemes and or any Cooperative organisation, we can improve our economic status thus alleviating poverty (FGDs, Mulakupikwa 18th August 2009).

For community members to belong to any Micro Cooperative scheme, there should be some benefits to be accrued from such entities. Participation, therefore, can only be effective when citizens perceive some intrinsic value and rewards from taking part. As illustrated in the Ladder of Citizen Participation Theory, the aspect of tokenism is the most important factor to

compel community members to participate in such programmes and projects. Citizens take part in activities which have economic benefits to them.

We take great pleasure to see our community appears neat and people economically developed. We are always interested in the livelihoods and wellbeing of the people in the community. Our aim is to work for the welfare and improvement of the general populace especially the disadvantaged people in society. We joined the cooperative scheme to develop our communities and to earn some income. (FGDs, Nanyunyi-22nd August 2009).

The above findings show that community members first and foremost work together primarily for some economic enticements, mainly with the interest of uplifting the wellbeing of households. And as already indicated, peoples' motivation for participating in developmental programmes and projects are diverse and mainly ranging from economic incentives to self-esteem and general community development. It is thus imperative to state that community programmes which provide various incentives are valued by the community members.

6.3 Local Structures and Community Participation in the Ministry of Agriculture

The livelihoods of the rural poor are mostly in farming, pastoralism, forestry, and fishing. In general, therefore, the rural inhabitants depend in agriculture as a way of living. It is in this context that government support to agriculture is recognised as essential for poverty reduction and for securing people's right to food.

The values of agriculture decentralisation entails that community members should participate in crop production by placing agricultural extension responsibility like planning and management decision making in the hands of the local people. The decentralisation of agriculture activities regarding the transfer of responsibilities for planning, management and agriculture resource mobilisation and allocation from central government to local units at the district level is one of the objectives of decentralisation reform.

This entails that the Agriculture Extension Officers working as field staff should be in direct contact with farmers on a day to day basis. The district extension agricultural plans are

supposed to be effectively translated into concrete practical actions at the local level in collaboration with farmers and other stakeholders.

It has been found in the study that although the Agriculture Extension Officers work with farmers in resolving agricultural related problems, much is needed to decentralise agricultural activities. To an extent however, the Agricultural Extension Officers work with clusters in rural areas within certain geographical areas called Zones or operational areas. And in that regard, the effectiveness of clusters has been found to be weak.

During FGDs with Agriculture Extension Officers, it has been found that, there is poor technology transfer to facilitate a wide range of agricultural practices through communication, advocacy services in agricultural system to enable communities to become aware on various methods of agricultural production.

The study results have shown that communities lack information and communication technologies which would allow local people to participate in agricultural production effectively. And although the districts receive agricultural budgetary support from the Ministry of Agriculture headquarters through the Ministry of Finance to enable the field staff provides extension services to farmers, the findings have indicated that the allocation of funds to agriculture sector in the national budget has been all time low.

Zambia generally, allocates an average of only about seven (7) per cent of its budget to agriculture annually. Below is the information obtained during the FGDs from participants:

The funding to agriculture sector is very poor, if you remember very well, on 14th October 2009, the Head of State then, Mr. Rupiah Bwezani Banda, in one of his speech pledged government to continue to provide a steady increase in the budget allocation to the agriculture sector until the Maputo Declaration was attained. Yet, just a few days after his assurance, during his government's budget speech, there was a cut from 8 to 7 percent budget allocation to agricultural sector (FGDs- 28th April 2013).

The research findings in all the four districts provided similar information regarding minimal funding to the sector. Agricultural Extension Officers in Muchinga in Nakonde district indicated that in the National Development Plan (FNDP), government committed itself to

increase the agricultural budget to not less than 9 percent of the total national budget. He explained that, since then however, the proportion has been very little than anticipated.

In Kasama and Mbala like in Nakonde participants indicated as follows:

We are aware that in January 2011, government signed the compact of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), pledging to reach 10 percent commitment. And yet in the 2011 budget, we observed that government had cut the proportion of the budget allocated to agriculture (Agriculture Extension Officers, 16th April 2013).

The study has further discovered that in the Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP) and in the new government strategy covering from 2011 to 2015 government had set an annual target for spending on agriculture of about 8 percent which in any case does not also meet the required target to finance the agriculture sector to accommodate community participation requirement in the sector especially for the rural poor of Zambia. In most cases and as observed during the study, government spending on programmes that benefit the poor is very low despite various policies that focus on providing research and extension services in agriculture to increase private participation in the sector.

The problem of dismal allocation of funds to the agricultural sector is also supplemented with fewer Agriculture Extension Officers to effectively carry successfully the Ministry's mandate in agriculture decentralisation. The number of Agriculture Extension officers is inadequate compared to Farmer ratio. This is a major obstacle in terms of service delivery including activities which involve the dissemination of extension information to the rural communities. Participants in the Ministry of Agriculture explained as follows:

Apart from poor funding from government, the staffing level is also a major factor which hinders effective service delivery. We are very few to work effectively. During our work, some remote areas such as Nalutete, Chiyombo, Chibeta, Mpangala, Kalizyabana and Nanyunyi are never catered for in our work plan. Most Zones and catchment areas are not covered, and it is not our fault that those communities are left out without being attended to (Agriculture Extension Officers, 2nd May 2013).

The low-level field staff to farmer ratio, therefore, is a critical issue which impedes community members to fully get involved in community agricultural participatory practices. This situation, as already alluded to is accelerated by delays and erratic release of funds from central government and in some instances, the inability of the central government to provide

full amount as specified in the ministerial budget make the work of agricultural extension officers very difficult. As a result, the situation limits the extension service. Thus, extension service provisions are extremely poor, and largely failing to contribute to increasing productivity or to help farmers diversify or promote sustainable agriculture in communities. In response to the above findings, Extension Officers explained as follows:

Already farmers have kept on asking when we will resume visiting Zones and begin field demonstrations. Up to now government has not remitted funds to enable us start visiting farmers before the onset of the rain. Our motor bikes are not in good condition as well. We can do better if our budget is met by the Ministry of Finance (Assistant Agriculture Extension Officers-Kasama- 2nd May 2013).

The study has shown that poor infrastructure and particularly the conditions of roads to market as well as the poor communication facilities affect both farmers and extension officers to effectively engage in agricultural community work.

During FGDs with local people in Mbala and Chinsali, the research found that access by farmers to the market and business centers were very challenging due to poor road network. The members of FGDs explained as follows:

The problems we are facing as farmers is the poor road network and poor mobile communication for us to know when farming inputs like fertilisers and seeds would be delivered to communities. It also takes time for us to know whether the farming inputs have been delivered to the depots, and or even the time to collect the inputs. Secondly, because of poor road network, we do not see government agricultural officers to come and guide us on agricultural farming methods (FGDs- Mbala- 10th May 2013).

As discussed during FGDs with local communities and the Agriculture Extension Officers, the fewer agricultural research and training institutes which community members can go to seek guidance in agricultural related problems are very far posing yet another challenge from accessing the services. Similarly, the banking sector which is an important service sector that contributes to agricultural development is not fully developed.

And during discussions with the local people at Nzoche to assess the level of community understanding on agricultural participatory mechanisms, participants indicated that citizen participation meant involvement through field demonstrations and practicing new techniques in agriculture system. Participants explained to participate in agricultural development

activities without experts like the Agricultural Extension Officer was a big challenge as explained below:

In most cases we encourage community members to be involved than leave everything to government officers. In this way, we believe that people become involved in agricultural production without having to wait for us. Several farmers plant same kind of crops year after year. But we believe that people learn better by doing modern agriculture practices than through their traditional way of growing crops. (Assistant Agriculture Officers- 16th May 2013).

However, despite government officer's understanding of the value of direct people's participation, most of the local people did not effectively participate in modern agriculture production. Their argument was that government officers were not effectively involving the local people as their main role was to implement government programmes. It was also found that the participatory process and the mechanisms of community participation were not clear enough for community members to participate effectively.

When asked why the local beneficiaries were not effectively consulted in the decisions that affected their lives, most of the officials explained that when performing government duties or when implementing government programmes, they were following government instructions and guidelines. Accordingly, although the Agricultural Extension Officers were instructed from central government to involve people directly, they did so because they were supposed to adhere strictly to procedures and guidelines. Agriculture Officers explained as follows:

We are qualified enough, and as government officers we know all the advantages and disadvantages of any agricultural programme better than most of the local people. So, we formulate programmes based on our experience and knowledge. We identify and select various agricultural development programmes in the communities. We also involve the local people because they are recipients of the programmes and projects. During our regular field work in the districts throughout the year, we collect all the information needed from the local people. Based on the information and reports, we then easily select areas which need government intervention. People in these districts are very happy with the services provided to them by the government. If you asked them, they will tell you how satisfied they were. (Assistant Agriculture Officers, 16th May 2013).

From the above explanation by agricultural officers, it is prudent to note that citizen participation is beyond the identification of government programmes but of local priorities whereby citizens become makers and shapers of local programmes to demand direct citizen participation in decision-making and implementation process related to the local issues.

Therefore, effective community participation in agriculture entails agriculture extension officers to mobilise all the people in the areas. Community members should be willing to fully participate in agriculture production. In the same context, the Agricultural Extension Officers should have the desire to show the people modern methods of growing crops to feed their families and not through the decisions made by the government. Community commitment to farming should be based on survival and livelihood sustenance.

In that context, it remains a matter of choice for government to build strong relations with local communities, which ultimately would ensure collaborative participation in agricultural services. In this way, the local people from various Agricultural Zones can have a strong and trustworthy relations with Agricultural Officers. Participants at Nzoche community in Muchinga Province explained as follows:

The problem is that we do not have power to control those in authority especially the facilitators. We do not control public leaders. We cannot direct or force government workers to follow all what we want as community members or compel the local people to control government agriculture development programmes. The officers from central government provide us with technical hope in the agriculture. (FGDs-17th May 2013).

The above explanation shows that community members need trust and some control of local programmes, they also need technical knowledge and information to make proper decisions that affect their lives. An increase in control over agriculture production would thus make people to participate effectively. Government officers also need to respect community culture and customs if proper collaboration and coordination must take place in agricultural programmes.

It is important to note that in Muchinga and Northern provinces of Zambia, agriculture sector comprises mainly of the small-scale farmers facing different obstacles to participate fully in the agriculture sector. It is government Policy therefore that interventions are put in place to enhance productivity of small-scale farmers at community level as this would be a useful step towards the sustenance of citizens in agriculture production as well as in poverty alleviation efforts. Peasant farmers are the major players in rural areas where poverty is widespread hence, their participation in agriculture for improved production would directly eliminate poverty at community level.

Secondly, farmers are confined to less profitable sections of agriculture, facing several challenges with little incentives to increase productivity. Arising from the above, local programmes aimed at creating a conducive environment to graduate farmers from small-scale to medium scale producers in terms of their production and productivity must be upscaled at community level.

This is so because the significance of securing more active community participation is that which does not rely on central leaders in spearheading agriculture in local communities. Community interest to participate in local activities which they consider as having direct benefits to them can be of great importance towards agriculture sector at the local level.

There are some positive arguments regarding the notion of participation in local governance related to agriculture. During the interviews with community members, the respondents mentioned the problems caused because of political meddling amongst local politicians thereby creating local level participation a nightmare.

6.3.1 *Local Participation in Agricultural Structures*


The functioning of the local structures in agriculture such as the Zone Agriculture Committees (ZACs), the Comp Agriculture Committee (CACs), the Block Agriculture Committee (BACs) and the District Agriculture Committee (DACs) is due to interest of citizens to participate in agriculture at the local level. Study information obtained so far have indicated that the local people are keen to participate in agriculture to increase food security at household level. The study results have shown that people fail to effectively participate when they perceive that the activities and programmes are driven purely by outsiders because goods and services which affect people's livelihood in nature should not be purely provided exclusively by outsiders. Some community members in Northern Province explained as follows:

People in the community would love to participate in agriculture activities because the production of crops is a benefit to families despite the agriculture inputs being expensive. Community members attach the importance of working together to boost agriculture production and enhance food security in homes. We depend in agriculture for our living and government assistance in this area is a welcome move. We can do a lot on our own if the central government can provide us with all the necessary agriculture inputs (Community Members, 17th June 2013).

Community members explained that the lack of interest for most of the community members was that community work in agriculture requires a lot of dedication which is a challenge because participation in agriculture needs self-interest and motivation for better results.

Although community members cherish to participate in activities aimed at alleviating poverty, those who wanted to participate did not aspire to dedicate their lives entirely on communal activities and that community participation in collaboration with other members in agriculture was very inoperative. Figure 9 shows in percentage form, the level of community participation in Zone Agricultural Committees (ZACs).

Figure 9. Participation in Zone Agricultural Committee by District



Source: Field data.

As suggested, the will to participate cannot be the same for every person, it is very common to find groups of very active individuals versus the absolute passivity of other sectors. A connected complaint of several interview respondents who belonged to the Zone Agriculture Committees in all the districts was the problem of widespread apathy and general lack of interest to be engaged in community work generally attributing to exhaustion produced by the demands of participating in agricultural activities.

Most of the committee members explained that people got discouraged to attend meetings where only fewer local people were in attendance. The problem was exacerbated by the bureaucratic requirements and organisational difficulties coupled with the tedious process of going from one village or community to another.

And while community members have the advantage of knowing their own poverty problems which enable citizens to come together and try to resolve them, problems emanate from the inability of the community members to organise themselves along the lines desired by agents of the state. This can lead to resentment on the part of community members who start asking themselves why the guidelines were so difficult to understand. Community members consider the requirements for participation as simply too high and technical. In view of the above statement, participants in the study explained as follows:


Sometimes community members want to participate in modern methods of crop and animal production, but we get discouraged by government officials who want us to follow their modern way of growing crops. We have our own way of managing the local crops which in most cases require less fertiliser application – The Chitemene system of agriculture for example. We lack modern seed and fertiliser for our crops, the exotic cattle for breeding and so on. Government has been giving us very few bags of fertilisers per person each year. What can one do with no seed and fertiliser? Let the Agriculture Officers go to urban areas where people have money to buy seed and fertilisers for new methods of agriculture” (FGDs-Chaswata – 26th September 2013).

Following the above revelation by community members, it was discovered that in tackling common problems with regards to agricultural production at the local level, the Block Agriculture Committees (BACs), the Camp Agriculture Committees (CACs) and the District Agriculture Committees (DACs) were confronted with enormous challenges due to limited capacity to persuade community members to work together and learn modern methods of growing crops and raising animals. The local people had limited information to venture into productive methods thus being conservative in old and unproductive agricultural practices which they felt were important to them.

To crown it all, the local people were deemed not to have the same technical capacity as government officials. The imbalance in terms of community participation at the local governance structures through Agricultural Committees meant that community members in urban areas participated more than those in remote areas because urban inhabitants were more aware of the local governance structures than those living in the countryside. This

presented a sense to argue that the urban population was enlightened than those predominantly living in the remote areas of the provinces. Figure 10 illustrates the level of awareness and participation by Rural and Urban communities.

Figure 10. Awareness and Participation by District in Rural and Urban Areas



Source: Field Study

The findings show that several rural community members in Kasama and Chinsali districts were not aware and equally did not effectively participate in agriculture through the established local governance structures. However, in urban areas, people were more aware and participated through the established local governance structures in agriculture activities.

About fifty five percent (55%) of the respondents agreed to have participated in agriculture in Nakonde urban areas. Fifty percent (50%) participation rate was recorded in Kasama. Mbala and Nakonde indicated a higher participation rate through local governance agricultural structures because of their agrarian predominance. The poor knowledge of local governance structures and non-participation by communities in rural areas not only did it hinder the capacity to solve common agricultural problems, but also hindered community members with food security.

The findings showed that rural communities in Kasama and Chinsali were compatible with the information obtained from rural communities in Nakonde and Mbala.

In urban set up, information obtained from the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) indicated that communities were aware of local governance structures such as the Comp Agriculture Committees (CACs) and the District Agriculture Committees (DACs). They also considered the Committees as essential because they represented the general populace in communities. Accordingly, respondents indicated that participation through the established local structures provided them with an opportunity to express themselves fully and to be involved in food production.

There are some tangible elements of participation by people in this community. People are aware that they need to fight poverty, all of us know for sure that we cannot have enough food if we cannot work together, we need to bring together our little resources and ideas to have a multiplier effect. We also believe that to have what we need, we should do it for ourselves and for our own benefit. Currently, community members decide what they want to do than before. And we do these things sometimes by the help of the local Committees. (FGDs -28th September 2013).

Based on the above revelations, and on probing the discrepancy between participation of the rural and urban communities through local governance structures, interviewees argued that community participation in urban areas could best be judged on the outcomes that were a result of community actions. Usually, it was the same active members who perpetually participated in urban areas because they valued the importance of agriculture a lot.

However, interviewees indicated that the role of DACs and CACs in the engagement of community members particularly on coordination among local people was not impressive enough. The lack of institutional framework for undertaking community mobilisation to enable effective community participation in the agriculture sector at the local level was not effective enough to compel the local people to actively participate in the process.

Various community members expressed a range of recurring problems with local structures. Notably were issues to do with lack of pragmatic solutions to their problems from central government officials in terms of agriculture inputs. And, the process of enabling people to participate effectively through the existing local governance structures had failed to work

well due to poor coordination between central government and the established local governance structures at the local level. The findings have also indicated that poor coordination resulted into a lot of confusion because there were no clear set rules and procedures to follow.

Reflecting on the findings by considering the partnership rung of citizen participation theory, it can be deduced that in the agriculture sector, there are however, some significant degree of power-sharing with residents. The Camp Agriculture Committee members come up with initiatives that results into negotiated sharing of power. Negotiations are usually triggered by citizens demanding for agricultural inputs from central government.

In doing so, some community members participate in crop production through the formation of cooperatives. However, the notion of power sharing in relation to information sharing in communities on decentralisation have indicated some contradiction. The findings indicate that the grassroots citizens are not very much aware on participation through agricultural decentralised activities. The lack of information on decentralisation is thus synonymous to what the ladder of citizen participation theory terms as non-participation by community members mostly those found (at bottom of the rung) in rural areas.

6.4 Local Structures and Community Participation in the Ministry of Health

For several years, community participation in health systems in Zambia has been a consistent element of health policies to support primary health care (PHC). The adoption of PHC in health provision at the local level means that public participation is important to the design and implementation of health systems.

The prominent local structure under the Ministry of Health is the Neighbourhood Health Committee (NHC). The NHCs have several community roles which includes disseminating information to communities on the prevention of diseases, promotion and coordinating as well as supervising community health activities. Other roles of NHCs include initiating and participating in health-related issues at household and community levels.

To support this, the NHCs identify, facilitate and co-ordinate training needs for the community, the Committees identify health problems in the community in conjunction with

others and bring them to the attention of the health centre and develop action plans to address community health needs.

The NHCs have oversight roles in monitoring and evaluating health-related activities, conducting household registration and seeking information on the existence of infectious and other diseases of relevance and or concern and hold services accountable on resources used.

Under the decentralisation policy, the ministry of health devolved primary healthcare to councils to manage all health centres and enhance community health service delivery. The specific activities for primary healthcare functions devolved to the councils includes the control of communicable diseases such as cholera, and other diseases, control of HIV/AIDS, the control of malaria, child health programmes, all vaccinations, maternal healthcare, environmental care, nutrition and health education and rehabilitation services.

However, it is important to note that devolution does not necessarily mean that all functions have been moved to local authorities. The ministry of health retained the general legislative functions including policy formulation for the health sector, the provision of policy advice to local authorities, quality assurance and setting national performance standards and monitoring and evaluation of health services. Therefore, community participation at the local established structures, is considered important in primary healthcare development because there are positive health outcomes at community level as it enables the members of the community either individually or collectively to assume greater responsibility for their health needs and problems. The expected outcomes of community participation in the local health sector structures give rise to more health consciousness which pushes up the demand for more access to health care through community-level workers and improvement of community level health infrastructure.

In line with the National Decentralisation Policy, there are decentralised structures of health care management known as the Neighbourhood Health Committees (NHCs). Initially, all the Health centres and facilities deliver services within their mandate using the local governance structures in their jurisdictions. The provisions of health services have been widely spread in a way that each health centre has a Health Centre Committee (HCC). Planning therefore, emanate from these Committees. The NHCs are representatives of the communities and regularly meet with members of the community to re-evaluate experiences, as well as agree on priorities to be engaged by community members. In Muchinga and Northern Provinces of

Zambia, the NHCs are the community representatives, the NHC meet with health personnel at the health centers to channel community proposals for implementation. The proposals are thereafter discussed with members of the District Health Management Team (DHMT) for inclusion into the overall district action plan which is then submitted to the Ministry of Health Headquarters through the Provincial Health Office, (PHO). In this manner, members of the communities indirectly participate in the health services through their elected representatives and or Chairpersons of the Neighbourhood Health Committees (NHCs) and their HCCs who manages the operations of health facilities by following the resolutions of the Committee Meetings.

As already indicated above, Zambia's health programmes incorporate several mechanisms for community participation in the health service provision. Although in several cases health programmes have only been partially implemented, community participation has been practiced at different levels.

The health care systems in Zambia are shaped by the historical patterns as well as by political, economic and geographical conditions. In Northern and Muchinga provinces, the health system focuses on curative care. And although to some extent, the system is mainly biased toward caring for the urban proportion of the population, some achievements in health care have been noticed due to the deliberate health policies by the government despite some health services provision challenges.

It has become clear in this study however that the health system in the two provinces has not been able to achieve the desired health outcomes. Equally, the high prevalence rate of diseases such as malaria and diarrhoea, the high infant and maternal mortality rates in the two provinces indicate how communities have not effectively participated in their health needs. It also shows how the health infrastructure does not cater for the needs of the population. Accordingly, the Zambia Health Demographic Survey shows that the low health status is associated to underdevelopment, low productivity, high unemployment rates, malnutrition, and environmental degradation with high poverty levels identified as the root cause of diseases.

Although information obtained as shall be seen later indicates that community members are involved in identifying activities to be undertake with the help of central government health personnel at the district, it is a common practice that officials from government at the district are the ones who plan the provision of health services.

6.4.1 Nanyunyi Community Clinic Project

The Nanyunyi Build Clinic Project (NBCP) is a decentralised government health post programme in collaboration with community members. The reason for government coming up with the project was because of community members facing difficulties in accessing health facilities due to long distances covered by community members to access health services. Government therefore requested the community to work together and to identify a suitable place to construct a health post.

In this case, the Nanyunyi Build Clinic Project was influenced by the ministry of health as an agency factor as well as by community power structural factors. The reasons for central government collaborating with community members were to enable local people to participate in health programmes that directly impact on their lives. And as such, community members mobilised themselves and provided labour by moulding blocks while the central government was to assist in sending other resources such as cement and roofing materials for the completion of the project.

However, the researcher found that most of the blocks were destroyed by the rain because by then government had not yet started constructing the health post and equally had not delivered any material for the construction of the health post. During the Focus Group Discussions with community members, it was found that the central government had by then not delivered the construction materials on the site. Respondents in the FGDs narrated as follows:

We fail to understand why the officers from the Ministry of Health made us mould those blocks for Nanyunyi clinic project. We laboured and worked tirelessly to see to it that our dream of building the health centre here at Nanyunyi became a reality. Our plans in collaboration with the ministry of health have never yielded any tangible result. Imagine! up to now the health centre has not been constructed. We don't even know where these

officers are hiding now, and our project is at stand still. No one will ever start that project again. (FGDs, Nanyunyi -15th September 2009).

The study findings indicate that community members were willing to contribute their time and labour toward the construction of the health post. But on probing on the procedures for the construction of the health post, several community members were not familiar with the project guidelines concerning the project management and sustainability. The same opinion provided by members of the focus group discussions were also expressed by Mr Mulambia a Group Village representative from Mbalwe who explained as follows:

There is great demand for a clinic by the community. Government officials have really let us down, we chose where to build a clinic upon being told by the government to do so, we were also told to contribute labour and to mould blocks. But it is almost four years from the time the government told us to mould the blocks. No cement has been delivered including the roofing materials. And no central government officer has ever come back to explain to us the reasons for the delay to deliver the construction materials for the project (Mr. Mulambya, Mbalwe -15th September 2009).

The explanations in terms of complaints from Mr. Mulambya and the members of FGDs is a manifestation that community members are always willing to participate in any activity which they feel is important for their wellbeing such as health services. Local people can demand a greater role to play in the project by bringing the services they require closer to themselves if supported financially and can as well take keen to participate in the process if well supported. However, the Nanyunyi Build Clinic Project failed due to lack of project guidelines and support from government as well as leadership to sustain the project.


The study has found that community members were interested to see to it that the clinic project succeeds. However, it is imperative to note that the local people lack project resources and they depend on government for project materials and as well as the spearheading of the project. One important factor to note is that the success of any project in the community largely depends on community members being able to raise their voices for resources from government and if their voices are heard as well.

Information obtained from community members at Nanyunyi clearly point out that the reasons for failure to participate effectively in project implementation process was due to lack of resources and lack of community voice. There are a few more reasons embedded in the

processes which made community members become unwilling to pursue the project. The participation failure in the implementation of the project can be attributed also to community members being not aware of the project goals, objectives and benefits, as well as the lack of capacity by community members.

The ideal situation is that community members are supposed to take part in formulating the budget for the health provisions and needs in the communities but are in most cases ignored and not part of when formulating health budgets. The research findings on the general characteristics of participation regarding access in terms of budgeting process in the health sector by communities in the two provinces is shown in Figure 11 below.

Figure 11. Access to Health services and budgeting process by Community members in Districts



Source: Field data

The results have shown that only about 47% of community members in Chinsali district have access to health financial budgeting process. Mbala, Nakonde and Kasama districts recorded less than 45% of community members having participated in the health budgeting process.

This clearly indicate that not all community members in the two provinces actively participate in the financial provision of health services to communities. Only few

participated in health financial services. However, during the Focus Group Discussions in Nakonde, some participants explained that they were members of Community Health Volunteer trained in administering health services such as the Tuberculosis (TB) Treatment known as Direct Observation Therapy (DOT) to patients in their communities.

These TB treatment supporters however, despite being fewer in number, were looked down upon by community members as they considered them to be inferior with no proper expertise in conventional medical specialisation, and as such, patients were compelled to go direct to the health centres than being treated by ill qualified community health care supporters from their fellow community members. However, positive results on community engagement were recorded because participation by members in the field of Home-Based Care (HBC) was impressive. Information gathered through administering questionnaires and during FGDs had indicated that community members who got trained were actively involved as caregivers mainly caring for HIV/AIDS patients and other terminally ill members of the community who were unable to fully take care of themselves. The care givers were as well involved in sensitising people in communities on HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment and support.

In the same context, there were also several community members trained and actively involved as Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs) who attended to expectants mothers. They were as well involved in the teaching of community members on safe motherhood practices. All the community members exhibited some form of happiness and were always willing to work hard towards health service provision as well as to be trained as community health workers. During discussions with community health workers, the information obtained is given below:

Although some community members don't trust our competences very much, we are however proud to work as community health volunteers. We also learn a lot of things from the Ministry of Health officers. People here are afflicted with different types of ailments such as malaria, diarrhoea, tuberculosis including HIV/AIDS. Some patients come to us to ask for advice and or get initial treatment before proceeding to health centres. Our work is noble, and we don't get paid, it is a charitable work and we help our friends, families and members of the community. (Community health volunteers - 18th April 2013).

During interviews with community members in the districts, it was found that about 40% of the community members were willing to be trained as community health volunteers. And

although others could not willingly express their interest, they explained that it was wrong to be merely recipient of government services without participating. However, information gathered from community members indicated that the lack of active participation by the local people was because most rural community members were illiterate and unable to interpret symbols and even adhere to the medical instructions.

Apparently, this came to light that, with regards to issues concerning public good provision, there would always be free riders in the process. Some community members were not interested to participate in activities which involved the whole community because even if they didn't fully participate, they would still receive the services from government. Equally, the lack of adequate support and limited facilities in terms of infrastructure and equipment compelled some community members to relax in community health programmes. One community health facilitator explained as follows:

Some community members would like to fully participate but they are not provided with basic equipment to use. This discourages the local people from getting involved in health care programmes. Even simple equipment like thermometers are not provided to us and we cannot diagnose malaria even to know the body temperature of patients or even to check the blood pressure. We need bicycles to move from one place to another and or even cell phones to enable members of the community to inform us when there is an illness in the community. Imagine walking for more than 12 kilometres on foot, community health volunteers walk and cover long catchment areas and are not provided with any form of transport (Mr S. Mkisi - 28th April 2013).

As shall be seen later, the problems which community members face towards participating in primary health care delivery do not only frustrate them from participating but also excludes community members from assuming greater responsibility for their health needs. Community participation in health services is cardinal for effective delivery of primary health care because the outcomes of community participation in the health sector include more health consciousness which pushes up the demand for more access to health care through community health improvements.

The general explanation emanating from the findings above, and as indicated by central government health personnel during the Focus Group Discussions, show that the promotion of public health services in Muchinga and Northern provinces in terms community participation is based on health personnel interaction with community members. General outpatient practice in communities as well as immunisation activities and other programme


components are perceived as cooperation between the health personnel with the local community members. Therefore, participation by local people in communities is equated with compliance, more patients attending follow-up services or immunisations programmes which were activities on community collaboration with central government officials. In the same context, the provision of health services by government officers in collaboration with community members had shown some positive collaborative efforts.

The local people were as much as possible and within their means able to collaborate in primary health care services. And although some areas in the provinces had exhibited a dismal collaborative atmosphere with government officers, the general scenario had indicated that community members care for their lives and the wellbeing of their families. As seen in the figure about community collaboration with central government on health services below, the study found that about 85% of community members collaborated in immunisation programmes with health personnel.

It was also found that 77% of community members had effectively collaborated with central government officers in HIV/AIDS information sharing.

Generally, the result as far as health provision was concerned indicated that, community members were keen to take part in activities relating to health services in communities. Figure 12 on the next page shows the extent in terms of percentage on how communities collaborate with central government in various primary health services.

Figure 12. Collaboration with Central Government in various Community Health Programmes




Source: Field data

However, despite the positive scenario in collaborative efforts, the general membership in the communities did not take part in decision making. Community members sometimes felt powerless, and in most cases, became uninterested in communal programmes which were technical in nature. Only the elites in communities become capable of collaborating with officers from the Ministry of Health. But while the general scenario had shown that most of community members had taken part in community health programmes, issues of information flow remained a great challenge to compel the rural communities to effectively get involved in primary health programmes.

As can be seen in the findings, urban areas in both provinces exhibited a remarkable reciprocity in terms of participation in health related programmes. Senga Hill in Mbala and Nyela near Nakonde for example had a higher percentage of community members collaborating with central government officials in primary health service provisions. Communities which were located far away from the Central Business Districts (CBDs), had

the lowest percentage in terms of collaborating with central government officials in the provision of health services to communities. This was attributed to poor road network as well as health infrastructure. Figure 13 shows the percentage of collaboration by communities in primary health care with central government.

Figure 13. Central Government collaboration in Health services with Community members.



Source: Field data

While community participation has been influenced by social, economic and cultural variables, the study found that distance, cost, quality of care and trust to be some of the major important factors which contributed to ineffective community participation in health services. In most rural areas, central government health providers travelled longer distances to various communities to provide health services.

Considering the above, and as seen in the table above on community collaboration in health services with central government officers, it was found that health provision was given a priority by community members. Several community members participated despite the long

walking distance to health facilities which in most cases acted as a hindrance to effective community participation. In some cases, as the findings indicated, the feedbacks from local community members were well institutionalised.

The discontentment regarding community involvement in health activities was mainly because of ‘top-down’ structure and the lack of specialised health services in maternal health care as well as the lack of critical treatment of terminally ill patients in rural communities. And as shall be discussed in detail in chapter seven on barriers to participation, the negative aspects hindering collaboration was in terms of time needed for reaching the facility and or a clinic. The little costs such as buying a small exercise book by patients for recording the diagnosis to prescribe medication was a huge cost to some of the people in rural areas even though, primary health care in all government health centres offered free health services despite health centres not being adequately stocked with all the required drugs. Patients thus had to seek other alternatives such as traditional remedies than walk for long distances without being properly diagnosed and treated.

6.5 General local level collaboration in Health service Provision

However, the research findings indicate that despite having representatives in communities, the ministry of health officials do not frequently invite community representatives for various health related meetings, and as such they lag in various planned health services and that the local people do not have proper knowledge with regards to what takes place at the district level. Community members are never requested to make budgets for health needs in their communities. This problem is compounded by the fact that the central government remits funds to health district offices with strings attached to it by allotting the budgetary ceilings for all activities to be implemented at community level. And because of that, the budgeting process in most cases overlooks various activities which various communities consider very important.

It has been found that in Kasama and Chinsali districts specifically at Ituna and Mulakupikwa communities, participation in local governance structures such as the NHCs and the Health Center Committee (HCCs) is among the best witnessed during the study where community members are encouraged to select their home based health workers, decide on health material distribution like how the drugs and other related health materials could be stored and the

number of community members to be involved in the programme. Members of the communities are given an opportunity to select the representatives from within their communities.

Data obtained by interviewing community members in Mbala and Nakonde however found that majority of the respondents did not know members of their Neighbourhood Health Committees (NHCs). When asked if community members had ever heard of NHCs, they indicated that they did not really know the NHCs but knew the service delivery roles performed by the NHCs.

Similarly, in rural Nakonde, several respondents did not know the members of their Neighbourhood Health Committees (NHCs), but, when asked if they had heard of NHCs, all of them indicated that they had heard of NHCs and as well knew the service delivery roles performed by the NHCs.

In the same context, in urban and rural Mbala, majority knew their members of Neighbourhood Health Committees (NHCs) and they indicated that they knew NHCs roles. Community members indicated however that although they knew about NHCs roles, they did not specifically know exactly all the members of their Neighbourhood Health Committees (NHCs). When asked some of the roles of NHCs, it was common from all the respondents that they were aware that the NHCs major role was to educate community members on health issues such as HIV/AIDS, family planning, hygiene, safe motherhood and TB. The FGDs Participants in Nakonde district at Nyela Village explained as follows:

Community members know the NHCs because they sometime call for meetings mainly to educate people about HIV/AIDS, immunisation programmes and sanitation issues. I wonder why they never allow us to attend financial meetings. Most of us do not know anything about budgetary allocations to our local health centre (FGDs, 8th October 2013).

From the above explanation, it is prudent to note that community members think that it is important for them to plan for various health issues including financial planning than merely following what is decided for them from the central government.

Members of FGDs indicated that despite being excluded in financial meetings by NHCs, they still commended the work of their committee in planning for health services, they gave credit

to the members of NHCs for what they were doing to improve people's general health care. But they were also quick to explain that while community members participated in form of labour to build health infrastructure, government did not do enough in the provision of materials for infrastructure development. Below is the submission from members of FGDs.

The NHCs have done a recommendable job in the health service activities. Some years back, NHCs mobilised all the villages to mould bricks for constructing a Clinic at Nanyunyi village near Chaswata primary school. We collaborated and moulded a lot of bricks, but up to now government has not brought us cement and other materials to start building the clinic. The bricks are now getting destroyed by the rain. The government has really neglected us and brought us down in this area. It is the same government officials who told us to mould blocks for the construction of a clinic. (FGDs, 8th October 2013).

The above findings indicate that community participation at the local level is not motivated enough to participate in various activities through the local level established structures. The decision-making process is still in the hands of the few who are already in the positions of leadership in communities. As indicated from the findings, community members do not consider themselves to be effectively involved in the implementation of decentralised local governance through the established local level structures.

One aspect to note is the difference between rural and urban areas, the urbans are densely populated with higher health risks, higher potential to transmit infectious diseases and higher demand for health resources. And as such, examining the potential of community participation in Muchinga and Northern provinces of Zambia in health provision has drawn some lessons as to why maximum health coverage is not attainable.

There is an urgent need for the promotion of community participation through self-reliance and collaboration to promote issues of determinants of social service provision in health sector. Effective community health service provision should be premised on community participation and community level inter-sectoral action.

6.6 Local Structures and Community Participation in the Ministry of General Education

The government and community members should be responsible for general management of the education sector. This being the case, communities are required to participate toward their children's educational welfare. And as such, community members perceive their main mode of participation in school management to be that of financial contributions. However, in practice, community participation in the school management with regards to general administration and especially on financial resource mobilisation and allocation had drastically changed over the years in Zambia.

The changes in education management is attributed mainly to the education Policy pronouncement for free primary education and the subsequent ban from levying parents towards the management of local schools. The characteristics of community participation as far as financial contribution is concerned, and regarding education involvement in school meetings and access to school financial information and their involvement in the school budgeting process varies as there is a significant change in the education administration in the sector.

First, the enforced ban not to allow parents from financial contributions toward the management of local schools and the pronouncement of free primary education policy has resulted in the declining of some programmes which parents actively participated before the free primary education Policy was put in place.

The policy made some activities such as farming clubs which previously was under production units in schools to decline. Similarly, agriculture production unit in schools have halted because public schools were no longer levying parents to cover the costs of buying agricultural inputs involved in agricultural production unit in schools. The school headteachers are currently afraid to levy parents to sustain such programmes because of the ban imposed by the government.

Nearly all the teachers interviewed during Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) explained that even though government remitted funds towards the cost of running schools, the money was

not enough to cover all the programmes which schools required than was the case before the ban from levying parents.

And in support of the above assertion made by teachers, about 80% of community members who responded to the questionnaire responded that they participated in education management through financial contributions before free primary education policy was adopted by Cabinet. Community members explained that since parents were no longer contributing funds towards the running of their local schools, they became reluctant to participate in other activities. During FGDs with various community members, it was found that parents became reluctant to participate in school activities because government had taken over the responsibilities of financing the education sector:

We are happy that government has lessened our burden in terms of contributing funds towards the management of our local schools. Dr. Kenneth Kaunda at some point did the same and we attended schools without paying anything. During United Nation Independence Party (UNIP) rule, even books were distributed to all the pupils freely. We never bought exercise books at that time. However, in my own observations, before the pronouncement of free primary education policy, parents worked hard towards the maintenance of schools. But we are a poor community and since the central government has put in place a Policy on free primary education again, no one can be compelled to pay any amount to schools as user fees. And because of that, we keep ourselves at a distance from school financial management (FGDs, Chinsali- 9th August 2010).

The views given by community members not to be involved in financial management at schools clearly shows how some government sectors can suffer community collaborative activities because of policy implementation that does not involve major stakeholders.

However, the study found that some community members still supported their local schools in a different manner such as willingly donating paint to beautify classrooms even when not asked by the school administration, especially on education self-help projects such as the construction of teachers' houses and classrooms or constructing toilets for school pupils. It was also found that sometimes, local people worked together with teachers on issues which needed their labour other than financial contributions to schools.

Generally, it has been reviewed that participation was eminent in terms of physical support such as the provision of labour to local schools through infrastructure development or

maintenance which required no financial commitments by community members. The teachers indicated however that the ban from levying parents was a big concern as it had affected the teaching and learning process. Teachers in Mbala district explained as follows:

The pronouncement of free primary education by government has made several community members not to be responsible towards their children's educational needs. Parents think that there is no need for them to pay anything, their level of participation in school matters have declined very much. Parents and guardians just come to school to ask about the teaching and learning process and about their children's progress reports. Majority of the parents have reduced their participation levels because they think that government has taken over all the affairs of school management (primary school headteachers, Mbala-14th August 2010).

The explanations by teachers about free primary education Policy were also indicated by teachers during the FGDs in Nakonde and Kasama districts. The teachers indicated that while community members were happy for government to remove school fees in primary schools, teachers were troubled about the inertia exhibited by several community members towards getting involved in school programmes as well.

6.6.1 *Participation in School Meetings*

Public hearings in educational planning have become increasingly common as justification by government for decisions on education management. Generally, public hearings which are usually required by law to inform citizens on any matter allow citizens to comment on a specific issue or proposal before government can make any decision. Under the right conditions, when meetings are held at a convenient time and advertised extensively, public hearings can be effective at influencing policy and can as well attract community members to attend. Generally, it has been found that, community members participate in educational meetings when called upon specifically based on their children's performance at the end of each term.

All the participants in the study including those interviewed during the Focussed Group Discussions (FGDs) explained that community members excused themselves during Annual General Meeting (AGM) than otherwise was the case when called upon during the end of termly meetings.

In the same context, community involvement in the meetings were not merely a matter of attendance, but the quality of community member involvement in the process of the meeting mattered most.


The power relations among various stakeholders involved in such meetings in terms of how much power community members exercise during the meetings is very important. Information obtained indicates that community members were in most cases not very active participants because, they feared to raise any objection after noticing any irregularity in the management and administration of local schools.

During the interviews with teachers, it was found that the meetings were meant to be the mechanisms for informing and consulting parents, as well as making decisions by parents, the process however was hindered by the fact that several community members felt inferior and at sometimes looked down upon by teachers and literate members in the communities. As such, community involvement in school activities such as the budgeting process and or whenever schools received some money from the central government was just a formality for legitimising the process. Everything was already prepared by the school administration and what was needed by the community was merely their acknowledgement and endorsement.

The findings indicated that the quality of meetings conducted in schools also left much to be desired. As already indicated, meetings are not only a mechanism for informing and consulting the members of the community but also for community decision making.

However, the study findings indicated that decisions were not reached by consensus during deliberations. The Parents Teachers Association (PTA) rather merely functioned as facilitator other than a legitimate decision-making body. Figure 14 illustrates community participation in school meetings in the four districts of the study.

Figure 14. Participation in Educational Meetings by District



Source: Field data

As seen on table above, although Kasama district shows some impressive results as far as participation in school Meetings is concerned with the highest percentage level of about 55% followed by Chinsali at 51%, the results in real terms indicate that, majority of the community members did not participate in school meetings. Nakonde and Mbala indicated less than 50% of community participation in school meetings. The scenario in terms of participation apathy was attributed to the free primary education policy and a general lack of information as well as the lack of commitment by community members in school management.

Community members were not willing to get involved in school activities owing to fact that some parents had perception that government had taken over the whole process of school administration and as such they thought that it was not necessary to be actively involved. Other reasons were due to ignorance by some community members feeling shy to talk freely because as already alluded to, parents realised that they had no control over school management anymore after free primary education policy.

6.6.2 Access to School Financial Information.

Community access to school financial information is a form of participation, however the results of the study as shall be seen later, show that majority of the community members did not have access to information with regards to the educational financial information. Several community members had no financial information regarding school finances. In fact, the number of community members who were aware about school finances was only limited to those who were nominated as PTA members in various schools.

It is important to note that community access to financial information correlated positively with the existence of the Annual General Meetings (AGM) which also acted as a mechanism for communicating to community members about school finances. But since only few community members attended the AGM, several community members mainly received muddled information on school finances through those who attended the AGM meetings. Community members who had accessed financial information were the same active members who also attended the Annual General Meetings (AGM) in schools.


Again, the ban on community members to contribute money to schools had in a way affected the accountability mechanisms involved especially that school resources were channelled directly from the central government to various schools. And as such, school accountability had shifted upward to the central government through the District Education Board Secretary's (DEBS) office and the Provincial Education Office (PEO) away from the previously community driven accountable mechanisms. As a result, information had become very limited and, in the process, compromising the opportunity for communities to have inputs on the control over financial decisions. One participant in responding to the above findings explained as follows:

I can still remember, before free primary education, there were financial reports on the use of school funds from our contributions. These days, no such reports are presented. I think it's because all the resources now come straight from the central government. And since the central government is paying for our children's school fees, we don't know anything about the allocation and expenditure of the money. In fact, in our culture, when you are passive and do not contribute anything, it is folly and inappropriate for one to become very critical like making comments on school expenditure. As at now, no community member contributes money to schools, so why become brave to criticise the school's financial decision? People would consider you mischief and arrogant in society (Mr. J. Silengo- Mayilondele-17th August 2011).

As can be seen on the figure that will follow, Chinsali district indicated 70% of community members not accessing school financial information, Mbala had 65%, Kasama 58% and Nakonde had 68% indicating that majority of the community members in the districts did not have access to education financial information.

The above scenario is also an indication that most of community members did not participate in financial decision making in their local schools as shown in Figure 15 regarding community access to financial information.

Figure 15. Community access to Financial Information by District



Source: Field data.


Based on the findings concerning financial accessibility in Chinsali, Mbala, Kasama and Nakonde, it is thus realistic to assume that the decentralised education structure does not contribute to communities accessing financial information in the districts.

From the information obtained, the results were a general reflection that the implementation of decentralisation through community participation in the two provinces at the local level with regards to accessing financial information had not been effective at all. The negative scenario in terms of financial information inaccessibility by the local people indicated the

way planning was designed to exclude local people in financial decision making at school level.

In the same context, from the research findings in Northern and Muchinga provinces with regards to financial accessibility from some selected local schools, a sample of fifty (50) community members was randomly selected from around five schools. It was found that in Kasama, at Ituna Primary school, only about 45% of local people accessed financial information. This percentage was very low to conclude that communities did access financial information. Senga Hill Primary school in Mbala had 25%, Nachisitu in Nakonde district had about 20%, while Nzoche and Chaswata schools had 15% and 10% respectively. Figure 16 shows the level of access to financial information by community members in kasama, Mbala and Nakonde districts.

Figure 16. Community Access to Financial Information in selected Schools



Source: Field data.

Based on the above findings from the communities, the local people in Muchinga and Northern Provinces of Zambia did not access education financial information from their local schools. This also indicates that the local people did not actively participate in education financial decision-making process.

Again, we are compelled to explain here that as attested by the Ladder of Citizen Participation Theory that, people who are found at the lower rung of the ladder regarding citizen participation have no impact but are merely manipulated by policy makers. Given that public policy implementation is also a cognitive process for local actors who interact variably with the policy makers and implementers, participants at the bottom of the ladder are deemed to possess very little policy-relevant knowledge that can influence or shape decisions for real participation like those found at the top of the ladder where citizen power is found.

Those found at the top of the ladder in educational sector are the planners at the ministry of education headquarters who are knowledgeable actors and they have authentic and supportive responses, whereas those considered to be less knowledgeable participants found at the bottom of the ladder strategically align themselves passively and remain indifferent.

6.6.3 School Budgeting Process

Ideally, the Zambian budgeting process in education sector goes hand in hand with income and expenditure budgeting plans which involves all stakeholders in education to profile the estimates and expenditure plans. As a requirement, local people are supposed to play a major role in the process. The process of planning a school budget commences with school management comprising of headteachers, teachers and sometimes with PTA members at the initial stage. The PTA executive committee is then later called upon to ‘approve’ the proposed budget plan for the year without engaging community members. The resolutions of the meetings are sometimes, although not in all instances, submitted to community members during the Annual General Meetings (AGM). It is seldom at this stage for community members to make changes on the proposed financial plan for the school.

It is thus a common practice that very few parents are involved in the meeting concerning the school budgeting process. And from the study, it was found that only few community members willingly attended such meetings. The budgeting process in schools was found to be not inclusive as indicated by community members at Nzoche primary school.

We are not very much involved in school budgeting process. Before the Policy on free primary education, we contributed some money and we were very keen to plan for our financial contribution at our school. We attended the PTA meetings with a lot of community members and made the budgeting plans. Parents had inputs despite most of them being illiterate to understand the budgeting issues. Currently, because no

parent or guardian contribute money to school, only few are interested to take part in the PTA school budgeting process (Nzoche- 23rd April 2013).


The study found that fewer community members were involved in the actual school budgeting process after government pronouncement of free primary education policy. And as such, community participation in the budgeting process regarding information and consultation with parents on budgeting plans has been very minimal. And despite having school committees such as the Parents Teachers Association (PTA), the information obtained from the study indicated that the portion of community members and the role of PTA in school budgeting had declined drastically because the money was allocated, prepared and managed by school administration.

The PTA and community members had no authority to make any change with regards to the budget plans. Everything was already planned at school level, the community members were no longer involved in the financial process, and they were sometimes invited merely as a political ‘buy- in’ without any tangible contribution. During discussions with teachers, as well as during FGDs, participants explained as follows:

After free Primary Education Policy, the allocation of funds has been restricted because these funds come with strings attached in terms of expenditure line. The little money comes with guidelines which schools follow. The involvement of community members is very limited because every allocation has the expenditure plan allotted to it. As schools, we don’t even call community members to inform them how much money the school has received and the mechanisms of spending such funds (Teachers/FGDs -28th April 2013).

The above scenario shows that the role of community members had diminished considerably because community members no longer offered inputs or made any correction to the budgeting plans. The role of the PTA and community members have become passive and, in most cases, just for rubber stamping government decisions. The local people had no control over school financial resources because of free primary educational Policy. The Policy thus weakened the involvement of community members in the budgeting process as illustrated in the Table 8 showing school budgeting process before and after the adoption of free primary education policy.

Table 8. School Budgeting process before and after free Primary Education Policy



Source: Field data.

Generally, in the context of education decentralisation, regarding community participation in schools, particularly on access and control over school financial resources as well as financial contributions, the study has found that access to financial information and involvement in school budgeting plans had changed tremendously after government announced the ban to levy parents towards the management of schools. This implied that community participation in education sector had not totally reached a stage of community self determination and development where community members could be involved not only in implementation stage, but in all stages of decision making.

The findings thus illustrated that community members had limited degree of financial control and authority in their local schools.

The extent of lack of community participation in school financial management became worse after the introduction of free primary education Policy. This scenario challenges the contested criticism of community participation as part of the broader justification for rolling back the state, reducing spending on social welfare, and shifting the burden from the public sector to the communities. Table 9 illustrates the findings regarding the general community participation due to changes in the new free Education Policy by Government.

Table 9. Characteristics of Community Participation before and after free Primary Education Policy

Participation	Before free primary education Policy	After implementation of free primary education Policy
Financial contribution by community members	Community members contributed actively towards the cost of running their local schools	Community members stopped to contribute for the cost of running their local schools
Community involvement in school meetings	Community members attended PTA Meetings when ever called upon	Low attendance in PTA Meetings.
Control over financial resources and access to financial information	High interest and control over resources with access to financial information	No interest and control over financial resources with little access to financial information
Participation in school budgeting	High participation and involvement in school budgeting process	Low participation and involvement in school budgeting process, mainly in terms of legitimisation

Source: Field data

The study findings had therefore shown that, school decentralisation in the context of free primary education Policy had instead strengthened the government's role by reducing the burden from the community to nothing. This also weakened community's position in terms of school management, again contrasting with education decentralisation which emphasises community participation in education sector.

Although community members acknowledged the benefits of free primary education Policy by the government, it has been found in the study that more genuine participation by community members could be achieved through community involvement in financial responsibilities. When parents in the communities stop contributing money towards the running of their local schools, it weakens community's participation in other areas of education management in schools such as involvement in school meetings and participation in decision making as well. Community members feel that their authority has been taken over by government since they neither pay nor control school finances. In this context, community

resourcing leads to genuine participation (Smith, 1998). Proper participation, therefore, calls for democratic decentralisation. The study findings indicate that due to poor link between decentralisation and participation in the context of changing Policies. The education sector in Muchinga and Northern provinces has not opened a wider potential for community participation.

It has been found so far that the policy makers at the ministry headquarters who occupy citizen control and placed at the top of (the rung) decision making, use the committees to prove that the grassroot people are involved in the programme while in the fact the programmes may not have been discussed with the people, or issues may have been described at a meeting in the most general terms. This scenario indicates that although community participation through (PTA) committees has become an important form of education development by government, a look at their conceptual foundations and evidence on their effectiveness shows that programmes that rely on community participation through such mechanisms have not been particularly effective in targeting the intended targets. In that regard, communities have not been facilitated with a clear, enough and effective mechanism because there is lack of community involvement in school management especially at the primary level.

The Free primary education policy has instead strengthened government's mandate, rolling back the community's role into that of a mere passive beneficiary.

6.7 Conclusion

The findings indicate that although government portrays great control in establishing participatory mechanisms at the local level, the collaboration by government officers with citizens have not effectively met the objective of decentralisation through the established decentralised structures at the sector level. One striking factor for low community participation in the provision of social services in the established structures is due to the absence of an open and predictable platform for community members to participate in local development programmes. The lack of proper human capital has depicted multiple poor performances in terms of community participation for development at sector level in collaboration with community members. The inadequacy of human capital in the two

provinces and the improper decentralised sector activities do not motivate the local people to actively participate in local development activities.

It is expected that the collaboration and partnership between government and community members should enhance and influence all members of the communities to be engaged in community development programmes. It is also imperative for communities to have an appropriate entry point to engage central government in areas of community concern. Community development facilitators and the local communities should be highly tailored toward local needs for sustainable development.

The results have indicated that, although community members in Muchinga and Northern provinces of Zambia have shown the zeal to participate in community activities at the local level through the devolved central structures for local governance, their participation has not yielded much tangible results due to lack of practical approach in the adoption of structural mechanisms for participation. Therefore, for community participation to be meaningful, there is a need to engage all community members to enable them to get committed to work with government officials at community level for the advancement of community service provision at the local level. This will in turn ensure that the local people at community and or village level have a say in the direction of programmes and to ensure that development programmes go to all areas where local populations feel they are needed.

Community development planning should be an important aspect of decentralisation that identifies community problems with community members. The basic participatory building block is to prioritise community involvement in development efforts by the state through devolving functions and matching resources from the centre to provinces and sub-district levels and integrating them into community programming.

It is a matter of fact that overcoming the social factors calls for a holistic action beyond the central government provision of services. This entails that government targeted interventions in collaboration with community members can yield much desirable results if communities are encouraged to plan and implement their plans. Community engagement and conceptualising social determinants of development can guide much of the envisaged implementation of comprehensive social service provision in the various sectors. What is

more important is a framework to justify among others, the need for a system at a community level that could adopt a social determinant approach in development.

In this context, community engagement needs a local framework that would indicate and embrace the socio-economic and political context with a strong stratification within societies. Some of the factors that can determine this stratification and could contribute to satisfactory community development and eliminate inequities are the nature of policies. The formal and informal governance structures are components that need to be developed to compel communities to participate in decentralised community development activities.

Therefore, informing citizens of their rights, responsibilities, and options is the most important first step toward a legitimate citizen participation. Information sharing should not be a one-way flow from central government officials to citizens with no channel provided for feedback and no power for negotiation. Of importance is that information should not be provided at a late stage in planning. Citizens should have opportunities to influence the programme designed for their benefit. As already indicated in the study, inviting citizens' opinions, like informing them, is a legitimate step toward their full participation. But if consulting them is not combined with other modes of participation, the notion of informing citizen will remain a sham since it offers no assurance that citizen concerns and ideas will be considered. If powerholders restrict the input of citizens' ideas, participation remains just a window-dressing ritual. Citizens are primarily perceived as statistical abstractions whereby participation being measured by how many people come to meetings, take brochures home or respond to questionnaires thus justifying that citizens 'participated in participation' by going through the requirements of involving stakeholders.

Although the have-not citizens are invited to serve on the local committees along with technocrats from central government sectors, the rights and responsibilities of the various elements or those committee structures are ambiguous and not well-defined. Such ambiguity causes considerable participatory doubts at the end of any programme development process because even if citizens may realise that they have extensively participated in such programmes, there is no significant impact on the comprehensive planning through the established committee mechanism structures. As discovered in the study, government planners carry out the actual planning with citizens having a peripheral role of watchdog and

ultimately the technocrats ‘rubber stamping’ the plans generated by policy makers at the center.

CHAPTER SEVEN

IMPEDIMENTS TO COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN GENERAL

7.1 Introduction

In the preceding chapters, various community participatory impediments were randomly discovered. However, it is important to note that some of the impediments cut across all the sectors discussed in the previous chapters and therefore requires detailed discussions for us to fully understand the impact on participatory difficulties by communities in relation to our research objectives and study questions. It is for this reason that this chapter has been dedicated to critically discuss in detail the findings on specific impediments to participation for development. The chapter has also consolidated the understanding of the empirical data with theoretical provisions on complexity of participation levels by citizens.

To begin with, northern and muchinga provinces demonstrate four broad categories of factors that exert an influence on the impact of decentralisation and community participation. These factors are the spatial context, the socio-economic context, the institutional context, and the local government already discussed in chapter five. One of the major spatial factors conditioning the effects of decentralisation on community participation and local governance for development is accessibility defined as the distance between the communities and central government institutions expressed in hours and or days due to poor road infrastructure.

7.2 Barriers and Complexities in Community Participation

The study has found that the debate around community participation are fervent and widely recognised by citizens in Muchinga and Northern provinces as a basic operational principle of local development. Conventionally, local participatory approach as a result of decentralisation is viewed as being a reaction to the shortcomings of top down development practices at times externally imposed as well as expert oriented.

The advantage of community participation approach is that it is centered on the role of the local communities as primary actors that should be allowed and enabled to influence and

share the responsibility and possibly the costs of the community development process affecting people's lives.

The findings as we shall see in detail later have indicated that community participation though an important form of development assistance in developing countries, a look at their conceptual foundations and evidence on their effectiveness shows that programmes that rely on community participation have not been particularly effective in targeting the poor due to various intricacies. The argument for community participation as far as this study is concerned is mainly to foster ownership, sustainability and accountability in development programmes. However, this study illustrates that participatory programmes are always faced with numerous challenges and the promises of good outcomes of programmes and projects initiatives are always hard to come by. Some of the participation obstacles have been given out below as discovered during the study.

7.2.1 Lack of Community Awareness on Decentralisation and Participatory Programmes

Community awareness is a process of making something known because accessibility influences the knowledge of the population in terms of general aspects of services and development programmes in communities. The study has made reference to the word awareness in respect to what the community members know about decentralisation. In this context, awareness means the degree to which community members have the knowledge about decentralisation and the value of community participation in the development process. Because, the lack of knowledge and information hinders community members to know various programmes which they require for them to participate in communal work. Below is the explanation by community members during FGDs:

We have no idea about decentralisation, but we hear that government will send to us some officers to explain about the issue on decentralisation. Our children are pupils at Isoka Secondary School, Kasama Girls and Mungwi Secondary and they explained something about community participation. We are not very conversant about decentralisation, and most community members do not know what the government require the community to do to work together with government on decentralisation (FGDs, 17th April 2014).

The above explanation shows that community members especially predominantly rural dwellers are not very much aware of the decentralisation reform programme. Communities in

rural areas lack accurate information on decentralisation and its mechanisms for community participation. The study has found that communities in the far stretched areas of Chaswata, Mweniwisi, Chanzi, Mwenimpangala, Chibeta, Kampumbu, Mulekatembo and Muyeleda are mostly disadvantaged because they do not acquire the much needed decentralisation information due to remoteness of the areas in which they reside. And considering the long-distances community members travel to arrive at the districts or urban areas, it takes time for community members to obtain such information. In that scenario, the study found that majority of the community members do not participate in local development activities. Apparently, the long distances also hinder community members from participating in development activities with central government. A community Civic leader during the FGDs indicated as follows:

It takes about two days from Nanyunyi to arrive to the district council due to the poor state of Kanyala-Nakonde road which is almost impassable in the rainy season. And when traveling back to Nanyunyi or Chaswata, people must divert and pass through Tanzania via Chitipa-Malawi then exit through to enter Zambia again which is extremely tiresome, and it is a long and curving trip which takes not less than ten hours (Mr. G. Ng'ambi -19th April 2014).

Another barrier is the lack of the presence of the media and their role in informing the population about people's participation and the performance of the local and or national government on decentralisation for rural development. It has been found that it is very difficult for one to access national newspapers such as the Times of Zambia and Daily Mail. Equally, the television signal for Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation including radio reception is very poor.

The obstacle of access to information on decentralisation from the newspapers or radio in remote areas entails that citizens are not well informed of their functioning and responsibilities in development agenda. The limited participation for the population in less accessible areas results into the local government receiving fewer demands from community members as well. And since there are fewer demands, fewer projects are planned and development programmes implemented. In the same context, regarding the implementation of programmes and projects, there are no materials to be transported to the needy areas for programme implementation. And since the transport of materials to remote areas such as Kanyala and Chaswata involves a long physical distance to be covered and is only possible

by making use of heavy-duty vehicles, the cost of programme implementation becomes higher than those in accessible urban areas.

The above findings show that the spatial context is a conditioning factor on the impact of decentralisation and community participation on local governance and local development as well. The differences in accessibility explain variations in the knowledge of communities on several aspects. Moreover, it has been found that the number of programmes and projects in less accessible communities, and the investments involved are relatively less than in areas where access is easier.

7.2.2 Inadequate Community Representation and Education levels

Participation in community programmes by the local people have dramatically failed in Muchinga and Northern provinces because community members do not effectively participate and are not fully represented in community development programmes. Most of the community development projects fail to perform due to lack of trust between the community members and those spearheading community programmes.

On the other hand, central government employees are in most cases criticised by community members for not being very consultative thus the lack of representation during decision making process renders the programme unmanageable. Information gathered during the focus group discussions in the study areas found that the lack of higher education attainment by most of the community members hinders active participation because they consider themselves as incapable of delivering services due to low level of education.

The low level of education by most community members clearly demonstrate as to why several community members were unaware of their roles and the degree to which they needed to participate in community programmes as beneficiaries.

The study results from all the FGDs in four districts found that only 30% of the participants had secondary level of education between nine and twelve years of schooling in rural areas. And those who had attained secondary education were actively engaged in agriculture as well as in small scale entrepreneurial activities as their main source of livelihood. These were also

a category that participated in programmes just for the sake but had no real say regarding various programme implementations. The above findings are a true reflection of the Ladder of Citizen Participation


Theory already discussed in chapter three where community members at the local level belong to the lower rung where participation is very low and are in most cases rubber stamped in decision making process by authorities and those in power.

It has been found in this study that there are several setbacks and limitations that continue to hamper the effectiveness of community participatory practice despite the efforts being made by the government to address these limitations. The missing links in people's participation according to the study is the failure to meet the right platform for development practices. Issues such as cultural practices, norms, tribal and societal ethics have remained solely predominant and persistent in Northern and Muchinga communities.

During FGDs, participants explained that some cultural practices either directly or indirectly prevented some individuals from participating in community programmes and participatory activities, yet development practitioners seem to neglect cultural issues that affect participatory decision-making in societies. In the same context issues such as the lack of transferring power from development facilitators to local people, the external influence on development policy formulation, the control of development resources by development organisations, among others have been found to be barriers for effective participatory practices. And as such the dilemma facing communities is whether to participate and become proactive in development practice or be represented by the elite within their communities.

The findings have indicated that development practitioners do not really engage the rural poor to participate actively in development activity, in the same way, they do not transfer power and decision making to the local people. Figure 17 shows the general findings regarding participation barriers by community members.

Figure 17. General Impediments to Community Participation



Source: Field data

The community participation obstacles as shown in the figure above represent the overall findings in the two provinces. However, it is imperative to note first that as development practitioners encourage active community participation in community development, they are also jealously protecting their position of power to continue to remain in control of development resources. This is also the reasons as to why decentralisation has been in most cases a political speech-making programme. Therefore, the increasing control of resources by government and development organisations, whether power should be transferred to community members to make them active participants has been very difficult to attain development in Northern and Muchinga provinces.

The pressure under which community members find themselves to work midst resource control by government and the retain of power by policy formulators does not guarantee a pure decentralisation for community members to fully control development programmes at the local level. It is difficult to maximise and quantify achievements based on decentralised activities because local people do not give priority to conventional programmes neither to innovative initiatives where approval may be uncertain or delayed for the rural development.

The unclear interpretations of the term decentralisation for community participation as well as certain contradictions in the use of the resources channelled to communities put community members in a dilemma. The study has found that the unclear interpretations of community participation compel community members to wonder how participatory practice should be conducted or if the process is just for representation by them. Government usually invite community members to participate in development programmes, persuading them to provide labour during programme implementations, or to be part of the programme process on pretence that the local people are part of the decision making using the term community participation.

The difficulties involved in promoting effective rural development as discussed later in this chapter through participatory practice are enormous. The elites, who work with the local people, often use their influence to control and make decisions for the whole community under the pretext of participation. Yet the underlining assumption is that, by allowing a few individuals to represent them, community members will consider the exercise as participation. And the fact that various organisations have little time to execute and implement development programmes especially in rural areas, the involvement of community members who may not initially be interested in participating cannot guarantee programme sustainability.

As already alluded to, the notion of participation has thus been mostly limited to institutions that rely on the services of local people mostly for labour to accomplish development goals especially when there are no adequate financial resources to hire expensive labour. Arguably, it is a matter of fact that in Northern and Muchinga provinces, the people who are made to participate in community development activities are those who have the confidence to speak to development specialists and have time to spare. These are the elite especially the teachers or school leavers who might have failed to progress at school and now idling in the communities. And as such, the involvement of such people in partial development activities is what most people and various organisations call community participation.

7.2.3 Gender Occurrence and Power Relations

Gender and power relations are some of the factors which affect effective participatory practice at the community level. The dimension of power and especially the struggle for power when one considers women is a difficult task for participatory process to succeed.

Gender disparity, like power relations still predominates in all the districts of Muchinga and Northern provinces of Zambia despite frantic feminist advocacy to reverse the trend by arguing that gender should be addressed because women have a vital role to play in development practice. The relations of power and how it is exercised over others, especially the marginalised groups such as women and children, are not only a problem related to development but one which affect almost every institution in the two provinces. The study found that women have been neglected in decision making process. Information obtained through questionnaires and from FGDs as well as from women revealed the following:

Men do not respect us as partners in development, when time comes for paving the roads for example, they tend to discriminate us, and they carry the tools without considering us, they think we don't have the capacity to do physical work. They make their own decisions and never consult us. They have no respect for us, and don't allow us to express our views and they are usually not willing to listen attentively to our views whenever we want to talk. In most cases they mumble when a woman expresses her views, this makes one feel very embarrassed in most cases. In the end whatever views women propose are not taken into consideration. At times men pretend as if they are listening to women, but at the end, the points are never taken seriously and even not implemented (FGDs- 20th April 2014).

The problem of power being exercised by the men over women in the two provinces is not an isolated case observed during the study. Rural development is supposed to target women because they are the most vulnerable and weak despite women playing crucial roles in society. Apart from taking care of their children and the sick, women commitments surpass those of men, the duties of women range from farming to childcare.

Men use their powers to influence decision-making and over-rule issues raised by women. The findings indicate that looking down upon women has more to do with cultural phenomenon because in Muchinga and Northern provinces as it is in most Zambian society, men are the head of the family, and as such, women's decisions are in most cases considered less significant.

The other factor hindering participation concerns the technical hitches being confronted by the rural women in Muchinga and Northern provinces. Development programmes that adopt rural women participatory approach do not make provision for rural community members to achieve the anticipated benefits. The expectations of the rural poor in participatory development activities are enormous but development organisations and government at times pursue their own agendas and objectives ignoring the benefits that the rural people derive from participation.

7.2.4 *Financial Mistrust*

Financial mismanagement is another crucial problem which has weakened the trust community members have in development towards those who facilitate development activities in communities. During interviews with community members, informants explained as follows:

We don't trust these development facilitators because they use development money to buy luxury things like Solar panels and cars. They build luxury houses and do not provide what is needed for development work. The facilitators inflate programme budgets for them to benefit from the funds meant for spearheading development programmes such as constructing bridges and deep tanks for our animals. In most cases they use local materials, which they get freely locally here and then use the money for their personal gain (Community members, Chinsali -24th April 2014).

On the other hand, however, government officers and NGOs explained that local people especially those in rural areas lacked basic skills and were unable to manage resources for development work. They contended that because community members were poor, they would embezzle funds meant for development programmes if they were to take charge of the resources. In the same vein, several women interviewed during FGDs contended that men would use government funds to buy alcohol. Men also argued that women were too passive to be entrusted with resources meant for development. They explained also that allowing the women to control development resources meant a shift of power to women who were supposed to be submissive and subordinate to them. And that entrusting the youth to be custodian of resources was not ideal because the youth were too young and inexperienced to manage the resources meant for development.

The participation barriers are stumbling blocks hindering the effectiveness of participation of rural communities. Issues concern spiritual attacks and the use of juju also hinder community members from participating effectively. Various participants interviewed expressed different ways in which the nature and ways of participatory processes had either been affected or hindered because of juju.

7.2.5 Opportunity and Programme time duration limits for Facilitators

Time does not only affect development practitioners' agenda in participatory activities but also affect the budget of the development programmes. As specialists in development work follow their set deadlines, Zambia faces inflation which affects programme set budgets. Similarly, time limitation become of great concern to development institutions as well as government working in remote areas of any country that experience fast inflation or those countries which face unstable economy.

In the same vein, all development facilitators inclusive those employed by government do their work to meet the deadline of their funding agencies and as such therefore, no time is allowed for delays in the execution of development projects and programmes. And as already explained, if the process drags for a long time, inflation increases the planned budget. So, to avoid the inflation and other unwanted occurrences, development practitioners must hurriedly rush to execute the programmes without really involving community members to participate. Equally, community members have time limits in terms of seasonal agriculture field preparations. Rural dwellers get engaged with pleasantly cultivation during rainy season, as such no development facilitator would manage to convince them to stop crop field cultivation and be involved in community development projects.

During interviews with community members, the study found that development facilitators visited communities in awkward times when community members were busy with their normal maize or millet field cultivation and or harvesting. During the unstructured interview with community members in Nakonde East at Nzoche, participants explained as follows:

We are a grain dependant society, we depend mainly on maize and finger millet, and our wives from March to August must harvest finger millet and be able scare away

animals such as monkeys and or cattle and goats from destroying the finger millets before harvesting the crop, so if any person and or organisation want to visit us and spearhead any development agenda, he or she should come at a time when the community is not harvesting, and or preparing fields for our staple food. If the development facilitators come without informing the communities, they are likely to find only the old, the sick and or children. (Community members, Nzoche-8th May 2014).

Another participant from the same locality explained that from June to August when the trees had enough leaves, community members were involved in Chitemene system of cultivation. During that time, men got busy cutting trees in the bush before the onset of bush fires. He explained that during the same time, women were not very busy since they waited for the branches of trees cut by men to dry before women started heaping the branches into one designated place in readiness for burning in October each year.

Similarly, in Mbala, the study found that several community members depended mainly on fishing. Community members were busy all year round. When the lake was calm according to participants, people became busy fishing, and at that time, it became difficult for community members to attend to any meeting called by development specialists or government employees as explained by community members as follows:

We would not attend such meetings, fishing here in Mbala and other surrounding villages along the lake of Tanganyika are irregular because good fishing is dependent on the condition of the lake. We all get into the water when the lake appears calm, but when it is cold, windy and or rough it become difficult to catch fish, but we still thrive to catch kapenta because it is during such time when the catch/kapenta become very expensive (Mr. K. Simfukwe, 10th April 2014).

In the same context, the study found that several women had little time to add extra responsibility as observed during the focussed group discussions because women had to attend to their daily household chores, so were usually reluctant to attend to such gathering when called upon. It was also observed in the study that men's attending to such gathering was an opportunity lost due to fishing, especially when the water was calm.

7.2.6 Social Barriers for Women and Girls

Issues of gender relations remains a problem in participatory activities in Muchinga and Northern provinces of Zambia. Other than time as earlier on alluded to, social barriers also

affect women to participate fully in community participatory activities. Women have various duties which among others include being mothers entrusted with the responsibilities of carers of children, the elderly, the sick, the disabled and as home managers. These duties discourage women to play an effective role in community development programmes.

Women's household tasks, as pointed out above, do not permit them to attend prolonged community activities which are organised by either government officials or development organisations in local communities. Women have mammoth responsibilities which also include spending long hours on their farms and preparing food for the families. As a result, they place their social responsibilities as a priority over participatory activities making it difficult for development practitioners to involve them. Most women don't compromise their livelihood activities with any sort of participatory development work because they hold a strong view that there is no immediate economic or material benefit for their families in the community development work. Information obtained from participants through the unstructured questionnaire discovered the following:

Participation for us in community development activities do not yield any tangible result, in fact participation is not mandatory but optional. we find no reason as to why we should be made to attend these communal programmes sometimes. Our children need food and good education, if we do not catch enough caterpillars (ifishimu) for sale during this time of the year then the children will not go to school. They need books and uniforms. These community activities have no direction and can not provide food for us to feed our children and the orphans (FGDs, Kasama-18th April 2014).

The explanation given by community members preferring to participate in activities that would only benefit them directly and not in activities that would not give them long term benefits is evident enough on how social barriers act as impediment to effective community participation. As already alluded to, social and economic commitments, gender issues are the most common social barriers for effective community participation. In the same context, the barriers and obstacles that most women experience in their lives have overall depressing impact on their communal activities.

7.2.7 Youth and Power Relations

The issues of power relations have held back the impact of women and youth in participatory programmes. During the FGDs in Chinsali and Kasama, the study found that men

deliberately organised participatory programmes during the time which were not suitable for women to attend. The study found that most of the participatory meetings and community programmes were carried out either in the morning or in the evening when the women were busy with household chores. In the morning, most women prepared for their day's work such as getting their children ready for school or preparing to go to the market to look for various foodstuff. Meetings were perceived to be organised at a time when most women were preparing food for their families.

During the focus group discussions, some women explained as follows:

Even if we do not like participating in meetings for various reasons, the attitudes of men sometimes hinder our efforts to participate effectively in the decision-making process in our communities. In most cases, men do not want us to take part in community development plans. Men organise developmen meetings when we are busy with household chores, when we are cooking and or fetching for food. (Women, FGDs, Chinsali-19th April 2014).

The above scenario is a clear indication that when local people endeavour to promote participatory activities, the men and elders who are powerful in the communities use their positions to take charge in the whole process. Several women indicated that the aggressive behaviour of men during community development programmes made it very difficult for them to participate in meetings and on various decision-making forum. In Mbala, the women explained that men's negative attitude made them to feel alienated from various participatory community development activities. The aggressive behaviour which men exhibited towards them reduced women's active involvement in decision making. These made women reluctant from participatory activities in general.

In the villages, the study found that the position of traditional leaders especially chiefs who yeilded alot of respect and command enabled chiefs to take advantage to act without proper objectivity and thus exercised their powers by exhibiting a degree of autocracy, and even intimidated or threatened their subjects when their authority was challenged. This type of autocratic rule discouraged participants to be fully involved.

The study found that community interest in participatory activities had waned due to excessive use of power by the traditional leaders in the villages. The youth too expressed

dissatisfaction about community participation which involved traditional leaders in the communities. During the focused group discussions in Nakonde and Mbala, the girls explained that in most cases especially during communal gathering and or during developmental meetings, they were scared to talk. Equally, the boys who were courageous enough got interrupted and threatened by elders with intimidatory reaction. And as such, most of the youth got scared to talk at such communal gathering. This shows that the attitude of the traditional leaders and elders made it very difficult for the the outspoken youth to contribute meaningfully during community development activities. The study found that not only did the boys get intimidated during community participatory programmes but also the outspoken women and girls. This situation was found to weaken the nature of participation as well and hindered the inclusion of local knowledge in development planning. Participants explained as follows:

We will never attend any communal activities in our life time chaired by the elders in this village. They rebuke and call all sorts of names because we do not agree with what the elders suggest (FGDs, Mpembe-24th April 2014).

As can be seen above, participants indicated that although most of the people at the communal gathering were unhappy with what the elders say, results in terms of democracy indicated that community members would not express their dissatisfaction due to fear of being scolded by the elders. Equally, some women could not express themselves freely because of cultural norms. Women are supposed to be quiet in most cases and especially in the presence of their husbands or elder people. They would prefer to stay quite rather than be reprimanded in front of their relatives. And as such therefore, most women in such circumstances would prefer to stay quiet during community activities.

Some community members and especially the young and women preferred to be quiet to avoid discussing confrontation issues and as a result, they rather remained quiet and could not take part in decision-making. This weakened the mechanisms of participation by community members as it became very difficult and cumbersome to effectively engage local people in active participatory activities.

7.2.8 *Superstition Beliefs in Witchcraft and Spiritual attacks in Rural Areas*

There are various issues of serious concern that needs to be looked at and evaluated to redress barriers of community participation. In Muchinga and Northern provinces, spiritual attacks in societies are quite pronounced and believed despite it being extremely difficult to ascertain how witchcraft and spiritual issues can affect community development more especially from participatory perspective. However, even though it is very complicated to ascertain problems affecting the effectiveness of community participation through the practices of juju and or spiritual attacks, the issue in extremely rural predetermined than in urban areas, this occurrence cannot be overlooked and or ignored in totality.

Spiritual attacks and magic practices are difficult to examine because one does not substantiate the existence of such actions. It is also very difficult for people to understand the concept of spiritual attacks known mostly as Juju (Ubuloshi).

The fear of spiritual attacks through witchcraft is very pronounced and synonymous to threats thus hampering not only community development but also the participatory practice by the youth, women and other members in communities. During the study, it has been found that most of the young ones in the rural areas fear to be actively involved in community work due to spiritual attack from witchcrafts. During the FGDs, the youth and women explained as follows:

All of us want to contribute in one way or another in community activities but the behaviour and attitudes of the elders scare us a lot, some of the elderly people in our locality practice witchcraft (juju). Any brilliant idea from boys, girls or women is thwarted and challenged instantly. If one starts questioning the elder's decision or even seen to be vocal during decision-making, he/she can be killed by the witchcrafts. Most of us are single parents, if we become critical then we are bound to be killed by these wizards and leave our children behind suffering. We have decided that we will not talk in front of those wizards due to their witchcraft practices. (FGDs-14th May 2014).

The above findings show that for participation to be meaningful, people should not be intimidated in any way. And when community members exhibit awareness on the value of participation, they can participate effectively especially if their lives are not threatened. As seen in the discussion above, community participation is a voluntary activity and that participants would not risk their lives in participating in activities that have no direct benefits

to them. Community members may agree to participate but when they realise that there are no incentives for them, they become reluctant and or withdraw completely from taking part in such participatory activities. The study has thus found that participation is sometimes viewed as a sheer waste of time, if there is no direct gain either in form of cash or in kind. Community members can not willingly participate in communal work amidst threats of witchcraft that would harm them afterwards if they are spotted to challenge some decisions by those who practice witchcraft.

In most cases, it becomes very difficult to overcome such participatory problems not only for decentralisation and development, but also to champion interventions on development activities in rural communities. As already discovered in the study, effective participation by community members in remote areas is not sustainable due to among other things the threats, intimidations and witchcraft which affect community participation and community development.

7.2.9 Mistrust and Financial Misappropriation among Stakeholders

As already alluded to, mistrust is an issue that has been observed to have weakened trust among community members with stakeholders championing development in districts.

The study has found that there is lack of trust towards and between community members and development practitioners as far as prudent use of resources is concerned. This is in conformity with the claim made by the Afro Barometer (2008) investigation to ascertain whether Zambians trusted development facilitators.

During FGDs, it was found that the development facilitators offered little services and mismanage resources meant for development. It was observed that community members considered development facilitators dishonest in the manner they utilised development resources in the execution of programmes. Although community members were somehow interested in undertaking development programmes, the findings indicated segregation to local people leading to frustration by community members. Information gathered during the FGDs revealed the follows:

We are sometimes willing to work with development officers but in most cases government officers and NGOs consider us very little, they think we cannot offer any

expert work to develop our areas. Yet they forget that as community members, we can do our work very well and at a cheaper cost, infact we can provide labour and even some local resources (FGDs; 18th May 2014).

The study found that leaving the development programmes to be the mandate of external officers reduces trust and as well weakens community participation and support. If community members were given an opportunity to manage the financial resources and local programmes, they would thus be empowered to effectively manage local development on their own and as well help to reduce costs. This can win trust from the people and enhance their level of participation in any development activity.

Several participants expressed their dissatisfaction during the study about the way development interventions were managed by officials who did not live in the local communities. This, accordingly, weakened the trust the local people had for external officials and reduced the effectiveness of participatory practice from community members.

Development facilitators and government expect community accountability, but their activities distort the much-needed community accountability. In the same context, government and development organisations claim that they require rural communities to participate in whatever intervention they undertake to enable community members to take control of their lives, but, government and external experts resist control from the local people. The systems of accountability that lies on the shoulders of development facilitators make them twist away from the local people. Therefore, if organisations must render accounts to the taxpayer and funding agencies, the transfer of financial control to community members should be to win trust and enhance community support in participatory practices.

As already alluded to in this chapter, financial mismanagement is a crucial problem which has weakened the trust the local people have towards development facilitators who work in their communities. Information gathered through the questionnaire indicates that community members are unable to fully participate in community work because men by nature tend to use development funds for their personal gain like buying alcohol and other personal belongings. In the same manner, men also argued that the youth were too young and inexperienced to manage financial resources earmarked for development and as such could not entrust the youth to control development resources.

The limitations affecting the success of local participation by community members in Muchinga and Northern provinces and especially in rural development programmes go beyond what most people and government perceive to be. This is because every community has its own distinctive problems and needs and mostly ranging from tribal to cultural practices which in most cases differ from different communities.

7.2.10 Authority of Traditional Leaders and Power Relations

The institution of traditional authorities is one of the enduring inheritances of the pre-colonial era. Traditional institutions have not declined in the face of modern democratic developments. Although traditional authority structures appear at variance with modern democracy, they are tolerated, and in most cases also politically embraced and at times manipulated. This is because traditional authorities exercise significant power and influence in their jurisdiction and sometimes can challenge the authority of elected leaders. With little exception, Zambia like many African governments has tried to exclude traditional authorities and chiefs from participating in national politics.

However, even with the non-participation of chiefs in politics, the chieftaincy has continued to exist, and people have continued to recognise their traditional authorities. It is against this background that central governments have sought ways of bringing on board the authority of chiefs by recognising the influence traditional leaders over communities as custodians of development. During an interview with traditional leaders during the formulation of the National Chief Policy, the Royal Highnesses explained as follows:

Us as Chiefs in Zambia are hereby requesting the government to define our role in development of our country as well as in political affairs. As Royal Highnesses we want to be part of various development agendas particularly in the decentralisation process. We are submitting by expressing our views that, government should clearly indicate the role of Chiefs in the decentralisation implementation programme to enable us effectively to participate in development by participating together with our subjects (Royal Highnesses, August 2014).

From the information obtained from the study, it has been noted that the decentralisation policy has provided an opportunity to engage and integrate traditional leadership in the development and governance of the country. The traditional leaders have implored government not to ignore them, but to clearly state what roles Chiefs could play in the implementation of the decentralisation programme. However, according to the PF Manifesto,

chiefs are supposed to participate in the decentralisation programme through provincial and district Assemblies of chiefs. Further, chiefs are supposed to play a part in the administration of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) and the Farmer Input Support Programme (FISP). This is so because the understanding is that traditional leaders play an important role in uniting people for local development.

The position of chiefs and their elders on the other hand enable them to take advantage in exercising their powers and thus exhibit a degree of autocracy even intimidating or threatening their subjects when their authority is challenged thereby curtailing the promotion of democratic participation by community members at the local level.

The study findings in Muchinga and Northern provinces have shown that in some instances, local interest in participatory activities does diminish due to excessive use of power by the traditional leaders and elders the communities. Community members expressed dissatisfaction about their participation in community programmes where traditional leaders took dominant roles as follows:

We are afraid to openly speak our mind during the meetings. We are always scared to talk when the leaders and or chiefs have already decided. How do you challenge the decision of the chiefs? Our culture does not allow us to object the chief, even to question what the chief has said. In some cases, our parents are also rebuked if a child has no respect to traditional leaders. This is so because children come from various homes, and it is from these homes that children are supposed to be taught respect for elders and leaders. It is in fact scary and discouraging to contribute anything at the meeting during such gatherings (Community members, -28th May 2014).

The scenario above was found to hinder the nature of participation and inclusion of local knowledge in development planning. Participants explained that community members who disagreed with leaders were in most cases segregated in community decision making, in this scenario, it was found that those who could not agree with decisions made by traditional leaders opted to remain quiet for fear to be rebuked by elders at the meeting. In that situation, and to avoid conflicts, most community members would rather prefer to stay quiet without expressing their opposing views during participatory meetings. This happens even when there are divisions on issues which have no bearing for community welfare.

7.3 Social Capital, Bridging and Bonding the Gap in Community Participation

Social capital is about networks, formal or informal, vertical and or horizontal, written or unwritten which are usually explained as commonly accepted norms, rules and sanctions. Aldridge, Halpern et al, (2002) identified the most common as being the distinction of structural and cognitive, and bonding and bridging- Bonding is horizontal, among equals within a community, whereas bridging is vertical between lower and higher echelons of the government structure.

Muchinga and Northern provinces are best known due to community links based on christianity and secular traditional activities, such as traditional games, piercing a fast-thrown moving object- semi hard round rhizome (tuber) root (Unyongwe) and musicals played during marriages (Vipikililo), annual festivities (Chikunka), traditional dance ceremonies (Mampenenga) mainly of the Lambya, Nyika, Tumbuka and Namwanga speaking people. These are mainly based on mutual support giving rise to solid bonds that bind the community together more than the adherence to superimposed laws and rules.

These practices still survive without workshops. According to informants in Muchinga, it was learnt that there have been attempts to use the best of these practices to better social practices and to promote community participation to improve the welfare of community members. Several informants felt that their cultural ethos which made them get united in all activities were being overridden and not given much attention due to modernity and erosion of culture and beliefs. In justifying the above, the participants explained as follows:

Our cultural practices have been destroyed, we used to come together and played traditional games and later discussed various assignments and activities which needed community unity such as paving roads and building markets. These cultural games in form of practices enabled us to identify areas which needed the community to come together and find solutions to problems. Traditional games and practices such as the tag of war, pulling each other with ropes were progressive games aimed at fostering socialisation and harmony. These social practices fostered positive attribute for social-economic development in communities (FGDs Nanyunyi, 8th June 2014).

7.4 The Missing Link for Participation

We have dealt with the concept of participation and decentralisation barriers in this chapter to gain an insight of the problem at hand. To be specific, although we have identified several

limitations, participation has recorded some successes in Muchinga and Northern communities. And despite several set-backs and limitations that continue to hamper the effectiveness of participatory practice, human beings by nature are development oriented, people make progress in life.

Despite the efforts being made by the government to address the limitations, the missing links in people's participation seem to have not been given the right platform and or has been neglected and not dealt with in recent development practices. Important issues such as, cultural practices, norms, tribal and societal ethics, among others, have remained solely predominant and persist in most Northern and Muchinga communities.

It is a matter of fact that some cultural practices either directly or indirectly prevent some individuals to participate in community programmes and participatory activities, yet in Muchinga and Northern provinces as it is elsewhere in development literature, it seems that there is a total neglect of important issues that affect community participatory decision-making for development. It is therefore useful to have explained in this study the development discourse that vividly show how such societal norms and cultural practices affect local people and their active participation in local development. Issues such as lack of transfer of power from development facilitators to local people, external influence on development policy formulation, control of development resources by development organisations, among others, still affect effective participatory practice.

It is important to note that community members are always aware of what is needed in their communities and can have their own way of handling whatever problems are in their localities. More importantly, people live together and exhibit some traces of harmoniously coordinated system. They eagerly conduct community gatherings and social activities together especially when it comes to attending funerals gathering and church services. The way community members live to make their livelihood pleasant is by increasing the level of cohesion which in most cases make it easier for them to solve and or address the problems that confront them.

Therefore, community problems require to be tackled with a local approach and with a community language that would be understood by them. Effective interventions in development become impossible if the local people hear voices from outside their cultural

norms which sound foreign, this become difficult for the local people to comprehend. In this context, government and development institutions should not take the driving sit and exert influence and power over the local people in the management of community development programmes, instead government and development organisations should create an enabling environment for local people to improve their own skills through participatory activities.

Government is obliged to encourage participatory practice to form the basis for communities to spearhead developmental programmes in their localities. This can motivate both the urban and the rural communities to contribute more effectively and in a sustainable manner to community driven developmental programmes. Only then would community members secure influential positions and be able to manage their own interventions more confidently and in an effective way.

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed impediments to community participation in general such as poor infrastructure, fragmented and uncoordinated structural mechanisms at the local level, inadequate community representation, the lower level of educational attainment by community members, gender and power relations, witchcraft practices especially in rural communities, financial mistrust, inadequate opportunity and time for participants, social barriers for women and power relations.

Therefore, the contextual understanding of barriers to participation is of primary importance to clarify impediments in the results of community participation at community level. The study findings have revealed that among others, the impediments to participation are various and context specific including norms and cultural practices. In that regard, barriers to community participation should, therefore, be given great attention in ensuring that they don't act as barriers to development.

For community members to participate effectively without any hindrance, there is need for government to address the limitations which hinder the local people to participate in community development activities. Participation barriers need tangible solutions to promote community involvement and improve the welfare of community members. It is imperative

that participants should not be influenced into participating in programmes which they don't understand.

The control over decision-making and sufficiently devolved resources must aim at upholding community engagement in development process. The ultimate end of community participation should be the consolidation of broad-based local plans for development. Therefore, an increase in advocacy for participatory achievements in community work, including citizen participation in setting priorities, financing, implementation and management of development programmes should be a priority and should be based on community needs.

Governments' decision-making process should apply tangible and practicable participatory principles in the context of decentralisation as a concept for community development because barriers and complexities of community participation are community problems and could be solved by the community members themselves. Some of the problems mentioned above are beyond government and development institutions requiring change of mind set by citizens.

CHAPTER EIGHT

MAIN OBSERVATIONS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 Introduction

The debate around community participation in relation to decentralisation are enthusiastic and widely recognised as basic operational principle of local development. Decentralisation reforms have been considered as the reaction to the shortcomings of top down development practices imposed by experts and policy architects. One of the advantages of decentralised community participation approach is that it is centered on the role of the local communities as primary actors that should be allowed and enabled to influence and share the responsibility and possibly the costs of the community development process affecting citizens.

The research findings have established that there are disappointing patterns of decentralised community development activities because of limited spaces and platforms for efficient community participation through decentralisation.

Therefore, the notion of ‘Participation’ as an act of being involved in something or assigning certain decisive roles to the users to share the decision-making responsibilities together has been found in this study to be very weak towards being inoperative.

The various inadequacies in the provision of social services such as education, health, agriculture and economic development in general have remained the greatest challenge to national development in Muchinga and Northern provinces of Zambia.

The findings have indicated that, the implementation of decentralisation reforms have several problems which contribute to the ineffectiveness and failure by citizens to participate in the development of their local areas. Community members are not very much aware of the intrinsic value of participation. And although some attention to transfer authority, responsibility and financial resources from the central government to lower government levels, the impact of decentralisation to promote community participation has not met its intended goals. The results on community participation for development has been interpreted against the background of state centralism making decentralisation to suffer a loss of legitimacy because it is unable to respond to the needs of citizens.

The involvement of community members and the local desire over the outcomes of the participatory development programmes have been found to be inoperative because of poorly coordinated decentralised programmes, coupled with lack of social capital, mistrust and poor tangible community work outcomes.

Although good theoretical reasons exist to expect improved community participation through decentralisation reform, the outcome in Muchinga and Northern provinces of Zambia is disappointing. In other words, despite decentralisation's vast scope of promoting community participation, the reform on decentralised participatory practices have been an illusion of imagination. It is not realistic to claim that the principle of transferring of functions and resources to lower levels has resulted in participatory local governance and local development because the impact of decentralisation on local development has not been fully realised.

The study has shown that there are various logistical and human resource problems in achieving local development in the two provinces. Currently, most of community participatory programmes in government sectors are planned at the center. And due to fragmentation of structural mechanisms at the local level and the non-recognition of the structural problems at the community level, the participatory development activities have suffered various implementation aspects yet, one way to address structural and economic problems faced by communities would be to make the planning system more local focused and oriented towards communal social demands by incorporating operative community committees and organisations in local development planning.

Most community development programmes have not effectively taken place at the local level but have remained on central government paperclips, while fewer local development programmes have survived through their own primitive improvised survival mechanisms. And probably even more for the survival dynamics of community members. It has been found in the study that government has not fully strengthened the local participatory initiatives partly because of the complexity the decentralisation reform has undergone since independence.

The Zambian scenario depicts a paradigm shift of a more technical approach emphasizing on participation by the local people but in real terms, the approach has been under played in several instances despite decentralisation programme objectives. This scenario has not in any way represented a true local participatory democracy for community development.

The top-down participatory approach has been found to be the dominant mechanism even when the sector programmes are intended to benefit the local people. Community members are not really consulted but are only involved just to legitimise the activities already planned for by the central government which also sets the rules for participation. The local people are merely given pre-defined roles just for the sake of legitimising government's development agenda. In doing so, community members understand that participation was taking place because they have 'participated in participation.

Considering the above, decentralisation in Zambia has led to the evolution of a participatory process that lacks legal continuity and institutional organisation, a process largely based on central planning and political publicity questioning as to whether the Zambian decentralisation reform represents a new version of re-centralisation or if it is based on enhancing central power within the hands of central government in the districts. In this context, political institutional legacies determine the performance of central government institutions because of strong feelings of political efficacy and highly centralised activities with less decentralised community participatory system.

The decentralisation reform and the implementation of the mechanisms that enable citizen to participate in community development clearly indicate that, although community members are usually willing to be part of the development process, the enabling environment for effective citizen engagement is not clear and predictable. The study has however acknowledged that, when political will exist, it is possible to extend public participation beyond its traditional levels.

The study results have shown that, the opportunities for the implementation of community programmes and projects are not the same everywhere in the two provinces. Some urban areas like Kasama and Chinsali, have more facilities and information for people to find out about the requirements for participation, while those in the remote areas do not. In this regard, much of decentralisation failure has been due to lack of associating the local people with decentralised activities. In the same context, the influence of political bias and polarisation indicate that citizens are not sufficiently informed about their purpose and functioning in community driven development projects and programmes. And that, the mechanisms for decentralisation and community participation are not very clear for the users which contribute to failure of community participation and decentralisation reform implementation.

Generally, the lack of information and the complexity of decentralisation reform programme, coupled with the huge cost of the reform process and the inadequacies to translate decentralisation and participatory implementation plan into concrete actions by government, is a major reason for decentralisation failure.

Although attempts have been made by the central government to devolve functions and resources to lower levels, the local governments system in Northern and Muchinga provinces seem to be ineffective because they depend mostly on central government for fiscal transfers. In addition, there are inoperative structural fragmentations at the local level which crumble and unable to motivate communities to initiate, plan, implement and accelerate decisions of their own choices.

8.2 Reflecting back and answering the study objectives

The general objective of the study was: *To investigate the nature and extent of community participation on decentralised activities in Muchinga and Northern Provinces of Zambia.*

The findings have presented a very negative view of the participatory community practices in the two provinces. We have established in this study that the participatory mechanisms in local development by communities have not yielded tangible results through decentralised interventions. Despite the negative aspects however, there are some significant observable advances particularly in relation to the establishment of sector committees as avenues for community participation. It is indeed imperative to note that, the creation of local structures has presented a miniature opportunity for community members to participate in the provision of social services. However, despite the creation of various local structures, there has been a retreat from the commitments to transfer fiscal, political and administrative power to local governments and local communities.

The above is opposed to decentralisation reform, a process of transferring of both finances and human resources from the centre to the local communities. Generally, the process of decentralisation and community participation in the two provinces have several contradictions with multiple grey areas of silence, making decentralisation initiatives cumbersome, slow and difficult to implement. There is lack of community development participatory clarity rendering

citizens to be passive. This scenario does not propel activities at the local level for community development.

The study has found that, under present circumstances, where community participation is promoted through the central government policy directives, it is difficult to establish whether this type of participation has met the objective and mechanisms which in principle should be that of enhancing community participation.

The implementation of decentralisation as a reform that enables communities to participate in the development of local areas, has shown that, when political will exists, it is possible to extend local participation in government sector programmes beyond their traditional levels. What the findings have shown in the study, however, is that political manipulation hinders local development and creates distortions in community participation.

The specific objective number one (1) was: *to examine the nature and extent of community participation in selected state sector institutions*. In exploring the above specific objective, the study found that community participation in state sector institutions is conducted through the established local structures in committees. Accordingly, the purpose of creating local level structures is mainly for building participatory actions. And drawing inferences from the Ladder of Citizen Participation Theory (see chapter three), for the most part, development facilitators such as government officials end up educating, persuading and advising citizens what to do. The central government employees and experts often engage the local people to perform some community works just for the sake of injecting government viewpoint of programme activities. In this way, citizens often perceive the process to be participatory despite the local people having no power or legitimate function in such programmes.

There are elements of manipulation of people in the community programmes and projects by professionals and policy holders. The grassroots at the bottom of (the ladder) communities, do not effectively participate and are in most cases manipulated by the elites and programme facilitators. Citizens have little information and are in most cases not consulted in community development programmes.

In most cases, decisions are communicated to community members only during meetings. Such meetings are only organised when policy makers as facilitators need cheap labour from the local people or when development facilitators need local resources which community members can provide. In this case, meetings are called to inform citizens about labour contribution needed in the programme implementation. To crown it all, in most cases the established local structures function as letterheads during the meetings. Government officials and the elites are the ones who educate, persuade, and advise citizens what to do. Experts legitimise the manipulative agenda by emphasizing the terms of the programmes. The central government employees utilise the local people to get involved just as a way of injecting government viewpoint on policy and programme activities by using terms such as ‘informing’ ‘gathering’ ‘community meeting’ as strategies to further persuade citizens in thinking that participation was present.

The specific objectives number two (2) was: *to investigate the nature and extent of community participatory mechanisms in the established local governance structures.*

Although community members show the desire to participate in community activities at the local level through the established local governance structures, the lack of practical approach in the adoption of the local governance structure for participation has not yielded the much-desired results at community level. Citizens have little participatory authority to venture and strengthen the decentralisation at the local level. The local people have not engaged themselves effectively with local government officials for community service provision at the local level. There is weak voice by community members in the execution of programmes and to ensure that development programmes go not only where they are needed, but to areas where the local population need them most.

The local governance structures such as the District Development Coordinating Committees (DDCCs), the Ward Development Committees (WDCs) have no clear purpose to provide direction to its members and communities in respect to community and district development activities. In addition, the inadequate strategic development planning by local authorities have shown serious shortage of resources for project facilitation despite being responsible for coordinating development activities at the district level. And as a result, the local governance structures have limited capacity to mobilise resources or to assist communities in resource mobilisation.

The local authorities lack the capacity and commitment to raise funds coupled with inadequate partnership between the established local governance structures and donors. This scenario entails that the local established governance structures lack the capacity for innovation and thus perform their roles in a routine manner without making efforts for innovations in their operations to match with the demand in terms of the needs of communities.

The specific objectives number three (3) was: *to investigate the extent of community participation in the design and implementation of community projects.*

Even though community members are keen to participate in various community projects, there is little support for enhanced community project participation and sustainability. There is little local expertise to influence participation in community driven projects due to complexities associated with project implementation. This entails that community members have little control and influence in project activities.

The grassroots are deemed to possess very little policy-relevant knowledge that can influence or shape decisions for real participation. Only those at the top have authentic and supportive responses considered more knowledgeable than the rural poor who accordingly align themselves passively and remain uninterested. Even in the situation where some local people are involved in initial resource mobilisation process, the elites and leaders ultimately find a way to control the process. Elite capture comes in mainly as a way of getting access to economic incentives accrued from the programme activities. The economic value of certain programmes and projects attract participation by the elites in community activities. Usually, most of the local people are not motivated in mobilising resources for community development because they are unaware of the underlying logics and long-term development goals of the programmes and projects.

The other striking factor is that community resource and project control are in most cases in the hands of the facilitators, only few are linked with the existing local leadership structure thereby shuttering the interests of other community members in development process. We have already indicated in this study that group meetings show effective sign and a forum for information flow as well as a medium of education for community members. The danger of these meetings, however, is the rubber-stamping in decision-making process which undermines the value of opinion and a sense of right and wrong open discussions by the local people. In

that regard, community project participatory activities are not well broadened to cover a wider community aspiration.

The specific objectives number four (4) was: *to investigate the impediments to full community participation.*

One important aspect to concede is that Zambia is a unitary state. In a unitary state, the sovereignty of power and resources are not equally shared between the center and the peripheral. This means that it is not practicable to assume that the state can fully devolve power and resources to the local level administration. In this context, we are compelled to finally indicate in this study that currently, Zambia will adopt decentralisation within centralism in the pursuit of community participation for development.

Considering the above, the study results suggest that participation should be inclusive enough to involve everyone irrespective of gender, sex or rank. And it should not be limited to a few influential groups or individuals who are placed in better positions in society. It is imperative that community members are aware of benefits and values for participation. Specific roles should be made clearly to community members because effective participation is not attainable without addressing among others the local structures and the concept of power. It is thus cardinal to allow community members to manage their own development by putting them at the mainstream of development programmes. This is the basis of attaining a coordinated and sustained decentralised programmes and project infrastructure. In the same context, it is important to build trust between development facilitators and the local people.

Development can not take place when there is mistrust. Therefore, addressing the issue of trust to enable community members be accountable to one another and to win support and uplift the morale among community members involved in participatory community development programmes is a cornerstone to decentralised participation for development.

Of the above-mentioned obstacles and among others, the study findings have shown that beside time which is a clear limiting factor, the duties of women as mothers, carers of young children, the sick, the elderly, the disabled and as home managers to be barriers for women to fully get involved in community participatory programmes.

Chiefs and traditional elders enjoy a lot of respect and power, and as such, the arbitrary misuse of power by Chiefs and the elders sometimes hinder effective participation by members in communities. Chiefs and community leaders dictate to their subjects what to do. If Chiefs apply their authorities and impose community programming on the local people, they are bound to stay quiet but reluctant to fully participate in such activities.

The study found that there is very little scope, mechanisms and structure through which traditional leaders can coerce their subjects to mandatory participate in community development in partnership with government in various community programmes and projects for local development. Equally, there is an absence of a legislative requirement to compel community members to effectively participate in public service delivery.

It is thus important that a comprehensive approach is put in place to compel communities to become motivated and participate in local development activities and reduce the dependence of community members to government for service provision. It is also imperative to recognise the limitations of the findings of the study as well as identify and thwart the forces working against meaningful community participation in development efforts. In this context, the political landscape on the matter is necessary as resource providers because the mechanisms of decentralisation have not been implemented by a way of recognising citizens as custodian of local development. Local participation and democracy can be better served if a link exists between community members and central government.

In practical terms, there should be a shift of government to community governance in the formulation of decentralised community programme functions. There is need to acknowledge that complex problems need holistic responses, an approach which implies a partnership between government and community members working together to solve various problems encountered in community development process. Decentralisation cannot be attained if champions of decentralisation do not characterise community governance as ‘partnership’ and as a positive take on for both community and government in development.

A more critical perspective is that government should portray the use of communities as instruments and champions of their own development activities. This calls for government to realise the core values of community development by acting as a liberating force for the citizens especially the poor in society.

Muchinga and Northern provinces of Zambia have shown that while the reform has somehow broadened the ability of community members to be engaged in community development, it is difficult however to quantify service delivery improvements. Primarily, the move is understood by citizens mainly for political reasons because the expected benefits of decentralisation for economic development have not been fully realised. And although the difficult aspect of researching in this area means that it is hard to draw a definite conclusion on the matter, we make suggestions that there is no pure decentralisation because of lack of consensus on what constitute decentralisation in totality.

Whilst this study does not refute claims that decentralisation can improve community participation for development, the concept of community participation in Muchinga and Northern provinces has not met its purpose for decentralisation to have proper meaning on participation. Therefore, a comprehensive rethinking of participatory decentralised community development policy in this area is needed because the successful implementation of decentralisation and effective community participation depend to a large extent, the degree to which the top political leaders are committed to the programme and the willingness of the citizenry to support the decentralised activities. Muchinga and Northern provinces of Zambia have shown little remarkable success on decentralisation which requires more than simply declaring a Policy of participatory community development, but a reorganisation of administrative operational structures at district level.

One important aspect to note is that decentralisation and community participation should not be implemented against the backdrop of centralism. If decentralisation entails citizen participation, then the scope for community participation in Northern and Muchinga provinces of Zambia for improved service delivery since independence seems to be a figment of imagination. There is an urgent need to move away from literature which centres on the intrinsic value of decentralisation as merely a desire to devolve resources and function as a goal. The developmental significance of decentralisation should not rest mainly on a series of assumptions and theoretical justifications but translating decentralisation plans into concrete community participatory actions and a mind set change that sees citizens as critical element of the development process.

Citizens should be aware that decentralisation and participation are not only governance concepts but a way of community life for social and economic development. And to attain

meaningful levels of decentralisation for community participation, the following should be seriously considered:

Enhancement of social participation and equity: Inequality and social exclusion are related to poor social service provision outcomes. Community groups differ in the amount of resources, power, voice and opportunities for advancement. Decentralisation outcome should aim at empowering those with less power by providing resources for development to needy areas thereby giving voice to Citizens in various communities.

Partnership building and consolidation: Decentralisation and community participation for development is about partnership which should involve relationships between sectors, between community groups and between government and communities. It is important that each party brings skills, resources and strengths.

Supporting sustainability: Decentralisation and community development should aim at bringing about long-term change in communities. It is also about building morale in communities that are underprivileged. It is thus important to ensure that programmes and projects have enough momentum, steadfast and sustainable to bring about social change. Raising community expectations require communities to be involved in programmes and broadening their skills to ensure that programmes being undertaken are not entirely reliant on only few key people or champions but to the general populace.

Sector integrations: Nurturing community development is a long-term process requiring actions by all sectors and stakeholders. There is need to integrate social, cultural and economic development. The champions of decentralisation should work closely and in partnership with communities to ensure that community development programmes are not run on a piecemeal basis. Cross-sector approach and networking, embracing best practice and evaluation should always be undertaken on an integrated manner. A coordinated approach is important because it encourages best practice to be shared across sectors, resources used strategically with results fed into the design of community development activities.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

Questionnaire for end users / community residents

PERSONAL DATA

Section one

Please tick or fill in the blank to give appropriate response.

A: Background Information

1. Sex
(a) Male
(b) Female
2. Age..... years
3. Marital Status

(a) Single
(b) Married

Section two

4. How long have you been living in this area?
5. Are you familiar with decentralization?

(a) Yes (go to question 7 below)
(b) No (Please answer question 6 below)
6. If the answer is NO to question 5 above, why are you not familiar with Decentralisation?
7. And if the answer is YES to Question 5 why do you think Decentralisation is important?
8. Are there any development programmes or projects in your area?
(a) Yes (go to question 10 below)
(b) No (please answer question 9 below)
9. If yes to Question 8, which projects?

10. Do you participate in the implementation and proposing of new projects with any ministry?
 - (a) Yes
 - (b) No
11. Do you know and understand the term “community participation”?
 - (a) Yes
 - (b) No
12. Do you participate in various community development projects?
 - (a) Yes (please answer question 13 below)
 - (b) No (please go to question 14 below)
13. If Yes to Question 12 above, which ones?
14. Which Ministry do you participate with in the development of your area?
15. Give reasons why you think community participation is important.
16. What different types of participation for development are people in your area involved in?
17. What different types of participation for development do you think people in your area have not been involved in?
18. Are you satisfied with the way projects are initiated in your area?
 - a. Yes (please go to question 20 below)
 - b. No (please answer question 19 below)
19. If No to Question 17 why are you not satisfied in terms of community participation?
20. Please tick the committees which you are familiar with
 - a. Zone Development Committee
 - b. Ward Development Committee
 - c. Area Development Committee
21. Which committee above in Question 20 do you work with in the Development of your area?

- 22 What are the roles of each of the committees below
 - a. Zone Development Committee
 - b. Ward Development Committee
 - c. Area Development Committee/Village Development Committee
- 23 Would you say that local people in your area participate willingly in the development of your area with other government ministries?
- 24 If yes to question 23 above, what major programs or project have come up because of community and government working together?
- 25 What factors hinder or prohibit community participation?
- 26 Do you participate in budgeting, resource mobilisation, allocation and planning?
- 27 If yes to the question above, how?

APPENDIX 2

Questionnaire for employees in selected line ministries:

- Ministry of Community Development and Social Welfare
- Ministry of General Education
- Ministry of Health
- Ministry of Agriculture.
- Ministry of Local Government and Housing

Section one

- 1 Sex.....
- 2 Age.....
- 3 Highest level of education.....

Section two

- 4 Do you understand the term Decentralization?
- 5 Do you understand what it means by community participation?
- 6 What is a community?

- 7 Are you familiar with any community project being undertaken within the jurisdiction of the Ministry?
- 8 Does your ministry get involved in the project implementation with community members?
- 9 What other major developmental programmes is the ministry working with the community?
- 10 Are there enough resources to enable these communities work effectively and accomplish their programs/projects?
- 11 Are these programs spearheaded within the notion of decentralisation?
- 12 How are decentralised activities inclusive to the people in the community?

APPENDIX 3

Questionnaire for Council employees

Section one

- 1 Sex.....
- 2 Age.....years
- 3 Position in the council.....
- 4 Are you familiar with decentralization?

Section two

- 5 What does decentralisation mean to you?
- 6 Has the decentralisation policy been fully acquainted to by the local authority?
- 7 What decentralised functions have been adopted by the council?
- 8 Do the council work with other line ministries in the decentralised system?
- 9 How does the council involve the citizens in decentralised developmental programs?
- 10 Which measures have been put in place to enable citizens participate in their developmental programmes through decentralisation?
- 11 How have the citizens participated in local development?
- 12 Would you say that local residents value decentralisation and community participation?
- 13 Would you say that central government is committed to enhance decentralisation by devolving functions to local authority?
- 14 What are the major challenges facing both the communities and the council as far as community participation and decentralisation are concerned?

APPENDIX 4

Guiding research instrument for data collection from key respondents

Management officials from selected line Ministries (Ministry of Local Government and Housing, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Community Development and Social welfare, Ministry of General Education and the Ministry of Health)

1. Effectiveness of devolved functions in decentralised activities and perceptions regarding participation by residents.
2. Extent and nature of resources in the implementation of decentralisation in line with Decentralization Implementation Plan (DIP) with communities.
3. Impact and effectiveness of Local Structures like ZAC, ADCs, DDCCs on district development programmes and community participation.
4. Impact and Interface with Residents Development Committees
5. Working relations with local authorities vis-à-vis decentralisation programme
6. Nature and extent of community participation and constraint factors in participation.
7. Perceptions with regards to policy framework for the ministry, structure suitability for DIP.
8. Policy matters in relation to the administration of decentralisation programme and inclusion of local people.
9. Problems faced by the ministries with regards to decentralisation
10. Ministerial advice concerning the programme

Focused group discussions with members of Resident Development Committees (RDCs), community members and officials from line Ministries

1. Role played by each in the groups
2. Perception about performance of individual ministry in the affairs of the communities vis-à-vis participation and decentralisation
3. General problems faced by communities in development efforts and the meaning of decentralisation at glance
4. Perception about the performance of local authorities via people inclusivity and participation
5. Issues on resource mobilization, allocation and planning

Representatives of selected NGOs and Faith Based Organisations (World Vision, Plan International, Church Groups etc)

1. Extent and nature of the organisation's participation in the activities of area development
2. Objectives of the organizations and the relationships with government and societies
3. Perceptions regarding decentralization, community solidarity, trust and inclusion
4. Major contributions towards governance and development
5. Operational framework and community participation

Selected officials from Community Based Organisations and Business houses

1. General objective of the CBOs and or Business entity
2. Perception regarding the community and support about government programme on decentralization
3. General perception on perceived constraints on people participation and decentralization as a cornerstone for development
4. The conduciveness of political, social and economic operationalisation as an anchor for community participation and social responsibility for development
5. Areas of involvement in community support tailored towards decentralization and development.

Cheifs and other local traditional rulers

1. Their perceived roles in community development vis-à-vis decentralization
2. Perception about the performance of government ministries within the context of decentralisation
3. Their perception about the performance of local authorities on service delivery and community participation in general
4. General problems faced by subjects in spearheading community participation and development
5. Perception on culture and group solidarity. Does culture encourage unity in diversity and development?

Councillors

1. Their roles in development inter alia in the triangulation of local authority, line ministries and community participation
2. Bases of their authority, operational framework, community and decentralisation
3. Their perceived constraints in influencing participative quality of decentralized activities
4. Their perception towards beauracrats as agents of government in spearheading development in the region.
5. Issues of trust, between councilors and government planners/policy makers vis-à-vis community involvement in programmes and projects aimed at development.

APPENDIX 5

Participants on structured and semi-structured questionnaires

1. Decentralisation Secretariat = 10 respondents from management (qualitative data)
2. Ministry of Local Government and Housing = 5 respondents comprising, HRA

- director, Assistant director, LGA director and two any senior staff (qualitative data)
3. Public Service Management Division = 5 respondents comprising senior management staff (qualitative data)
 4. Key government line Ministries (Education, Health, Community Development, Agriculture) = 20 respondents, five from each Ministry Comprising of the Permanent Secretaries, Directors, Assistant directors, Planners, Human Resource Officers and 15 randomly selected staff. (quantitative data)
 5. Traditional Leaders = 6 respondents (qualitative data)
 6. NGOs = 20 respondents/ general staff members (qualitative and quantitative data)
 7. Council appointed officials = 40 respondents, 10 from each of the four councils (Qualitative and quantitative data)
 8. Community Based organisations = 20 respondents (quantitative data)
 9. Faith Based organizations = 40 respondents from various denominations (quantitative and qualitative data)
 10. Councillors = 20 respondents, 5 from each district (qualitative and quantitative data).

APPENDIX 6

Checklist for Council Agenda Meeting Minutes

1. Are the minutes of the lower levels incorporated?
2. If submitted is this for information or for (formal) ratification?
3. Do items from lower levels appear on the agenda for action?
4. How often does this happen?
5. On such occasions, are recommendations accepted or rejected?
6. Are items being remitted downwards?
7. If so, is this for: information, action, advice or consultation?
- 8.. Who is present at each meeting?

APPENDIX 7

Map showing study areas

