Infrastructure sharing by mobile operators in Zambia: A game theoretical approach

The problem of infrastructure sharing among competing agents, each hoping to maximize its utility, is a daunting task for regulators and policy makers at large. This study used a game theoretical analysis of how a Network infrastructure as a Service (NaaS) company can optimize its utilities or payoff given strategic moves of other users. It set out some of the key themes, under factors of willingness to pay regulatory factor and price, with infrastructure investment by network operators and thereafter conclude with benefits it would bring to the service providers, (provision of network as a service) subscribers and the regulators. Utility-based decision rules are defined for competing mobile providers under varying regulatory, price and willingness to pay requirements. An adapted model of utility was used under information asymmetry and information symmetry game environment.
Simulation analysis was done to determine the effects of such factors on infrastructure investment. This study used the adapted model for infrastructure sharing and we present the following results:
The simulations results showed that the willingness to pay factor has positive contribution to the provider of Network as a Service (NaaS). Additionally, an increased investment in infrastructure coupled with positive response in willingness to pay from users, increases the NaaS’s utility. It was further deduced that investment in infrastructure alone when other factors are constant reaches an optimal point or maximum point at which it starts to reduce negatively.
In conclusion, willingness to pay, price and regulatory factor plays an important role on whether the provider of NaaS should invest in the provision of network infrastructure as a service to the country.